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SOCIO-CULTURAL REFORM MOVEMENT IN CENTRAL ASIA

Phool Badan

Abstract

The study of socio-cultural reform movement in the form of Jadid movement in Central Asia throws light upon the history of the national progressive socio-cultural movement in the region during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. This cultural movement is known as Jadid movement. The word Jadid has been taken from the Arabic language, which means progressive/ modern or new method. The history of Jadid movement and its evolution from socio-cultural enlightenment to a powerful political movement would also be highlighted in this study.

Keywords

Progressive Movement, Jadidism, Socio Cultural, Central Asia, Reform Movement, Literary Legacy, Traditional Intellectuals, Jadidist.

First of all, it is essential to throw light on the socio-cultural and political situation in Central Asia during the 19th century which prepared the ground for reform movement in the region. If we look at these conditions, we find that prior to Russian conquest, the culture and political life of the people of Central Asia did not differ greatly from the settled and nomadic population in other parts of the Muslim world[1]. At that time, Central Asia was divided into three native *Khanates* of Kokand, Khiva and *Emirate* of Bukhara. These *Khanates* and *Emirate* were backward feudatories which were ruled by *Khans* and *Emirs*, and Islam was the main source of political legitimization. The system of administration, land tenure and the taxation was based on the Perso-Arab administration of Transoxiania. The system of justice was based on the Islamic laws *(Shariah)* and the customary laws *(Adat)*. In practice, the dynastic rulers of the *Khanates* and their subordinate officials did not generally follow the accepted principles and the legal norms. The rule of the native *Khans* and *Emirs* was cruel and exploitative. The *beiys,* the wealthy landlords and subordinate feudal officials used to exploit the poor people of the region. Poverty was the rampant, disease and illiteracy widely prevailed.

The Russian Army moved towards south in 1839. But, this move was half hearted. In reality, it began after 1857 world economic crisis.

Russia fought the Crimean war (1853-56) with the European powers. Russia was badly defeated. Due to defeat, Russia lost its national glory and prestige. In the aftermath of this, Russia made an attempt to get back its lost glory as well as to raise its prestige at the international level. As a result, Russia showed serious interest to move towards south[2]. The Russian army captured Tashkent on June 15, 1865. The Russian conquest of the Central Asian region was completed with the capture of Merv in January 1884 Kushka and in March 1885. The Russian advance in Central Asia, which began in 1839, in the course of less than half a century resulted in the reduction of the E*mirate* of Bukhara and the *Khante* of Khiva to vassal status and the total annexation of the territories of the Kokand *Khanate* into the Russian Empire. The Russian army did not face any serious resistance because the native rulers were disunited and were fighting against each other. The Tsarist army did not face any serious challenge during the conquest of Central Asia. In the aftermath of the annexation of the region into the Russian Empire, the Tsarist administration started colonization of Central Asia. The Central Asian response to Russian colonialism followed two distinct patterns. The first was rebellion under the clerical leadership which played significant role in the various rebellions, including 1916 uprising. The second pattern was reform movement which adopted the liberal ideas[3]. During the period of conquest, there was political and ideological unrest in the region. Conservative circles were facing severe criticism for the first time. This was not the case only in Central Asia. Similar social, psychological and political upheavals were prevalent in all the Muslim societies of the time. They were looking for ways and means of liberating their people and lands from the colonial rulers. Religious intellectuals and political elites in these societies were formulating new ideologies and methods in order to end exploitation[4].

The educational system in Central Asia during the late 19th century, was associated with religion and largely based upon the scholastic pattern. The existing system of Islamic education consisted of the *Maktabs* or primary schools which were attached with mosques, and the *Madrasahs* or seminaries for training of clergy and religious teachers. Thus, higher education was provided by the *Madrasahs* to the Muslim clergies and specialists in Islamic law. Independent thinking was not encouraged. The teachers were recruited from among the clergy and some of them could only read but could not write. The pupils repeated aloud after

the teacher and no attempt was made to understand what they were studying, with the result that pupils learning in the *Maktabs* even after a period of five or six years was often unable to read. The *Jadidists* were of the view that the Muslim society of the Russian Empire in general and Central Asia in particular was backward in comparison to the Western countries and was in desperate need of reform to catch the standard of the advanced people of the world. The *Jadidists* were of the view that Muslim society was in a crisis. According to them, the departure from the true path of Islam was the main cause of this crisis. The *Jadid's* plan was to introduce some secular instructions in the curricula and at the same time to preserve their religious character. Thus, it can be said it was an Islamic reform movement which fundamental objective was to revive Islamic culture in the region.

Jadidism, a movement of enlightenment in Islam, appeared in Central Asia in the late 19th century as a critique of traditional Muslim education and advocated the need of reform movement in the native society. In the region the esteemed representatives of the *Jadidists* movement were Makhmud-Khodja Bekhbudi, Ubaidullah Assadullahodjaev, Munawwar Kary Abdurashidanov, Abdullah Awlani, Abdulqadir Sakuri, Ajzi, Khodja Muin, Tashpulatbek Norbutaev, Nasyrkhantura Komolkhonturaev, Obidzhon Mahmudov, Ishankhodja Khanhodjayev, Faizullah Khodjayev, Abdurrashid Khan Oghli, , Ishaq Khan Tora Junaydullah Oghli, Ashurali Zahiri, Hamza Himmatzada Niyazi, Abidjan Mahumdov, Mir Zahid Mir Aqil Oghli, Said Nasir Mir Jalilov, Sayyid Ahmed Wasli, Tawalla, Kami, Khislar, Siddqi, Abdullah Qadiri, Abdulqadir Sayyah, Abdunnasir Kursavi, Shihabuddin Marjani, Ahmad Makhdum Danish, Sadriddin Ayni, Said Karim Bay, Said Ahmad, Mirza Hakim Sarimsaqov, Abdulhamid Sulayman Oghli, Mirmuhsin Shermuammadov Ubaydullah Khojzev, Abdurauf Fitrat, Mukhitdin Mansurov, abdulvahid Burhanov, Musa Saidzhanov, Mukhtar saidzhanov, Usamon Khodkayev, Muhammad Rasul Mirzo, Bekzhon Rakhimov, Matyakub Pozachi, Bobookhun Salimov, Palvanniyaz Khodja YusupovAvaz Utar, Khussain Matmurodov, Nzar Sholikorov and others. All of these reformist leaders made immense contribution to enlighten the masses and also helped to the development of emancipating ideas.[5]

The fundamental beliefs in *Jadidism* were civilization and progress. As a result, *Jadidism* propagated highly enlightenment philosophy of

history and historical change. The *Jadidists* assimilated these ideas into their understanding of Islam to produce a modern analysis of Islam, in which the achievement of civilization came to be seen as the religious commitment of all Muslims. The *Jadidists* argued that only a modern person equipped with knowledge, in accordance with the need of the time, could be a high-quality Muslim[6]. As far as the Tsarist Government is concerned, it had little intention of educating the people of Central Asia. As a result, until the last decade of the nineteenth century no significant effort was made to change the old system of education and modernize it. With the change of Tsarist imperial policy towards local religion and religious institutions, the Russian Government did not interfere in any way with *Maktabs*. At the beginning of the twentieth century the Russian Government began to take interest in the *Madrasahs* and established Russian type schools. These schools were of three types: *(i)* for the training of interpreters; *(ii)* schools for the education of Russian settlers and families of officials in which a limited number of places were reserved for native children.; and *(iii)* the so-called Russo-native schools whose object was to acquaint Muslim children with Russian culture through the medium of their own language. The new schools helped a small section of native society. The Russo-native schools were not a success, but they stimulated the creation of so-called new method schools by *Jadidists*[7].

With the change in the structure of the native society, the traditional pattern of life also began to alter. Thus, towards the close of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries, a new born native intelligentsia had started emerging and gathered strength and influence. Though small in numerical strength they influenced the native population. The native intelligentsia was divided into three groups. These were:

Intellectuals: The intellectual on whom the impact of the Russian culture was great and worked for better relation between the Russians and native people. They were scholars and writers. They interpreted the Russian cultural and literary legacies through their writings. They favoured the opening of Russo-native schools in Central Asia and made attempts to popularize them. Their role in bringing about the cultural awakening among their own people was of considerable, despite their not having great following among the natives.

Traditional Intellectuals: The second group of Central Asian people was traditional intellectuals, known as *qadimists*. They were

the bitter critic of the *Jadid* movement. The majority of q*adimists* (Ulema) was ultra-conservative and did not provide much spiritual or intellectual leadership in the region. If contemporary accounts are to be believed, they were venal, ignorant and dominated by superstitions. The emergence and growth of the new ideology had impacted significantly the conservative and traditional elites of the region who were against any kind of reforms in the Central Asian society and culture. The traditional, conservative Islamic leadership was opposing *Jadidists* reform movement because their own power was threatened as *Jadidists*' following grew and influence expanded. The traditional conservative Islamic leaders were apprehensive that educational reform in the region would wear down their base, as the number of students in the traditional maktabs and madrassahs were decreasing and scriptures were easily available to more Muslims[8]. These traditional conservative people were against the reform in the region. They stood up to defend and preserve Islamic orthodoxy and the unity of the *Islamiat*, and to oppose the Western education which was based on Russian pattern. They also opposed all the reforms which sought to modernize the native society on Russian lines. *Qadimists* not only opposed any change in education system, but also according of equal rights to women and non-Muslim minorities. They regarded any socio-cultural changes as un-Islamic. They found the new method school threatening to their cultural and political dominance and called them *haram*. They were of the opinion that their children would turn into infidels. They controlled all educational, religious and cultural institutions. Their supporters came from among the Muslim clergy, landlords, wealthy merchants and also the peasant of the vast hinterland[9].

Jadidist: Another intellectual group of native society, namely the *Jadidsts*, was under the Tatar cultural influence. These progressive/ modern people were in favour of the reform, especially in the field of education. So far as the genesis of the *Jadid* movement is concerned, it can be traced, with introduction of the Phonetics known as *'Usul-I Jadid'*, meaning new method of teaching, reading and writing instead of understanding the subject in Muslim religious school system of *Maktabs* and *Madrasahs*. Young Central Asian intellectuals, who had good religious knowledge, started advocating the reformation of dogmatic understanding of religion. Reform, according to them, was revival of Islam that the prophet and his followers had practiced, an

Islam, which was different from religious dogmas that were prevailing in the 18th -19th centuries. These arguments of the reformists angered traditionalists (*qadimists*) who were in favour of maintaining status quo. First Muslim reformists such as Jamalluddin Afghani, Muhaamad Abduh, Rashid Rida and Dr. Muhammad Iqbal were advocating that the "gate of *ijtihad* (exercise of independent judgment) is open for renovation which helps the Muslim people to solve the problems of the community" [10].

Initially, a group of native intelligentsia, the *Jadidists,* started their reform movement first in the field of education and proposed a radical reorganization of the old educational system. In other words it can be said that the fundamental object of this movement was to modernize the Central Asian society under the Tatar cultural influence. It was a kind of social and cultural reform movement led by native progressive intellectuals of the region. The *Jadidists* were critics of religious fanaticism. They stood for fighting religious fanaticism of the masses by spreading new secular literature and developing European type of schools. They also started talking about the requirement of substitution of obsolete Muslim schools and seminaries with new method schools. *Jadidists* supported the development of science and culture, advocated the publishing of newspapers in the native language, the opening of cultural and educational institutions, which helped in the consolidation of democratic forces of the native society. The main aim of this movement was to reform the traditional Muslaim religious educational system of Turkistan. They introduced arithmetic, algebra, geography and science subjects in the new method school. They attempted to change traditional *Maktabs* and *Madrasahs* by introducing a new method of study. However, the movement ended in failure. The *Jadidists* also began compiling new alphabets and special text-books for the new method of study. Following this, the followers of the movement started opening "new method schools in many of the cities of Central Asian region"[11].

The first Jadid School was opened in Andijan in 1889 and during the subsequent decade spread to all major cities of the region. The first alphabet in Uzbek language based on phonetic method was published in the year of 1900[12]. Between 1898 and 1908, the *Jadidists* were running 102 new method elementary schools and two new method junior high school in the Turkistan General Governorship of Tsarist Russia, Six

new method schools in the Emirates of Bukhara, and six new method elementary schools in the Khanates of Khiva. In order to support the new method schools, the Bukharan reformist intellectuals and businessmen founded a company, *Shirkat-I Bukhara-I Sharif* (company of noble Bukhara), in March 1909, which was presented as a trading company but in reality was a political organizations in disguise[13]. This company secretly provided textbooks and other materials to the new method schools of the region.[14]**.** The *Jadid* educators and intellectuals were facing severe difficulties and ill-treatment in their drive to expand modern education in their new method schools.

Russia's initial response to the new method schools was rather positive, and the Russian colonial administration in Central Asia encouraged the *Jadidists* reform movement. In the process the Russian authorities realized that *Jadidism* was developing itself from a purely educational reform movement to a regional movement for social and political transformation in the native society. Consequently, the Tsarist colonial administration withdrew its support and joined hands with feudal rulers of the region to oppose the reforms[15]. The authorities supported the conservative Muslim clergy against the reformist Muslim intellectuals. Even a small number of new method schools frightened the clergy in Bukhara and Russian officials of Turkistan as well. The establishment's fury was so immense that the Russian authorities closed down 50 new method schools in Turkistan during the academic year 1910-11. During the academic session of 1913-14, the *Emir* of Bukhara closed all the new method schools known in the *Emirate*[16]**.** Due to such type of attitudes of the Tsarist Government, these new method schools were reduced to 57 in 1913, of which 12 were situated in Tashkent city, 17 in Semi-rechie Oblost, 12 in Kokand region, and others in Peovsk, Samarkand city, Bukhara city, Andijan, and in Turkistan city. In other words it can be said that the foundation of secularization of education had been firmly laid by the *Jadidists*. So far as the process of modernization is concerned, it was a great land mark in the history of Central Asia. They glorified the virtues of Islam and also sought to absorb some traits of modernity [17].

Despite the pressures from the imperial authorities, interest in native intellectuals for new method schools remained strong. One of the leading reformists of Bukharan *Emirate*, Osman Khodja, met with Ismail Bay Gasprinski in 1909, on his way to Istanbul. After studying

essential methodology of the new method schools, he went to Istanbul where he studied the modern Ottoman school system. During his stay in the Istanbul, Osman Khodja and Abdurrauf Fitrat founded the Charity Society of Bukhara for the spread of education on October 26, 1909. The basic aim of the society was to bring student from the Central Asian region to continue their education in Istanbul.

The *Jadid* movement did not remain confined for long to mere educational and cultural activities. *Jadidism* gradually began to transform itself into a political movement. They advocated the relaxation of censorship and the development of free native press, lowering of taxes and regularization of the tax structure. In Khiva and Bukhara, they demanded the limitation of the autocratic powers of the *Khan* and the *Emir,* fixation of taxes and their proper management, granting of legal guarantees for the security of life and property. In 1909 the *Jadidists* laid the foundation of an organization, the objective of which was propagation of cultural and social reforms. In fact, it was a political organization. But as the Tsarist colonial administration did not permit the functioning of political organizations the *Jadidists* propagated their political programme under the guise of a cultural body [18]. However, the *Jadidists* remained loyal to the Russian empire and Tsar, but the colonial administration still considered them dangerous for their idea of pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism. Political organization like the Union of Muslims (*Ittifak*) was formed to counter *Jadidists* influence in the region[19].

The *Jadidist* movement developed in the region through education and press. In terms of press influence, the bilingual newspapers played the most significant role in the establishment and development of press during the late 19th and early 20th centuries in Central Asia. The *Jadidists* also began to publish newspapers, booklets and magazines. Apart from this, the intelligentsia of the region began to establish libraries, museums, clubs, scientific societies and other social, political and cultural institutions and theatre, which became powerful ideological weapon in the fight against the moral, economic and political backwardness of the region. They wanted to study the experience and progress of the other people of the world, especially the best practices of Muslim reformers of the Crimea, the Volga region, the Transcaucasia, Turkey, Iran and India, who had already become aware of the progressive social and political, spiritual and cultural life of Europe[20].

The *Jadid* movement in Central Asia was influenced by the reformist and revolutionary movements of Russia and the neighbouring Islamic countries in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The founding father, Ismail Bay Gasprinski, of the new method school in Crimea in 1884 and the publisher of the newspaper *Terjuman* which was published first in 1883 were significant and potent sources of ideas and inspiration for Central Asian *Jadidists.* The literature from Turkey, Egypt, Lebanon, India and Iran left deep impact on the *Jadid* movement in Central Asia. A number of books were imported to the region from India. The Persian poetry and newspapers in Persian language reached the region from India, Afghanistan and Egypt in spite of the strict sanctions imposed by the Russian imperial government on the import of the literature from out side[21].

The *Jadid* movement was formed to modernize the native society on the one hand and to oppose the Russian rule in Central Asia on the other. The low level of literacy rates in Central Asia caused the *Jadidists* to push for reform in the field of education. Thus, it can be said that the main objective behind the reorganization of the educational system and other cultural reforms of *Jadidists* were to awaken the national consciousness and the achievement of the national freedom. So far as the emancipation of women is concerned, the *Jadidists* were in favour of girl education. They were of the view that the women and minorities should be given equal rights as the native men. The genesis of the modern education and activism of Turkic Muslim women could be traced out from the second half of the 19th century with start of the modernization drive. The founding father of the *Jadid* movement in the Russian Empire, Ismail Gasprinski, started the first women's journal *Alem-i Nisvan* (Women's world) in 1906 and made his daughter, Shefika Khanim, its editor[22].

They were of the opinion that the emancipation of women in Central Asia could be achieved in three ways:

1) Through gradual reforms in the education of both male and female by introducing new method of teaching in reformist Jadid schools.
2) Through dissemination of reformist ideas among the Central Asian Muslims via independent newspaper and journals, and finally,
3) Through the establishment of democratic government in the region[23].

The *Jadidists* reform movement in Central Asia was divided into two groups: Turkistani and Bukharan *Jadids*. The main reason behind this

division was the independence (vassal status) of the Bukharan *Emirate* from the Russian Empire. Turkistan was totally under the control of the Russian Empire. During the early period of the reform movement in the region, the Central Asian *Jadidists* were functioning under the influence of reform ideas of Ismail Bey Gaspirnski who transmitted his views through the use of modern schools and newspapers. As a result, *Jadidists* managed to open schools in Central Asial[24]. The main aims of the movement were the creation of political and cultural awakening, the modernization of Islamic life and emancipation of women as well. Besides, they also wanted to unite all Turkish Muslim subjects of Russian Empire[25]**.** The ideology of reform can be found in the writings of *Jadidist* leaders of the region, which became the foundation stone of *Jadid* (renovation) movement.

In due course, Bukharan *Jadids* changed their methods as they were followers of the Tatar model. They decided to adopt a method of Young Turks who were working to bring the reform in the Ottoman society. As a result, they named themselves as "Young Bukharans" by drawing an analogy between the activities of the "Young Turks" and their own. The *Jadidists* were generally linked to the Young Turks, even though they rejected their vision of Pan-Turkism[26]. Abdulrauf Fitrat, Fayzulloh Khojaev, Usmon Khojaev, Sadriddin Ayni, and Abdullah Qodiriy were among the main leaders of the movement. The main difference between Young Turks and Young Bukharans was that the former were thoroughly secular and sought to reform the society by rejecting Islam, whereas the Bukharan reformists were religious, conservative, radical and moderate people. They wanted to purify the Islam rather than rejecting it. They professed their ideas about culture and identity, social change, religion and the state. The main goal of Young Bukharans was to find solution for the problems faced by the Muslim society, by tracing the genesis of those problems. Initially, they paid their attention to problems of Bukhara but latter expanded their thought to the wider Muslim society. According to Young Bukharans, the reason behind problems in Central Asia was deviation from the original Islamic thought and practices. This deviation led to the spiritual degeneration in Islamic societies[27]**.**

The Young Bukharans were feeling pride in their Islamic past. For example, Abdulrauf Fitrat's splendid writings on Bukhara reflected this tendency: O unhappy Bukhara, who has known such spirits as Abu Ali Sina al-Arabi (Avicenna), in these days of distress thou art

bereft of motion. Yet this is the same Bukhara that, in the past, through the prestige of its knowledge and its faith, won recognition for its exceptional dignity. He adds that if the same conditions persist Islam can disappear from Bukhara[28]. According to Bukharan *Jadids*, the Bukharan state of their time was corrupt, violent and exploitative. They accused the traditional clerics for it. They were of the view that these clerics and Ulemas were the responsible because they had replaced the religion of Prophet with their own interpretation. The motive was to serve their own interest. Their perception of Islam was an "ossified religion, immobile and hostile to all dynamism and all progress"[29]. They condemned those who blindly followed and obeyed the traditional clerics without questioning them. They dubbed these people as *taqlidchi* (imitator). Young Bukharans were of the opinion that this was the main cause behind Muslim backwardness which isolated them from the progressing modern world, especially the West. Dogmas of traditional clerics were seen in the education system, as well. Bukhara had been the cradle of science in the past. But, at the time of Young Bukharans the education system had almost collapsed. The curriculum of *madrasahs* did not contain any natural sciences. Education was based on learning by heart, not on reasoning[30].

Young Bukharans did not criticize the Muslim societies very bitterly. But, they believed that the native society was in a serious crisis, in which its survival was at stake[31]. After analyzing the problem, they suggested some solutions, certain "ways in which their country and the entire Islamic community could escape from this crisis and restore God's Kingdom on earth"[32]. The reformists were of the firm belief that everything was in need of change, with education at center stage. They said that enlightenment and modern education would save the society from all these problems[33]. The Bukharan *Jadidists* were of the opinion that, individually, every Muslim should be educated. Because without education progress of the society is not possible as individuals make the society. According to them, knowledge should be useful in both worldly and spiritual lives of individuals. Thus, knowledge should not be restricted to the material world. They advocated that new knowledge should be subjected to intellectual enquiry and should not be accepted blindly. Young Bukharans also argued that knowledge should be obtained from wherever it could be gained. They also refuted that Islam needed to learn from the West, either in terms of inspiration or imitation. They were of the view that the sequential importance of the West

actually came from Islam. In short, they argued that Muslims should take back their culture and civilization from the West[34]. The Bukharan reformist leaders were in favour of transformation of the governmental structure in totality. They accused that all the bureaucrats and wealthy *begs* (lords) were corrupt[35].

An organization namely, Gamiyati Tarbiye-i Atfal (Society for the Education of Children) was established in the end of December 1910. The fundamental objectives of the society were to found new method schools in the *Emirate,* to *provide* education to Children, to fight government abuses, and to wage agitation against the government. This group functioned like a conspitorial organization in order to escape government suppression. It was headed by active reformists like- Mirza Abd al-Vahidov, Usmon Khodjaev, Ahmad Makhdum and Hamid Khojaev Mihri. Soon after its creation, the society managed to unite all the reformist organizations of the *Emirate*. Abdulrauf Fitrat's organization Society for Disseminating Knowledge among the Masses was one of these organizations. The organization's main function was to finance the native students to going to study in Turkey[36]. Gamiyati Tarbiye-i Atfal's main objective was the dissemination of knowledge by the introduction of natural sciences in the new method school system. For practical reasons the society was functioning through two branches; *Maarifat* (Talent) and *Barakat* (Blessing). *Marifat* was headed by Fitrat and Usmon Khodjaev. Its function was to disseminate the essential quality of reform among the native population through the distribution of books and the establishment of social-cultural and political clubs. *Barakat's* job was to import necessary material for mass education and propaganda. In a short period of time the society proved itself to be one of the best-structured reformist organizations in the area. It was very difficult to become a member of the society. They had formulated very strict rules in this regard. The references of the members of the society were required to get membership[37].

The Young Bukharans adopted several methods in achieving the long term goals of the society. These were- (i). They opened new method schools in Bukhara. These schools achieved considerable successes during the period of 1910-14, while they were stringently pursued and attacked by the traditional clerics. (ii). They began to print newspapers, *Bukhoroi Sharif* (Noble Bukhara) to disseminate their ideology among the masses. (iii). They used the *Jadid* circles for the dissemination of reformist ideas in the region. Young Bukharan intellectuals were used

to gather in one of the comrades' house where they read newspapers and books, both imported and native. Fitrat's works were especially widely read in the new method schools and many Young Bukharans knew his main works by heart. His major works were copied and made available to the people of the *Emirate*. (iv). They used theatre as an instrument to propagate their ideas among the native masses. The works of active reformist leaders, like- Mufti Behbudi, Abdurauf Fitrat and Chulpon were staged in the theatre. At the time of the revolution in 1917, a majority of the Young Bukharans decided to collaborate with the Bolsheviks as they had promised equality among nations and equal religious, cultural and linguistic rights[38].

The Bukharan *Jadidiists* were ardent supporter of the change. But, they were not in favour of gradual change. In this regard, Fitrat was of the firm view that rapid method to change of education, language and orthography, or the position of women, is against public opinion and creates dispute among the Muslims. We need to inter into gradual reforms through public opinion that does not exist in the society. We have a general majority, but it has no opinion. There is not a thought, not a word that emerges from their own minds. The thoughts that our majority has today were not their own, but were the thoughts of some imams, clerics and mufti. He further states that no real change can take place in the society through gradual process[39]. *Jadidists* favoured the idea of revolutionary transformation of society. In other words it can be said that *Jadidists* were in support of radical, sudden and imposed change. In actual sense they wanted to revolutionaries the mind of the people. According to Fitrat, no change can take place in a society without changing the mind of the people. The *Jadids'* embrace of the idea of revolution brought them close to the Bolshevik Party. But, their idea of revolution was quite different from the Bolsheviks ideas of revolution. For *Jadids*, the idea of revolution was national rather than class in terms. It was against the basic postulate of the Bolshevik Party[40].

The Bolshevik Revolution took place in Russia in October 1917. But, due to opposition of the native population, the Bolsheviks could not get control of Bukhara in their first attempt. Consequently, they decided to preserve the autonomy of the Bukharan *Khanate*. Soon after revolution, the *Jadidists* created Islamic Councils, while the traditional conservative Islamic leadership (*Qadimists*) drew its power from the society of Ulema. Both group proposed a programme for the future

development of the native society. In the beginning, the *Qadimists* were success in their strategy by portraying *Jadidists* as too young and inexperienced people[41]. However, the *Jadidists* continued to demand for the implementation of their reforms. They opposed the rule of the conservative. As a result, they were persecuted by the Qadimists in the *Emirate* of Bukhara. The autonomy of the Bukharan *Khanate* did not last for long. The Red Army captured the city of Bukhara on 2 September 1920. Consequently, its last Emir, Said Olim Khan, the last Manghit (a Turkic tribe) ruler of the *Khanate*, fled to Eastern Bukhara. The *Emirate* of Bukhara was transformed into the People's Republic of Bukhara immediately after the conquest. Because of their help to the Bolsheviks, Young Bukharans were awarded with some key posts in the newly formed republic[42]. In other words it can be said that the *Jadidists* were given control of the area for a short period of time.

Thus, it can be said that the process of reform in Central Asia was not an easy tasks. There were some obstacles in the way of reformists contributing to the failure of the movement, which are summarized as under:

- The physical remoteness of the region hampered the establishment of contacts with like minded thinkers of the region.
- The Jadidists were frequently under the pressure from Ulema. Very few members of Traditional clerics were compassionate to *Jadidists* ideas while most of them were the harsh critic of the reformist movement.

It can be safely concluded that modernization of religion and culture guarantees that the nation and state will survive and develop. The *Jadidists* movement emerged in Central Asia in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. It was not limited to the idea of reforms in education and modernization of Islam. It believed that several cultural parameters should also be changed. It rejected religious xenophobia. It relied on the basic Koranic principles to critically analyze all sorts of scholastic ideas preached by orthodox Muslim theologians. Thus, it should be clear that *Jadidists* movement in Central Asia did not create a new form of Islam. It tried to remove historical and ethnic layers which had developed into *taqlid* (unquestioned truth). The *Jadidists* restored the freedom of thinking in Islam based on the principle that neither the community, nor the imam or mufti should stand between man and God. It means that man should be conscious of his responsibility for what he is doing and should be able to distinguish between good and bad.

On the eve of the revolution, the *Jadidists* reform movement had taken root in the urban areas of the region. But the traditional elite (Ulema) still retained considerable influence. The carriers of the reform found themselves fighting a mounting battle as their position was in danger in the society. Despite this the *Jadidists* were determined and confident that the surge of history was behind them. They aspired to universal civilization, which they considered as fully in harmony with Islam. The *Jadidists* were fighting for inclusion of Muslims into the modern world, and into the Russian Empire as equal citizens, with rights and representation, rather than as subordinate subject.

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ENVIRONMENTAL GEOPOLITICS
Kazakh – China Hydropolitics Over Lake Balkhash Basin

Sutandra Singha

Abstract

This study represents the hydropolitics between Kazakhstan and China over the Lake Balkhash basin. Transboundary watercourses present a challenge in terms of water management as they pass through different territories with different interests as per their national needs and different groups of people in the different states with different needs, which ultimately give way to water conflict among the riparian countries. During the last decade, socio economic activities and climate change have severely affected Balkhash hydrological regime. As industry expands to feed China's booming economy and as China pursues its "Go West Policy" to encourage immigration the Xinjiang area bordering Kazakhstan, demand of water is rising constantly. This paper gives an overview of changes that have been occurred in the Lake Balkhash basin so far, alongwith the focus on geopolitical changes took place in the area. This paper also highlights problems regarding management of water resources in the Lake Balkhash drainage basin with special reference to role of Kazakhstan and China. Both, a conflictive and cooperative behaviour of these two countries have been discussed in terms of their geo-climatic situations, geo-hydrological characteristics of the basin and level of politico-economic development regarding the planned use of available water resources. A critical review of river basin management has been added to the end of the study and recommendations have been given for a better future.

Keywords

Environmental Geopolitics, Hydropolitics, Balkhash, Transboundary Watercourses, Water Management, Hydrological Regime, Go West Policy, Conflict to Cooperation, Environmental Degradation.

Background of the Study

Environmental politics can be seen as relationships between global political forces and environmental change, with reference to the implications of local global interactions for environmental management and the implications for environmental change and environmental governance for world politics (Meadowcroft, 2002). The concept of threat posed by environmental degradation to human life was considered as contemporary environmental politics, whereas the modern environmental politics includes political and mass movements,

green parties and green ideas within its territory. The concept of global environmental politics has come up with some new issues in the past one and half century e.g. free trade, water resources, hydrocarbons, energy and sustainable development (Kotzé, 2012).

In the light of increasing global water demands, trans-boundary rivers are often portrayed both as a source of inter-state conflict (water conflict) and as a catalyst for international cooperation. Water conflict can be viewed as a type of environmental politics where, riparian states as unitary rational actors fight over water - a natural resource, to pursue specific national interests. In other words, it can be stated that, water is shaping the nature of politics not only within the country but also the international relation among or between the riparian countries. Water conflict takes place when volume of water decreases in the source region due to climate change followed by low amount of rainfall. This creates conflict between upstream and downstream rivers on the ground that upstream countries construct dam to do maximum utilization of available water, which deprive the downstream countries of water (Olmstead & Sigman, 2015, p.507). The conflictive or cooperative behaviour of riparian states in shared basins encompasses hydrological connectedness, the overall level of water scarcity, level of economic development, the geopolitical context, geographical position of riparian states and existing and planned domestic water uses regulations. Among the emerging issues of global environmental politics, hydro politics of water resource among Kazakhstan and China over of Lake Balkhash basin is worth mentioning.

The second largest lake in Central Asia - Balkhash is a unique endorheic lake with freshwater western part and saline eastern part (Eosnap, 2008). Ili – Balkhash basin covers southeastern Kazakhstan and northwestern China and which raises transboundary water management issues in the region. The Ile River, flowing in from the south, pours water into the western part of Balkhash basin, and contributed 80 - 90 percent of the total water input into the lake until a hydroelectric project utilized and reduced the volume of the river's inflow in the 20th century (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1999). Only few small rivers e.g. the Qaratal, Ayaguz, Lepsi and Aqsū feed the eastern part of Balkhash. The eastern part has been salty but the western part was fresh and suitable for consumption (Rafferty, 2011, p.117). The lake remains frozen from the end of November to the beginning of April (Rafferty, 2011, p.118). Carbonates forms the ground deposits of the Lake Balkhash

(Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1999). Earlier, around 20 species of fish used to inhabit the lake. However, its deteriorating water quality since 1970s has declined the fauna (Sourd & Rizzolio, 2004).

Fig. 1

Lake Balkhash Basin and Riparian Countries



Source: Image Courtesy: Propastin, 2012, p.451.

Since 1970s, Balkhash basin has been under stress due to Soviet-era industrial and agricultural expansion and the growth of population around the rivers which feed into that lake (Guillaume et.al., 2015, p.4203). Situations worsen critical since China began its program of developing Xinjiang in order to attract migrants. China has thus increasingly taken water from the Ili River there by restricting proper input of water into the lake. If the current situation persists, Kazakhstan's Lake Balkhash basin -the largest water body in the former USSR and the 15th largest lake in the world may follow the fate of Aral Sea into extinction-a series of small isolated lakes and dried out places within few years. If Lake Balkhash dies, its impact on the surrounding area is likely to exceed that has been in case of the Aral Sea. This background will help to investigate the driving forces behind conflicts and cooperation regarding issues of water allocation and utilization in the lake and their economic development vis a vis stress on water resourse. Also, it will lead to safer and area-specific recommendations regarding the improvement of the current situation along with protecting both of the countries' respective national interest.

Hydro-politics on Balkhash Water

Lake Balkhash - the third largest freshwater lake on the earth is located in the southeastern corner of Kazakhstan (Greenberg, 2007). More than 20 percent of the country's population draws on the lake for its drinking water. Transboundary rivers from Kyrgyzstan and China feed the basin area. After decades of water diversion to nearby factories and farms, Lake Balkhash is threatened with the same fate as the notorious Aral Sea, which is widely considered one of the worst anthropogenic ecological disasters in history. Rivers replenishing Aral Sea were diverted over decades to facilitate the water intensive cotton cultivation across Central Asia, which ultimately made the sea shrunk followed by splitting into two parts.

China has offered incentives to people to move to its resource rich Xinjiang territory as part of its "Go West" policy (UNECE, 2008). This region covers part of the basin area. Out of population pressures, water is fast draining into nearby sugar and rice farms (Greenberg, 2007). China is increasingly becoming an important factor in the governance of Central Asian waters (Water Politics, 2009). Beijing treats Central Asia as a supplier of cheap electricity to make up with the western Xinxiang's energy shortfall. Agriculture is the chief activity in this province and cotton occupies close to half of Xinxiang's arable land and Beijing considers the massive exportation of textiles to be of vital strategic interest. China is already using some of the Irtysh waters to provide water to the Karamay oil fields. Further development in the province is to be facilitated through diversion schemes for the Ili which supplies 80 percent of Balkhash's water (Water Politics, 2009). In October 2004, the China affirmed that it was counting on using as much as 40 percent of the Irtysh's effluence (Peyrouse, 2007).

These plans would endanger access to water for inhabitants of northern Kazakhstan and Kazakhstan's development projects in this part of the territory, in particular its new capital city of Astana. It would also affect industry in the area, which is highly dependent upon Ili. Lastly, the project could have a serious environmental impact. China's use of water from the Ili River is already having significant consequences on Lake Balkhash. Many specialists argue that Lake Balkhash is in serious danger of following the sad fate of the Aral Sea. In accordance with the new project, two non-rigid dams will be built on the Tasmurun and Bakanass channels at the lower course of the Ili River that will provide drinking water to the Kapshagai city and increase the efficiency of the

Kapshagai hydroelectric power station (Kamalova, 2014). The non-rigid dams will also improve the irrigation water supply and decrease the water discharge from the Kapshagai water reservoir during the vegetation season (Lavalin, n.d.). These measures will help to preserve natural water level of Balkhash.

However not everyone is optimistic about the project. The Head of the Environmental Society - Tabigat (Nature) Mr. Mels Yeleusizov insisted that the new dams would not help the water level in the lake (Kamalova, 2014). The Ili river that feeds the lake is a trans-border river (Schlager, 2011). It flows through China before entering Kazakhstan. The water in the Ili river decreases because China intakes more water than it should. China has constructed numerous dams, hydroelectric power stations. Expert calculated that by 2050 as a result of Chinese projects, the Ili River dwindle by 40 percent (Kamalova, 2014). This would turn into a catastrophe for Balkhash lake. As the population and degree of industrialization in western China is increasing along with traditionally poor political relations between Kazakhstan and the People's Republic of China, it is likely that conflict over the fate of the limited waters of the Ili will intensify. The water pollution of Balkhash is intensified as urbanization and industrialization in the area grow rapidly. Over the past two years the water level in Balkhash lake has dropped by 8 cm from 342.73 meters to 342.65 meters. However, water level in Balkhash lake has increased by 75 centimeters. Even though the recent water level drop looks like a temporary development now, Kazakhstan wants to address this problem before it is too late, especially since it can deal with many more water related issues along the way.

According to UN Environmental Program, the scenario of China's and Kazakhstan's accelerated development suggests that Balkhashh lake may lose up to 86 percent of its water reserves by 2045, which will mean a huge environmental disaster for Kazakhstan. The water inflow to Balkhashh is decreasing 2-3 fold every year and this trend will remain until 2030 (Tengri News, 2013). Currently China and Uzbekistan are major suppliers of trans-border river water to Kazakhstan. But their own demand for water is likely to sharply surge by 2030, which will create additional risks for Kazakhstan's water supply. According to the experts' forecasts the water demand in China would grow from the current 555 billion cubic meters to 818 billion cubic meters in 2030 (Visser, 2012). The trend may cause a radical decrease of the water level in the Ili River that supplies almost 80 percent of the water flow to

Lake Balkhash (Schlager, 2011). Significant fall of water supply would split the lake into two, with the western side eventually drying up.

Fig. 2
Water Levels in Lake Balkhash (2002 to 2013)



Source: The Committee on Water Resources of the Ministry of Agriculture, Kazakhstan.

Kazakh-China Water Politics and Balkhash Fate

Lake Balkhash was already ecologically damaged in the 1960s and 1970s with the construction of the Kapchagai reservoir. This lake is the chief controller of climatic balance in the central and south-east Kazakhstan (Peyrouse, 2007). Dozens of dams are being built on Xinxiang's 12 rivers, including the Ili. Once they are completed, only a third of the water that currently ows from China will reach Kazakhstan. For Lake Balkhash, such a course of events would be a death sentence. The lake is shallow – not more than 10 meters at its deepest point. So even now, the lake is divided into two parts: the fresh and the salty. And since water quickly evaporates in a dry climate, the lake is extremely sensitive to any reduction in the inflow of water. The shallower the lake becomes, the faster its water evaporates. Gradual increase in the salinity level is adversely affecting its fresh water. The less water flows into Lake Balkhash, the faster the surface area of the lake shrinks. That in turn would threaten the extensive wetlands surrounding the lake, a refuge for many fish and bird species. Nearly 3 million people, who are settled around the lake and depending upon fishing and agriculture, would see their livelihoods destroyed (Schlager, 2011). So far, Kazakhstan and China have not reached any agreement. However, Kazakh politicians tend to avoid criticizing China because of its immense importance as a trade partner. Kazakhstan also straining the Balkhas water resources by

growing rice. Rice cultivation requires lots of water. In addition, more than 50 percent of the water drains unused into the soil due to lack of proper irrigational management system.

Ironically, thanks to increased glacial melt caused by global warming, Lake Balkhash has not shown loss of water in the last several years, rather there have been minor gains. This has created a false sense among many people regarding the existing and future environmental security of Balkhash. Recently there has been a record amount of outflow from the Ili (due to melting of snow and glaciers in China), that has increased the water extraction. Satellite images on 11th and 18th April, 2003 show large cracks found in the ice on the western part of the lake and most of the ice melted with remnants primarily in the western half.

Fig. 3

Ice Melts on Lake Balkhash, Kazakhstan



Source: Jacques Descloitres, MODIS Land Rapid Response Team, NASA GSFC. URL: http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/IOTD/view.php?id=3416.

Negotiating the Lake Balkhash: Successes and Failures

China (unlike Kazakhstan) is not a signatory to the 1992 International Convention on the Protection and Use of Trans-boundary Watercourses and International Lakes, whose member-states aims to take due, account of trans-boundary impacts in their domestic water management practices (Zhian, n.d.). In 2001, China and Kazakhstan signed an agreement to facilitate cooperation on transboundary water management including the Ili. A Joint Commission was set up to oversee this agreement, and has convened annually over the last decade (Biba, 2014). Information on its work is scare, beyond official confirmations of the fact of its meetings**.** Despite annual meetings no specific yearly water allocation has been agreed on. The original 2001 document is ambiguously worded and insufficiently stringent, from the Kazakh standpoint, in obliging China to respect Kazakhstan's water security needs when implementing its plans for the future economic development of Xinjiang (Burman, n.d.). China and Kazakhstan held talks on the problem quite recently, but China spurned Kazakhstan's proposal to send China large stocks of free or heavily subsidized food for 10 years in exchange for a commitment from China to allow an unimpeded flow of river water into the lake.

In 2007, Kazakhstan offered negotiation of a new accord, but Beijing has refused to do so, thus exacerbating the situation of Lake Balkhash. Now, the Committee on Water Resources of the Ministry of Agriculture of Kazakhstan is planning to construct non-rigid dams on the Ili River to maintain the water level of Balkhashh lake (Kamalova, 2014) and also hoping that the international community will put pressure on Beijing to agree to talks. If that doesn't happen, Lake Balkhash will follow the Aral Sea into extinction and far faster than anyone imagines. Infact A draft agreement on the use of Ili-Balkhashh water was prepared by United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) at a conference in 2007 and sent to China, but there has been no response so far (Nuttall, 2010). China is believed to be focusing on domestic environmental issues, and therefore has less interest in issues affecting its neighbours. Some indications exist that limited progress has been made, especially water quality issues, on which a special bilateral agreement was signed in February 2011.

The issue of trans-boundary water management was raised in April 2013 during Kazakh President Nazarbayev's visit to Beijing (Burman, n.d.). Prior to this, he has himself occasionally referred in public, albeit

obliquely, to Kazakhstan's concerns in this area. However, the Kazakh authorities have little negotiating leverage to deploy over this issue, given China's greater size and power, and also its already significant and still-emerging role as a trade & investment partner for Kazakhstan. This has made Kazakh civic activists and oppositionists criticizing Astana's perceived inactivity over bilateral water issues. China's approach to management of the Ili and Irtysh was criticized as 'genuine water blackmail 'by Murat Auezov, Kazakhstan's first Ambassador to Beijing (Burman, n.d.). In September 2013, China and Kazakhstan signed a declaration on strengthening the relations in the strategic partnership of the two states (FMPRC, 2013). Both Sides set a task to research and coordinate agreements on the use of cross-border rivers. As of today, all research work on cross-border rivers has been concluded. Two countries discussed on the work of the China-Kazakhstan Joint Committee on Cross Border River Utilization and Protection During President Nazarbayev's visit to China from 30 August to 03 September in 2015 (CIWL, n.d.). In 2015, they initiated scheduled consultations on the draft of the "Agreement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Water Distribution of Cross Border Rivers (FMPRC, 2015). Both of the countries agreed to continue to hold discussions on the draft to elevate bilateral cooperation in the field of utilization and protection of cross border water resources to a new level.

Findings and Recommendations

Political issues surrounding Lake Balkhash (water management, dams, and irrigation) are complicating relationship between Kazakhstan with its neighbour China. Along with the Soviet legacy, Kazakhstan also diverts water from the Ili, for the purpose of irrigation in paddy fields. Settlements along the river are dependent on the crop, with people employed in the fields and rice processing plants. Republic of China is building even more dams along the rivers feeding Lake Balkhash. China's oil industry is booming. The oil industry requires water-flooding and therefore extracts huge amount of water from the upper reaches of the Ili River basin. Most important issue is the decreased water available when upstream developments call for more water, impinging on downstream consumers. Every year, China is including more land under irrigation facility. The current economy is developing

under conditions of increasing water deficiency in Kazakhstan - it needs Chinese oil more than China needs Kazakhstan's oil. In short, China's population and economic pressures are serious issues for Kazakhstan. China's plans in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, earmarked for rapid agricultural and industrial development over the upcoming decades, is likely to intensify the water issue with Kazakhstan over Lake Balkhash basin.

Groundwater and precipitation supply some of the Balkhashh basin, whereas snowmelt and glacial waters are the chief source of water, removal of which would bring unprecedented economic and ecological consequences. The dying condition of Lake Balkhash would initiate longer and hotter summers with increasing crop water demand and thereby would heighten irrigation requirements. This could reduce aggregate water savings even after improvements in irrigation systems. A drying Balkhash would expose thousands of square miles of salty and sandy land that would cause environmental pollution. The disappearance of Balkhash would widely effect the local population also. The UNDP and EU are promoting integrated trans-boundary water management in Central Asia. Kazakh NGOs and government agencies are also aware of the problem. However, Kazakh politicians generally maintain silence regarding criticizing China as, this country is Kazakhstan's most important foreign partner. Thus the Chinese stay away from talks, while continuing to develop their western regions without regard to the fate of Lake Balkhash. If Balkhash dies then China would suffer from it too, because salt (lifted by winds from the dry bottom) would end up in their glaciers. They should think of the way to save the glaciers, sources of pollution should be mapped and possibilities of their remediation should be discussed among local citizens, experts and state authorities of both Kazakhstan and China foe a progressive solution. It is better to start planting agricultural products that require less water. Adoption of new more effective mechanisms, decision-making in water security at the interstate level, effective water use in economic activity, reduction of water losses due to evaporation, transportation and filtration, repair of irrigation on irrigated territories, rejection of ineffective irrigational methods, introduction of water-saving technologies, introduction of rainwater harvesting, water recycling and setting up a Basin Management Body could prove fruitful to save the dying Balkhash while maintaining both of Kazakhstan and China's respective interest.

China needs to lead by managing the Irtysh and Ili rivers with Kazakhstan. Encouragingly, compared with its water policies on other major transboundary rivers, China has a relatively high level of institutionalized association with Kazakhstan. China can take the lead in mediating water disputes among Central Asian countries by facilitating the adoption of the 'nexus approach' to managing water conflicts in Central Asia which recognises that water, food and energy systems are inseparable. Efforts in the food and energy production systems could therefore help to alleviate water stress in Central Asia. Agricultural modernization will help to keep regional water conflicts under control. China has much to offer on this front. China could invest in Central Asia's backward agricultural infrastructure, particularly in modernizing its irrigation systems. Water saving technologies and drought resistant seeds from China could further reduce water demand in Central Asia's agricultural sector. By promoting interregional and intraregional agricultural trade across Central Asia, China could approach to facilitate a better cropping structure.

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DYNAMICS OF SOVIET EDUCATIONAL MODEL IN CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS

Darakhshan Abdullah

Abstract

Soviet regime is attributed with a well developed and comprehensive educational system in the entire erstwhile USSR. The mission of literacy was deemed an essential imperative for the socio-economic and cultural transformation. Therefore, for the establishment of socialist state, based on Marxist-Lenin principles, the term "likbez" was developed and a crusade against illiteracy was launched which culminated into the so-called "infallible and invincible" model of Soviet education. Though Soviet model is believed to be a monolithic model, yet coherent educational system was not followed so far as soviet Central Asian Republics were concerned. Moreover, during perestroika and subsequent disintegration, the utter failure of Soviet educational system in former Central Asian Republics exposed the myth of invincibility. The present paper intends to re-analyse and re-approach the Soviet educational policy in the former Central Asian Republics.

Keywords

Soviet Schools, Marxist-Leninist Thought, Universal Compulsory Education, Modernization and Sovietisation, Infallible-Invincible Model, CARs.

Introduction

Education throughout ages has pre-eminently served as an ameliorative agent for bringing improvement, development and change in every society. Reckoning the importance of education as a core channel of economic and political transformation, the communist regime of erstwhile USSR considered it a key to the "socio-economic and cultural revolution" as well, that would create a society purely socialist and modern. To build "a new Soviet man," with a "communist consciousness," who would contribute in restructuring economic and social institutions, became the major goal of Soviet education. Marx and Lenin often emphasised that knowledge must prove its worth in practice; as such school was perceived as a means to disseminate and apply knowledge towards the modernization of a backward society. To function as an agent of material progress in a proposed environment of industrialization, the paramount task of the new schools was to

transform the school from the weapon of bourgeois class domination into a weapon for the total destruction of class division within a society.[1] Therefore, schooling was seen as means to implement major social and cultural innovations. In the backdrop of Soviet philosophy to build Soviet society, to construct Soviet identity, morality and socio–ideological integration, educational policies were formulated and implemented in the Russia as well as in her inherited appendages soon after Bolshevik revolution.

Implementation of Soviet Educational Model in CARs

Central Asia named as Turkistan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic after revolution, was soon fragmented and divided into number of Soviet Socialist Republics.[2] The immediate task before regime was eradication of illiteracy, since region on the eve of revolution was considered largely an illiterate nation, despite certain amount of success achieved during early twenties due to joint efforts of Jadidist and Czarist regime.[3] Indeed the existing educational institutions like traditional madrasas and Jadidist Schools alongwith cultural values and traditional identities of Central Asian's were incompatible with the ideological goals and objectives of new regime. Consequent upon, new government from November 1917 to 1919 initiated a number of fundamental reforms in educational sector after signing series of decree on establishment of a government commission on enlightenment, according to which schools were to be administrated in a decentralised system, but under central authority. On the basis of these decrees, free and universal compulsory education[4] (up to the age of 17 years) was introduced for the children of any age, sex or any nationality. Initially Russian language was declared at par with the regional languages in the non Russian schools of Central Asian States,[5] yet by 1938, Russian language was accorded the status of official language and was made compulsory in all non-Russian schools. In 1919, The Turkish Commissar of people's education directed to introduce co-education instead of separate education, (a deep-rooted tradition of the region on the bases of religious belief) whereby children of all nationalities Uzbek, Tajiks, Turkmans, and Kirgiz nomads and semi-nomads were ordered to study jointly. Religious instruction was prohibited and religious institutions were restrained to interfere in educational affairs. Schools were to serve as centres' to promote adult literacy and cultural programs, where as teachers conceived as architects

of change, were expected to inculcate ideological loyalty and Soviet patriotism by emphasising upon materialistic oriented curriculum aimed at furnishing human resource needed for industrialization, collectivization and nationalization (Sovietisation) of the traditional society.[6] Students were provided with material aid and were encouraged to relate schooling to work experiences. The Soviet policy planners endeavoured to project the Schools as a platform for radical departure from the traditional socio-cultural and political institutions, as such a throbbing educational system; transforming virtually every sphere of life was envisaged with the ultimate aim to build a utopian society integrated by a common civic culture and values. The direct participation of Schools in these huge social programmes meant that they were regarded as political instrument "since education outside politics was believed unthinkable."[7] Educational achievement at each stage of the academic ladder had a transcendent value in society, functioning as a passport to preferred positions.

Though, Communist regime from its inception had categorically declared, that "our objective in the field of School system is same struggle as for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie"[8] and state education throughout USSR was used as an instrument to construct, develop and reproduce Soviet political, economic, cultural and social institutions, yet with regard to Central Asia, the experiment in the early decades was fluid process and a zigzag educational policy was adopted in the region due to certain political constraints. The historical experimentation of educational development in the region can be divided into several distinct phases.[9]

During first phase which was the period of civil war and Bolshevik consolidation, development of coherent educational programme could not be realised due to lack of firm administrative apparatus, the tides of military conflicts and the vicissitudes of political control both in Moscow and in Turkistan.[10] The Soviet Nationality policy, which was not matured until 1924, also restrained the Russian authorities to implement Soviet educational plans at par with the other parts of USSR. Fact of the matter is that period coincides with three leading characteristics: continuity of Muslim schools up to 1928 on legal basis with financial assistance from waqf grants and selection and approval of textbooks for their schools from the republican Commissariats of education.[11] The compromise in Soviet strategy at this stage was necessitated by

political expediency. They intended to ease the tension generated by the native uprisings like Basmachis[12] who burnt Soviet schools, lashed at the teachers and parents, to seek favour of native teachers and parents gradually towards the government lunched policies. The conciliatory approach towards Muslim educational institutions during this phase resulted in the development of new method schools at the hands of native intelligentsia who perceived Soviet regime quite different from Czarist regime and saw themselves creating a new Civilization; modern Soviet Central Asian; Turkic and Muslim at once. To quote Adeeb Khalid,[13] "forty eight new method schools with 158 teachers and 9200 students were opened in Tashkent alone during 1919, which was a significant increase over the figures of Czarist period" when a net work of Russian and Russo native schools was established with a dual purpose i.e., to educate the native population and to facilitate the smooth functioning of administration.[14]

Growth and Development of Soviet Educational Institutions

Parallel to these schools, Soviet educational authorities diplomatically and systematically endeavoured to establish Soviet Schools but in general the actual growth owing to certain socio political reasons was initially very low. Statistically it had attained limited success up to 1928, although some boarding schools for selected youth had started in the early 1920, the main effort for day primary school up to 1925 could not claim on republic basis even 1% of the school age population.[15] Of course developments in and around centres were different. The assertion is substantiated by official estimates which reports, "out of a possible 132,000 of school age children, 40,000 were enrolled in primary-secondary grades and in children's homes in Tashkent city and district. Of those enrolled in Tashkent city proper about 37% attended schools in the "Old City" hence they were mostly native children. The others, enrolled in the "new Soviet Schools" were substantially non–natives, i.e., Russian and other Europeans.[16]

The growth and development of Soviet schools gained real momentum only after1928 with the change of leadership from Lenin to Stalin and with the declaration of compulsory primary education in 1930, a gradual but a certain expansion to universal and modern education. The rapid increase in the growth of school network is reflected from table-I.

Table-I
Number of Schools and Enrolment in CARs (1914-1938)

Republic	1914/15		1927/28		1932/33		1937/38	
	Schools	Enrolment	Schools	Enrolment	Schools	Enrolment	Schools	Enrolment
Uzbekistan	160	17300	1933	139800	6444	644300	4641	931900
Kazakhstan	2011	105000	3944	274000	6869	576600	7936	1022100
Tajikistan	10	400	336	13800	2319	124900	4224	220900
Kyrgyzstan	107	7000	515	41600	1566	145800	1794	264900
Turkmenistan	58	7000	508	31900	2005	103400	1442	184200

Source: Educational Planning in the USSR, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Paris: 1968, pp. 96, 97

The stage was characterised by a new dimension of atheistic propaganda and vigour's anti–Islamic campaign on institutional and ideological levels. The conciliatory policy towards traditional and new method schools was abandoned, traditional and new-method schools were closed down and prominent Jadidists leaders were exiled and persecuted on the pretext of anti Soviet activities. The new political Elite "the so–called class of 38" whose education and worldview was entirely shaped on Soviet lines dominated the political scene for seven decades.[17] Apart from literacy schools, thousands of special after-schools and Red corners[18] were established across factories, State farms and collectives farms "as adult outreach centres" for teaching literacy, practical skills and hygiene, special courses were organised in every nook and corner for youth who failed to complete primary schooling. It is pertinent to mention that during first two decades Soviet authorities emphasised on the development of primary schools as compared to the secondary schools with the objective to create favourable conditions for inculcating new values among the new generation especially in rural areas as such natives did not enjoy a distinctive access to specialised professional education. The enthusiastic phase of Sovietisation was followed by comparatively much relaxant period from1941-1959.To ensure support for ongoing world war second, Central Asian scholars were allowed to glorify their national heroes and study of their native

history was incorporated in the curriculum of secondary schools.[19] Nevertheless post war years witnessed a significant increase in the enrolment of students at secondary level education.[20] In accordance to economic and political expediency, changes in Soviet educational policy remained peculiar phenomena and accordingly last nail in the coffin was put in early 80's during the Garbachev era when union-wide educational reforms along with political changes were introduced. The reforms were considered most important ever since 1920 and emphasised on political education, designed to promote Marxist-Leninist ideology.[21] To speed up Russian language, Russian teachers from Ukraine and Russia were appointed and local cadres with low Russian–fluency were replaced with the salvs.[22] The increasing Russification of educational sector during early 80s prompted some western scholars to predict, that quantitative transition of non-Russian languages to Russian would result in the inevitable extinction of native languages.[23] However, all such predictions failed in the wake of disintegration of USSR and formation of independent Republics in Central Asia along with other former Soviet States, when language laws were passed in Central Asian Republics and native languages were declared official languages.[24]

Laxities and Shortcomings of Soviet Educational Model

An objective study of Soviet Educational policy in general reveals that literacy and technical education with its remarkable super structure from pre-school education to Higher education excelled during Soviet era. The expansion of educational provision has been remarkable and the communist regime did lot to extend the educational opportunities. The regime is attributed with a well developed and comprehensive educational system but the picture was not equally bright in whole of the USSR. The sector in fact was confronted with serious loopholes and shortcomings, especially in Central Asian Republics; often concealed by defenders of Soviet regime.[25] Recent research on Soviet Educational policy in Central Asian Republics reveals that Soviet defenders while exalting the quantitative achievements have failed to realise the fact that even "effective education" in the absence of freedom becomes just training and a mere brain wash. Soviet education though aimed to provide youth with necessary knowledge and skill to carry forward the work of the society, was primarily used as a "political tool for the construction of a communist society." At the outset Soviet Educational

policy persuaded bilingual schooling and allowed the schooling in mother tongue in national schools, which apparently appeared a benevolent concession but in reality the National or Native schools were not free expression of national will. They were "Soviet schools'' operating according to the slogan "National in form, Socialist in content," or in other words Russian communist Schools in the languages of minorities. The centrally designed curriculum and State controlled educational institutions, teaching appointments, syllabi and textbooks ensured overtly that all learns were exposed to the same outlook, knowledge and attitude to promote internationalism above nationalist and ethnic identities but in practice it promoted Russian identity over other national identities within the USSR, The discrepancy in Soviet educational policy is revealed further with the introduction of the Russian as the second mother tongue[26] which minimized the scope of regional languages and relegated them to a mere language of conversation that too with a huge incorporation of Russified words like Kolkhoz, Bolshevik, Agitator, Revolysiya etc.[27]

Not only this, to facilitated the Russian learning, Arabic and subsequently Latin was changed by Cyrillic script which caused a crushing blow to Muslim clergy and intelligentsia, the two possible sources of trouble to Soviet regime and slowed down the literacy campaign since they were practically reduced to the status of semi-literates, having to learn how to read and write all over again.[28] On the pretext of modernization and progressiveness, iron curtain was drawn and Central Asians were effectively divided on the regional basis and isolated from the Islamic world and their cultural heritage.

Though Soviet education espoused equality and uniformity, scholars argue that contrary to official doctrine, Soviet schooling was never monolithic or egalitarian in practice. Besides clear disparities between Russian and Native schools[29] obvious status differences also existed between urban and rural schools. Rural Schools were marginalised and neglected. They lagged behind urban schools and lacked equipments for laboratories, visual aids, technical teaching devices prescribed in their curriculum. Discriminatory approach towards national schools is substantiated by sub-standard quality, shortage and delays in textbook supplies which remained a perennial problem with these schools. The out dated printing presses; supplied with a limited quantity of fine paper from authorities apart from frequent syllabus changes unable to cope the

demand, further accelerated the shortage of text books in the region.[30] Contrary to this, books for Russian schools were mostly imported from other republics, without such irregularities.

Another Pernicious characteristic of Soviet education was low teaching standard[31] an offshoot of less experienced and less qualified teachers especially in rural areas because many young specialists failed to report to their job assignments owing to harsh living conditions.[32] The situation was perplexed by the absence of Teacher Training Institutions and in many schools, subjects like maths ,physics, chemistry and Russian were not either taught at all or were taught by those who were not trained teachers or subject experts[33] Similarly the role envisaged to Russian as a second language was not satisfactory notwithstanding the official sources that maintained "populations of the Republics have assimilated into Russian culture and have mastered Russian as second language''. Shortage of competent teachers for Russian language remained a peculiar feature of Soviet Schools. It has been observed that standard of Russian teaching was low and even the 6th and 7th grade students of urban schools (mostly under Russian environment) were hardly able to recognise Russian words and consequently affected their higher education and job opportunities.[34] The legislation of 1978 increased number of hours to improve study of Russian language and emphasised on teaching specialised subjects in all higher institutions only in Russian.[35]

Apart inadequate infrastructure and low teaching standards, discrepancies with regard to policy implementation also remained a peculiar feature of education sector during soviet regime. Though seven years universal education was declared compulsory in 1923, but it was not implemented union wide especially in Central Asia. In most of the rural areas four years education was offered until 1953.[36] In 1959-60 compulsory education was further increased to eight and ten years but policy was not implemented in most of the rural areas until 1973,[37] and it seems that during first twenty years, Soviet administrators concentrated mainly on producing literate population that would be consumers of elementary information appropriate to the tasks and aims of Socio–cultural revolution in broader perspective. The significant changes in enrolment of natives in the secondary and higher education appeared only in 1950.[38] The grim reality of the Soviet educational policy is exposed further from the practice of engaging native children along with

teachers during peak academic session for cotton harvesting and other agricultural works. The Russian children on the contrary had no such obligation and where provided with reading rooms and other curricular activities. Critics point out, that "even nursery school children were required to pick one skull cap with cotton."[39]

The expansion of vocational–professional training institutions, both at secondary and university-level also presents the disappointing picture.[40] The assertion is explained in terms of unsatisfactory outcome due to misguided Central economic planning and ineffective education in Central Asia where more vocational training school and rural job schemes were needed keeping in view the increasing population ratio in Soviet central Asian Republics than in the rest of USSR.[41] It is said that in 1988-89 approximately 760,000 people of working age in Uzbekistan were not employed. Furthermore the number of indigenous students in vocational training for skilled industrial jobs was proportionally fewer than Russians. In the mid 1980s, 9.7% of 15 to 19 years old in the USSR studied at vocational technical schools; in comparison to 5.6% in Uzbekistan. Moreover in egalitarian Socialist society, career opportunities, to all citizens were expected open, yet within Central Asia the rural majority generally lacked the advanced scientific and technical education; a prerequisite for technological jobs, hindering their prospects of labour and social mobility in the Soviet economy. Critics point out that so called "Soviet welfare colonist" had failed in the effective ideological integration and acculturation of Central Asian masses. Had school socialization been effective, the young adults of Central Asia with surplus labour force would have migrated to work in other parts of USSR.[42]

Conclusion

Despite these limitations the incredible job of transforming the Central Asian region from mere literacy to universal literacy was accomplished by the Soviet policy planers with vigours zeal. The literacy rates touched 98% in case of Uzbekistan; 96% in Kazakhstan; 98% in Kirgizstan; 95% in Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. Their endeavours were commendable and serve an example how literacy can be achieved in a highly unfavourable environment especially with regard to women who often were referred as zaif (weak) and "naqis-ul-aqal" in the traditional societies due to secluded life and low status within the family. Contrary

to this phenomena, Soviets bent upon to bring out the Central Asian women folk from their homes to learn and earn; did away virtually all the difference between the educational levels of the male and female in Soviet Central Asian Republics. However, after the breakup of the USSR it became difficult to sustain the high level of education achieved during Soviet period and Sector in post Soviet period is confronted with several challenges, like decrease in enrolment due to increasing poverty, high cost of education, deficit Educational budget and increasing corruption. The biggest challenge to the sector is however inefficient human resources of the region, without policy making skills weather it is curriculum reform, textbook reform or management of financing reforms. The Soviet legacy of centrally planned education, a common value-laden curriculum, designed to prepare youths for the communist and socialist culture, to produce academically qualified and vocationally trained workers for industrialisation failed miserably to face the challenges of market economy. This grave shortcoming of the Soviet education inverted the myth that the Soviet model was invincible and has a potential to mould the world.

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1 Brezhnev in his speech to all union congress of teachers has often emphasised the importance of knowledge for shaping the personality of soviet man. His communist consciousness, love of work, patriotism, humanness, and feeling of internationalism for carrying on the business of society and economy: Roy D. Laird, [1970], *The Soviet Paradigma,* Macmilliam Limited, London: p. 170.

2 The five Socialist Republics carved out from Czarist Central Asia were Uzbek SSR, Kazakh SSR, Turkmenistan SSR, Tajik SSR, Kirgiz SSR and the Karakalpak SSR. For details see, Vaidyanath, [1967], *The Formation of the Soviet Central Asian Republics; A Study in Soviet Nationalities Policy 1917-1936,* Peoples Publication, Delhi: pp. 135-142; Arne Huge, [2003] *The Establishment of National Republics in Soviet Central Asia,* Palgrave Macmillan, Great Britain: pp. 1-8.

3 For details see Darakhshan Abdullah, "Education in Central Asia with Special Reference to the Czarist Period," *European Academic Research,* [April 2014], Vol 11, Issue 1, pp. 60-75.

4 Soviet systems of education includes three stages; [a] schools of general education with a whole range of different types of educational institution ,including general Primary schools, eight year schools, complete general secondary schools, incomplete secondary schools, boarding schools ,secondary schools for children with physiological defects, [b] schools and colleges for vocational technical education of workers and collective farmers, secondary specialised educational establishments (Technicums) [c] higher educational establishments (universities) institutes, academies, special higher schools. However, total number of schooling years changed throughout Soviet period.

5 According to official policy two types of schools were functioning i, e Russian schools with Russian as a medium of instruction and National schools with native language as medium of instruction, though Russian as a subject was also taught. Viewed from "Second Mother Tongue," *Central Asian Review,* [1965], Vol 12, Central Asian Research Centre, London: pp. 310-322.

6 Compared to traditional education all these educational goals were new whether one refers to Russian education or Muslim education.

7 Emphasising on the importance of education Lenin remarked, "only by remoulding the teaching, organization and training of youth we shall be able to create communist society." *The Great Soviet Encyclopaedia,* [1982], Vol 31, Macmillan Publishers, London: p. 450.

8 V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works,* Moscow: Vol 37, p. 77.

9 Fanny Bryan in his article "Anti-Islamic propaganda" has divided the period into three phases, 1917-1920, as a era of war communism, 1920-1924, era of pause and 1924-1928 as era of preparation, for vigours anti Islamic activities 1934-1958, and on wards. *Central Asian Survey,* [1986], Vol 5, p. 30. Whereas Bennigsen has divided the period into seven phases from 1917 to 1982. Alexander Bennigsen, [1985], *Muslims of the Soviet Empire,* Central Hurst Company, London: pp. 11-12.

10 During this period the khanates of Bukhara and Khiva, named as Peoples Republics in 1920-21, were not under firm control of Bolsheviks. For details see, Seymour Becker, [1968], *Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva 1865-1924*, Massacubsetts.

11 The board, consisting of 6 members managed the income of waqf endowments and contributions for the educational development. As the board included soviet representatives as well; a careful and strong control over the teachings in Muslim schools was maintained. Vishvanath Thakur, "Development of Public education in Soviet Central Asia", *Journal of Central Asian Studies,* [1992], Vol 3, Centre of Central Asian Studies, University of Kashmir, India: pp47-54.

12 The term Basmachis is an Uzbek word meaning to attack. In pre soviet times it was used for marauding bands and high way robbers but in soviet period it was exclusively applied to anti soviet nationalists. For details see, "Basmachis; The Central Asian Resistance Movement 1918-1924," *Central Asian Review*, [1959], Vol 7, Centre Asia Research Centre, London:

13 For details of New Method Schools see Adeeb Khalid, *The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reforms,* California University Press, California: 1998, p. 291.

14 For details of Czarist educational policy in Central Asia see, Darakhshan Abdullah, "Education in Central Asia with Special Reference to the Czarist period," *European Academic Research,* [April 2014], Vol 11, Issue 1, pp. 60-75.

15 Though official sources report that approximately some 1,117 soviet schools were opened during 1921, yet it did not produce similar results everywhere. At certain places like Fergana, Soviet authorities were compelled to close down the Soviet schools temporarily due to civil war.

16 W.K Madlin, W. M. Cave and F. Carpenter, [1971], *Education and Development in Central Asia: A Case Study of Social Change in Uzbekistan,* E J Brill, Leiden: p. 97.

17 The term was first coined by Donald. S. Carliste, "The Uzbek Power Elite; Politburo and Secretariat," *Central Asian survey,* [1986], Vol 15, p. 99.

18 Red corners were temporary learning space mostly established in rural districts and near factories to eradicate illiteracy. The tutor was often anyone who could read and write. Other names given to this type of basic learning space include "Red Hut" and "ABC schools." Some improvised learning space created for men and women, others for women only, and some for children and teenagers. Sevket Akyildiz and Richard Carlson, [2014] *Social and Cultural Change in Central Asia: The Soviet legacy,* Routledge, London and New York: p. 28.

19 Since suppression of native history was perceived a potent factor for increasing anti Russian sentiments among university students so, as part of political strategy natives were allowed to exalt the achievements of their national heroes. However, purge of Tashkent and Samarkand universities was soon initiated, once natives especially Kazakhs began to exalt those heroes who struggled against the Russian conquest of Central Asia. Elizabeth E. Bacon, [1994] *Central Asians under Russian Rule: A study in cultural change,* Cornell University Press, Ithaca: p. 21.

20 Though in1940 the number of native students dropped from 3.28 million to 2.35 million in 1945-6 - for the reason that most of the students left schools either to go to war front or to work in newly built factories. For details see, Shrine Akiner, [1983], *Peoples of the Soviet Union,* Kegan Paul international, London: p, 28.

21 The increase in the compulsory education from 10 to 11years, whereby reducing the age from 7 years to 6 years for primary school, further intensified Russification of educational system by increasing learning hours for Russian language in National schools. Sevket Akyildiz and R.Carlson, Ed. [2014], *Social and Cultural change in Central Asia: The Soviet legacy,* Routledge, London and New York: p. 22.

22 Nancy Lubin, "Uzbekistan: The challenges Ahead," *Middle East Journal,* [1989] Vol 43, No 4, p. 625.

23 Bruchis Michael, "The Effects of the USSR's Language Policy on National Languages of its Turkic Population," viewed from Yaacovi Roy, [1984], *The USSR and the Muslim World, Issues in Domestic and Foreign Policy,* Allen and Unwin, London: p. 14.

24 In Kazakhstan alone Russian due to its demographic composition was declared as second official language.

25 William Fierman, "Glasnost in Practice: the Uzbek experience". *Central Asian Survey,* [1989], Vol. 8, Society for Central Asian Studies, Great Britain; Isabella Kreidler, "Non-Russian Education in Central Asia", *Central Asian Survey,* [1982], Vol 1, No 1, , pp. 111-123.

26 Prior to1938 medium of instruction in National schools was mother tongue, though Russian as a subject was also taught.

27 To quote Borovkov just within a decade (1923-33) Persian language with a wide range of Arabic words was reduced from 87.4%to 12% only by the replacement of Russian or Soviet international words. Carried from Central Asian Review, [1962], Vol. 12, pp. 315-316; See also, Mark Dickens, [1985], *Soviet language policy, http://www.oxuscom.com/ lang-policy.htm*.

28 For the generations beginning their education in Soviet Schools and adult education, the literacy blackboard was wiped clean and ready for new. Elizabeth E. Bacon, [1994], *Central Asians under Russians Rule*, Cornell University Press, Itihaca: p. 191.

29 According to official policy two types of schools were functioning i,e., Russian Schools with Russian as a medium of instruction and National schools with native language as medium of instruction, though Russian as a subject was also taught. Viewed from "Second Mother Tongue", *Central Asian Review,* [1965], Vol 12, Central Asian Research Centre , London: pp. 310-322.

30 "From the Komsol to the Rural School," Soviet Education viewed from *Politics Identity and Education in Central Asia* (Ed.) [2013] Pinar Akcah and C.E.Demir, Roultedge, London: p. 151.

31 Though official sources were indicating a constant increase in the success rates but a substantial section of graduates during late 1960s especially from Samarkand, Tashkent and Andizhan regions were not able to qualify even entrance exams for Tashkent University. The situation remained same throughout Soviet period with exception of few, where students competed in higher technical institutes of Moscow, Leningrad, and Novosibirsk Riga: etc. For details see, *Soviet Studies,* [1962], Vol 14, No 2, pp. 13-157; *Great Soviet Encyclopaedia,* [1982], Vol 31, Collier, Macmillian, London: p. 450;Ann Sheehy, "Primary And Secondary Education In Central Asia And Kazakhstan ;The Current Situation," *Central Asian Review*, [1968], Vol 16, No 2, p. 199.

32 For details see, *Central Asian Review,* [1968] Vol 16, No 2, p. 195

33 It has been reported that even during 70s in the Karshi region arithmetic and native language was taught just by 4th and 6th grade pass out persons. *Central Asian Review,* [1968], Vol 16, No 2, p. 199.

34 E. Glyn Lewis, [1972], *Multilingualism in the Soviet Union 'Aspects of Language Policy and its Implementation,* Mouton, The Hague, Paris: p. 202.

35 Isabell Kreindlerm, (Ed.), [1997], *Socio Linguistic perspective on Soviet National languages: Their past, Present and Future,* Amsterdam, Mouton: p. 202.

36 Seven years education might have been available in some rural towns and urban regions of Uzbekistan before 1953, but the evidence does not refer to such cases. Sevket Akyildiz and Richard Carlson, [2014], *Social and Cultural change in Central Asia: The Soviet legacy,* Routledge, New York, p. 16.

37 M. Rywkin, [1990], *Soviet Society Today,* London, M E Sharp, p. 99; J N Westwood, *Endurance and Endeavour,* Oxford University Press, Oxford: p. 417.

38 The number of natives during 1924-25 was negligible between 1927-67 the number of natives i.e. Uzbek, Kirgiz, Tajiks and Turkmens increased by 225 times, 183 times, 199 times, and 178 times respectively. E. Glyn Lewis, [1972], *Multilingualism in the Soviet Union: Aspects of language policy and its implementation,* Mouton & Co, The Hague: p. 165.

39 Mobin Shorish pointed out although practice was officially banned but it was in vogue in Uzbekistan even during early nineties. Mobin Shorish, [1994], "Back to Jadidism," *Islamic Studies,* Vol 33, Islamic Research Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan: pp. 161-182.

40 During the 20s and 30s, the enrolments in both levels moved gradually. It has reached to 62.2% in 60s only. William K. Medlin *et al, Education and Development in Central Asia A case Study on Social Change in Uzbekistan,* p. 115.

41 Sutherland, "Perestroika in the Soviet General School: From Innovation to Independence" in J. Dustan, (Ed.), [1992], *Soviet Education under Perestroika,* London and New York: pp. 14-29. Though vocational training was designated to

generate proactive technically skilled workers and social cohesion, but in practice Central Asia was lagging behind keeping in view their increasing population growth. William Fierman, "Glasnost in Practice: the Uzbek experience," *Central Asian Survey*, [1989], Vol 8, Society for Central Asian Studies, Great Britain; Isabella Kreidler, "Non-Russian Education in Central Asia," Annoted Bibliography, *Central Asian Survey,* [1982] Vol 1, No 1, , pp. 111-123

42 For details see, Sevket Akyildiz and Richard Carlson, [2014], *Social and Cultural change in Central Asia: The Soviet legacy,* p. 25.

US POLICY TOWARDS POST-2014 AFGHANISTAN
Achievements and Emerging Parameters

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Abstract
Afghanistan has not been a success story for the United States till now; nor has it been an unmitigated disaster. Some national interests have been achieved with hard struggle, but the cost in doing so has been high, and it has taken a very long time. Withdrawal of International Security Assistance Forces from Afghanistan in 2014 does not proclaim the stability in Afghanistan. After the withdrawal of International Security Assistance Forces, Afghanistan again emerged as an arena of instability and chaos. Though United States and other members of Resolute Support Mission are active in Afghanistan but the burden of security finally relies upon Afghan government. In this backdrop, the present paper aims to highlight major achievements in Afghanistan since 2001 and the emerging problems in Afghanistan after 2014.

Keywords
US Withdrawal, Resolute Support Mission, National Interest, Emerging Afghan Problems, NATO, Counter Terrorism, ISAF, International Security, Policy Failures, Military Coalition.

Introduction

United States entered in Afghanistan in October 2001 to dismantle, disrupt and retaliate from Taliban and to make Afghanistan a stable state.[1] Alongwith international community, United States served thirteen years with multiple objectives in Afghanistan. The first major aim was to oust Taliban from power. Second aim was to establish US friendly regime in Afghanistan for long run. After waging the longest war in the history, killing Bin Laden in 2011, United States finally announced the partial withdrawal from Afghanistan. Withdrawal of NATO forces from Afghanistan does not mean withdrawal of United States but the withdrawal of United States led International Security Assistance Forces. In spite of Withdrawal in 2014, 9800 US troops are still stationed in Afghanistan which reduced to 6800 by the end of 2016. During these thirteen years of Operation Enduring Freedom, in Afghanistan, the U.S was not at a stage of winning. United States both achieved and lost in Afghanistan and it is an open truth that United States failed to eliminate Taliban and its other allied groups like Haqani

Network, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan Islamic Jihad Union etc. from Afghanistan. This was debated by the academia that whether withdrawal of US led forces was a choice or a force. Taliban mockingly declared that withdrawal of NATO led ISAF is a defeat for United States and victory for Taliban.[2]

At the NATO Summit held in Chicago (USA) on May 20-21, 2012, NATO and ISAF partner nations made a strong pledge of long-term support for the security and stability of Afghanistan. The summit concluded with the commitment (including the U.S.) of $3.6 billion per year for the ANSF starting in 2015 and running through 2017. This summit is a major milestone for the security and stability of Afghanistan in the forthcoming years. The Afghan government also agreed to provide roughly $500 million annually and gradually increase its share of financial responsibility for maintaining its security forces over time. NATO and ISAF Partner Nations also recommended NATO Strategic Plan for Afghanistan (NSPA), which defined a strategic approach for the pre- and post-transition Afghanistan.

In 2014 United States has made a ten-year financial commitment to Afghanistan for the period 2014-2024, and has signed a Strategic Partnership with Kabul, which includes a military presence in Afghanistan for the next decade, in the form of intelligence operations, Special Forces and training activities. But this continued involvement cannot mask the U.S.'s expected future disengagement. It reveals that, United States is likely to remain an active partner of Afghan Government in the years to come. United States priorities in international security have clearly been reoriented toward the Asia-Pacific region and the 'Greater Middle East'[3]. At the same time, the situation in the Middle East has changed after the Arab Spring (2011), the civil war in Syria and renewed Israeli calls for greater support. This will probably lead to Afghanistan and Central Asia becoming a secondary priority. The sense of future American disengagement is also visible in the State Department's 2011 'new Silk Road' narrative. It is thus expected that, after 2014, United States will modify its perception towards Afghanistan and might reduce its economic floe to Afghanistan. During the 2014 State of the Union Address, President Barack Obama said:

"After 2014, we will support a unified Afghanistan as it takes responsibility for its own future . . . . a small force of Americans could remain in Afghanistan with NATO allies to carry out two narrow

missions: training and assisting Afghan forces and counterterrorism operations to pursue any remnants of al Qaeda"[4]

One of the major strategic developments between United States and Afghan government a few months before the withdrawal of ISAF was the approval of a security agreement. On September 30, 2014, the United States and Afghanistan signed a Bilateral Security Agreement providing the framework for a continued mission to train, advise, and assist the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces (ANDSF) after December 31, 2014. On the same day, the United States, Afghanistan, and NATO allies signed the NATO Status of Forces Agreement, confirming that international efforts to train, advise, and assist the ANDSF would also continue after 2014. On January 1, 2015 the United States and NATO formally ended their combat role in Afghanistan and the ANDSF took full responsibility for securing their country. United States opened a new chapter in its relations with Afghanistan under Resolute Support Mission. The United States and NATO continue to support the ANDSF through train, advise, and assist efforts, however, Afghan forces now lead all combat operations.[5]

US Major Achievements in Afghanistan After 2001

Afghanistan has not been a success story for the United States till now; nor has it been an unmitigated disaster. Some national interests have been achieved with hard struggle, but the cost in so doing has been high, and it has taken a very long time.[6] During the last 14 years, Afghanistan has been transformed, politically, educationally, socially and economically despite large scale conflict. The pool of human capital has been enormously expanded and extended, especially among youth, many of whom make up a mass of aspiring and motivated citizens eager to make a positive difference. Even if the outcome of the 2014 presidential election was contentious, the core notion of democracy has grown, with citizens increasingly expressing their demands for participation and accountability.[7] The status of women, while still uneven and subject to much debate has changed profoundly. Girl education which was zero in 2001 has made significant change. There is a pluralistic media and a level of political sophistication that would not have been imaginable 13 years ago. While challenges still abound and Afghanistan remains a country at risk, unfortunately the narrative of failure has drowned out some of the successes; the troubles of the Kabul Bank make headlines,

but the very favourable scores on the public expenditure and financial accountability assessment do not. Perhaps most impressive, what has been achieved has been achieved despite on-going conflict.

Afghanistan has achieved three successful presidential elections in the past 14 years (2001-2014). With regard to the development of military, the country built up more than 350,000 national security forces in the past years. Progress has also been achieved on the economic level: per capita GDP increased from 115 USD in 2001 to 678 USD in 2012.[8] Furthermore, Afghanistan is well on its way to joining the World Trade Organization (WTO). The Government of Afghanistan also got the membership of World Trade Organization (WTO) at the 10th WTO Ministerial Conference in Nairobi, Kenya, on December 17, 2015 and became164th member of World Trade Organisation.[9] Despite these economic and security transformations Afghanistan is still facing important challenges of Taliban and: the country is experiencing a threefold transition process, on the political, security and economic level. 2014 is an important year for Afghanistan because at the political level there was a political transition and the transfer of political power shifted from President Karzai to his successor Ashraf Ghani. At the security level, NATO forces withdraw its most of troops, leaving with 9800 troops in Afghanistan to train Afghan soldiers and Afghan forces. Afghan Forces are not so competent to take the responsibility of security amid ongoing insurgency led by Taliban. At the economic level, there will be an economic transition, the belief that international donors might reduce the economic assistance to Afghanistan in the post 2014 period and with significant reduction of NATO military spending in Afghanistan as a result of the troop's withdrawal. NATO has spent more than 100 billion dollars a year in Afghanistan, which had a significant economic spill over on the local economy. The uncertainty about 2014 has had a negative impact on foreign investment and contributed to capital flight from Afghanistan to other countries.

During the past 13 years, United States remained as the chief architecture in the nation building of Afghanistan and spent billions of dollars in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Despite getting success in the field of health, education, reconstruction, security, social sector, etc., United States also lost its 2238 precious lives

in Afghanistan who have sacrificed their lives while fighting with Taliban. United States through its International agency named United States Agency of International Development (USAID) spent billions of dollars in Afghanistan in various sectors which includes;[10]

Agriculture

- Distributed vouchers for improved agricultural inputs to more than one million Afghan farmers across the country for agricultural improvements.
- Afghanistan cultivated more than 118,000 hectares of licit agricultural crops with USAID assistance since 2009.
- More than 400 veterinary field units were established.
- Administered more than 26 million vaccinations to livestock.
- Trained more than 633,000 men and women in improved farm and business skills since 2009.
- Established a $100 million Agricultural Development Fund (ADF) to provide loans to Afghan farmers and on-lending organizations, directly benefitting more than 5,000 farmers across 17 provinces

Democracy and Governance

- Helped extend the outreach of the government by strengthening the Civil Service Commission, resulting in the recruitment of 1,100 new civil servants in insecure provinces
- Increased the participation of women in Afghanistan's two-year judicial training program by 20 percent; notably, the top ten graduates of the May 2011 graduating class were women
- Strengthened the institutional capacity of two key governance institutions: the Afghan Parliament and the Independent Election Commission as well as a number of Afghan civil society organizations working on a range of issues from electoral reform to gender empowerment
- Strengthened the capacity of 112 women-led and/or women-focused organizations, launched the Afghan Women's Advocacy Coalition, and funded a national policy dialogue conference to discuss policy reform priorities
- Increased access to independent media by supporting the establishment of 75 active TV stations, more than 175 new radio stations, several hundred print media, and several dozen websites
- Created more than 100 district level councils, who serve as

governance bodies at the district level, advocating for community members, resolving disputes, and serving as a vital source of stability

- ❖ Provided media training to more than 700 female journalists across the country
- ❖ Built the capacity of elected members of the provincial councils and provincial governors in all 34 provinces, strengthening constituent outreach, advocacy, service delivery, and budget planning
- ❖ Increased revenue in 33 municipalities and improved service delivery based on community input

Economic Growth

- ❖ Helped increase revenue collection, improve the legal and regulatory framework for private sector investment, grow small and medium sized businesses, implement regional trade agreements, and strengthen the government's capacity to manage the economy
- ❖ Created 490,000 new jobs, which can be directly attributed to USAID programs
- ❖ Helped the Afghan Government increase customs revenue by 400 percent during the past four years, as a result of implementing a centralized collection system, and Increase total public revenue by 225 percent to $1.6 billion
- ❖ Expanded access to telecommunications services from one million to 14 million; there are now four mobile network operators with more than 14 million subscribers, with mobile money services that include salary disbursement and utility bill payment applications
- ❖ Assisted in the licensing of 17 licensed commercial banks with $840 million in outstanding loans and $3.5 billion in deposits
- ❖ Facilitated more than 830,000 micro-finance loans to Afghan women during the last eight years and developed more than 175,000 micro- and small-businesses
- ❖ Launched 50 public-private partnerships leveraging more than $95 million from private sector-partners in insurance, communications/ media, apparel, information technology, natural resource extraction, and food processing

Education

- ❖ Contributed to increased enrolment from less than one million in 2003 to more than seven million today, 37 percent of whom are girls, and an increase in teachers from 20,000 to 164,000 (30 percent female). According to another source in 2001, only 900,000

children were in school, basically none of them were girls. In 2014 the figure had increased to 8.5 million, of which 39 per cent are girls.[11]

- ❖ Contributed to increased enrolment in universities from fewer than eight thousand students to 63,000 in 24 higher education institutions and trained more than 53,000 teachers (31 percent female) in 11 provinces
- ❖ Provided community-based schools for more than 103,000 (68 percent female) children in remote areas and supported the development of more than 1,900 school management councils
- ❖ Trained more than 223,100 adult learners in literacy, numeracy, and productive skills courses
- ❖ Printed and distributed more than 97 million textbooks and supported development of the national teacher training curricula, manuals, and materials, which are used in all 34 provinces
- ❖ Supported 132 professors and civil servants in obtaining graduate degrees from U.S. universities
- ❖ Developed the only Master's in Education degree in Afghanistan at Kabul Education University, graduating 44 professors (50 percent female)

Health

- ❖ Financed 530 health facilities, including six hospitals, in 13 provinces; these facilities served approximately 11,000,000 people in 2011
- ❖ Trained more than 21,000 healthcare providers, including more than 1,700 midwives (accounting for over half of all midwives trained in the past 10 years) and 3,612 community health workers, contributing to a 40 percent contraceptive prevalence rate in the 13 USAID-supported provinces, more than double the national average
- ❖ Contributed to a 16 percent decline in mortality rates for infants during the last 15 years; medically-assisted deliveries also rose rapidly, from 14 percent in 2003 to 34 percent in 2010, contributing to a significant decline in maternal deaths
- ❖ Supported the implementation and institutionalization of the first National Health Accounts, which provide critically important health financing information for planning and long-term sustainability of the Ministry of Public Health
- ❖ Created the Disease Early Warning System, a national system of infectious disease surveillance that collects information on

15 targeted communicable diseases on a weekly basis from 274 sentinel sites across all 34 provinces

- ❖ Developed the national Health Management Information System in the Ministry of Public Health that strengthened monitoring and evaluation of health services and created a culture of evidence-based decision-making

Infrastructure

- ❖ Strengthened Afghan capacity to design, build, and maintain roads; increase the supply of reliable electricity; expand access to potable water; and design and construct schools, clinics, and hospitals; since 2006, USAID has invested more than $1.5 billion on infrastructure improvements
- ❖ Rehabilitated nearly 2,500 kilometers of regional and national roads increasing access to marketplaces and international trade; eighty percent of Afghans now live within 50 km of the improved Ring Road, giving Afghans better connections to their country's major transportation routes, and facilitating their access to markets, schools, health clinics and government services
- ❖ Supported the addition of 230 megawatts worth of new electricity generation, providing power to 1.5 million residents
- ❖ Strengthened Afghan capacity to expand access to potable water, manage trans-boundary issues, and govern the water sector
- ❖ Implemented water and sanitation projects in Kabul and rural areas to expand access to water for more than 300,000
- ❖ Supported 230 MW of new electricity generation, providing power to 1.5 million Kabul residents
- ❖ Expanded transmission and distribution nationally while improving technical and management capacities of the national utility

Withdrawal of International Security Assistance Forces: A Choice or Force

Donald John Trump is an American businessman, politician, television personality, author, and candidate for the Republican nomination for President of the United States in the 2016 election says that United States policy after 9/11 in Afghanistan to attack Taliban was a mistake but he recommended that troops in Afghanistan needs to stay after 2014 to avoid collapse of government and maintain stability[12] About 54 per cent of American believe the decision to send US troops into Afghanistan in 2001 was not a mistake, according to a June 2015 Gallup

poll. Still, 42% of Americans say the war was a mistake, according to the same poll.[13]

The visit of the Afghan President and Chief Executive to Washington this week is crucial because it is likely to lay down the framework for future US engagement and involvement in Afghanistan. Reports in the US media suggest that Afghan leaders are going to urge the American President to stall the pull-out of US troops and rejig the withdrawal plan.[14] For its part, the Obama administration has already made some adjustments in the draw-down schedule and has also allowed US troops to engage in combat operations against the Taliban if US interests are at stake or in danger. But whether or not the US will accede to the requests of the Afghan leadership and extend its military mission in Afghanistan beyond 2016 will depend on not just how much the Afghan leaders can convince the Americans about their future plans but also on domestic politics in the US. Moreover, global geopolitics and new hotspots in the Middle East could divert US attention and commitment away from Afghanistan.

The decision to slow down the US troop withdrawals for at least this year has certainly infused a degree of confidence among most Afghans that they are not being abandoned or thrown to the wolves. While the panic bells have stopped ringing for now, the sense of gloom has not dissipated entirely, and for good reason. But for the alarming rise and the lightening advances made by the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, which at one point threatened to over-run even Baghdad, chances are that the Obama administration would have stuck to the original withdrawal schedule. Post the emergence of the challenge posed by the IS, the Americans realised that with their troops pulling out, Afghanistan could easily suffer a similar fate, something that would reduce to dust all the blood and treasure that had been spent to rebuild Afghanistan. The problem, however, is that this is at best a temporary readjustment, a last throw of the dice if you will, and by no means a strategic decision to stay the course and finish the job of eliminating the Taliban/Al Qaeda combine in Afghanistan.

Clearly, delaying the drawdown is not going to change the dynamics in Afghanistan in any significant way. At best, continued US presence will prolong the military stalemate. It will not solve the problem of the Islamists running rampant across the length and breadth of Afghanistan. After all, if nearly 150,000 foreign troops with the most awe-inspiring

weaponry and technology couldn't pacify the country, much less decisively defeat the Taliban/Al Qaeda conglomerate, there is no way that 12,000 odd troops would be able to make any difference in changing the ground situation. But even the stalemate will be temporary because while the US presence might be able to keep the Taliban at bay in 2015, the next year will be a different story, or even the year after. What is more, the stalemate means continuation of the high attrition rates in the Afghan security forces. While they have held up reasonably well for now, no army can sustain such high attrition rates indefinitely. The Taliban, on the other hand, have managed to not just carry on their fight but also force the exit of foreign troops despite suffering enormous casualties. To expect them to enter into a peace deal at this stage when they see themselves on the cusp of victory is akin to wanting the moon.

What this means is that by prolonging its troop presence in Afghanistan, the US will not be solving anything. In fact, it will only be reinforcing failure. Worse, it will make it impossible for the Americans to address the root of the problem in Afghanistan – Pakistan. As long as US troops stay in Afghanistan, they will remain dependent on Pakistani Ground Lines of Communication (GLOCs). It was precisely this factor that forced the US to turn a blind eye to the double game that the Pakistanis played for more than a decade, a double game which was recently acknowledged by the former dictator, General Pervez Musharraf.

In terms of causalities among the Coalition partners, United States shares the largest number of causalities of its soldiers, as per data, 67.77 percent of total causalities were of American troops. This statically tabulated data is also a source of worry for the American community that is why some percent of civil society recommended the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan.

Coalition Military Fatalities[15] (2001-2016)

Year	US	UK	Other	Total
2001	12	0	0	12
2002	49	3	18	70
2003	48	0	10	58
2004	52	1	7	60
2005	99	1	31	131
2006	98	39	54	191
2007	117	42	73	232

2008	155	51	89	295
2009	317	108	96	521
2010	499	103	109	711
2011	418	46	102	566
2012	310	44	48	402
2013	127	9	25	161
2014	55	6	14	75
2015	22	2	3	27
2016	11	0	2	13
Total	**2389**	**455**	**681**	**3525**

Moreover, United States took unilateral decision for withdrawal from Afghanistan whose implications might by tolerated by the Afghan Government. The decision of withdrawal was thus US oriented not Afghan oriented because United States does not want to lose its forces in Afghanistan further and finally handed over the responsibility to Afghan forces. United States thereafter relied on aerial attacks on Taliban as a 'Safe Strategy'. Through this, United States have the minimum possibilities to lose its forces and maximum chances to destroy and disrupt Taliban. As a part of this strategy, United States killed Mullah Akhter Mansur in Pakistan areas.

Emerging Problems in Afghanistan after the Withdrawal of ISAF

Withdrawal of International Security Assistance Forces from Afghanistan does not proclaim the stability in Afghanistan. After the withdrawal of International Security Assistance Forces, Afghanistan again emerged as an arena of instability and chaos. Though United States and other members of Resolute Support Mission are active in Afghanistan but the burden of security finally relies upon Afghan government. Apart from security there are various other issues and challenges which Afghan government likely to face after the withdrawal of ISAF. The most important ones follow:

Corruption: Corruption has been a problem in Afghanistan since long. The United States and other prominent donor nations have continued to pour billions of dollars into the country for development and reconstruction but without a comprehensive anti-corruption strategy or policy. In 2010, about 19 people stole nearly $1 billion from Afghanistan's largest private bank.[16] Throughout the past 13 years, high

levels of corruption and bad governance have seriously thwarted the international community's efforts to stabilise Afghanistan. Millions of dollars that were allocated for the reconstruction and development of Afghanistan were misused or wasted.[17] According to Transparency International, Afghanistan in 2015 ranked 166th-worst out of 168 countries, ahead of only Somalia and North Korea when it comes to public perceptions of corruption.[18] Ninety percent of Afghans say that corruption is a problem in their daily lives. From 2006-2015, more than 76% of Afghans surveyed, on average, said that corruption is a major problem in the country.[19] Despite government efforts to curb corruption, 89.9% of Afghans say that corruption is a problem in their daily lives, the highest percentage reported in a decade, with 61.1% saying it is a major problem and 28.8% saying it is a minor problem. Helmand (84.8%) and Kabul (81.3%) are the two provinces where the highest proportion of residents say that corruption is a major problem, and Panjshir (11.0%) is the lowest. This year, over half (53.3%) of Afghans who had contact with police within the past year say they paid a bribe, up from 45.1% in 2014 and exceeding the previous high of 53.4% in 2011. The frequency of bribes paid to officials in the municipality/ district office (66.0%), the judiciary and courts (63.4%), customs office (61.2%), provincial governor's office (60.9%), when applying for a job (58.7%), state electricity supply (54.9%), ANP (53.3%), public health services (52.6%), ANA (43.2%), and admissions to school/ university (43.0%) all rose in 2015.[20]

Issue of Rising Drugs: As Matthieu Aikins in December 2014, pointed out that, "After 13 years of war, we haven't defeated the Taliban, but we have managed to create a nation ruled by drug lords".[21] He further added that about 6400 tons opium was produced in Afghanistan in 2014 which is about 90 percent of the world's total. It is interesting to mention here that this 90 percent ic cultivated in Taliban Controlled Areas only. The opium industry accounts for about 15 percent of Afghanistan's GDP, a "figure that is set to rise as the West withdraws." The US has spent more than $7.6 billion trying to crush the Afghan opium trade, but it's stronger than ever. Sopko has said in the past that recent gains in areas like women's rights, health, and education are in jeopardy due to the country's booming narcotics trade. The problem now, he writes, is that the United States no longer sees fighting narcotics as one of its top priorities in the country. In 2015, 97% of total opium cultivation in

Afghanistan took place in the Southern, Eastern and Western regions of the country, which include the country's most insecure provinces.

Security and Stability. Since the formation of the National Unity Government, President Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah have been cooperative and committed partners with the United States and international community on security matters. President Ghani remains active and engaged in his role as Commander in Chief as he contends with complex internal political and security challenges. President Ghani is a willing and welcoming potential partner in the Resolute Support Mission and wants to see both U.S. and Afghan interests met. One of Ghani's first acts as president was to sign the Bilateral Security Agreement, and he remains a strong advocate of a continued U.S. presence in Afghanistan. The United States is in a position to support Ghani as he leads Afghanistan into a new decade of transformation that includes a long-term and effective Afghan-U.S. security partnership, although he will face tough requirements to preserve the security of the country even so. According to a United Nations report, 2015 was the deadliest year for Afghan civilians with more than 11,000 killed and wounded - the highest number recorded since the U.S.-led invasion in 2001. The report documented 3,545 civilian deaths, a 4% increase from 2014, and 7,457 injuries, a 9% increase.[22] A recent report cited in the Long War Journal counted 35 of Afghanistan's 398 districts under Taliban control, with another 35 being contested.[23] In October 2015, the Washington announced that its forces will remain in Afghanistan at their current levels (6800) throughout much of 2016. This is because of perpetual clash with the Taliban forces in various contested zones whose number ship according to Long War Journal is 35. Thus, many areas continue to face significant threats by Taliban fighters, particularly in Helmand and Kunduz provinces. In the first half of 2015, the causalities civilians in Afghanistan from war reached a record high, with more than 70% of the casualties attributed to actions by the Taliban and other anti-governmental non state actors. This is one of the serious security issues in Afghanistan in the Post 2014 period. Taliban and other non-state actors are the overt cause of causalities, while ground engagements and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) remain the other leading cause of casualties. In January 2009, United Nations Mission in Afghanistan (UNMA) has started to record civilian casualties and according to its report until June 30, 2015, more than 19,000 civilians have been killed,

and more than 33,000 injured in the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan.[24] Moreover, as per United Nations report in 2015, due to insecurity, more than 1, 20, 000 people in Afghanistan has applied for political asylum in 44 countries in the world.[25]

Weak Afghan Security Forces: the biggest challenge for Afghan government in post 2014 is the development of competent Afghan National Army and Police which is still weak. According to Pentagon Report, the security situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated in the year 2015 with more Taliban assaults and higher casualties among Afghan security forces. This report further alarmed that ISIS is becoming a greater threat in that country. The covert emergence of ISIS is a major threat the security apparatus of Afghanistan. One of the major cause of weak Afghan forces according to Military Times is weak leadership. About 70 percent of the Afghan military's problems stem from weak leadership.[26]

In October 2015, Taliban occupied Kunduz province of Afghanistan which posed a threat to the Afghan Security Forces and United States as well. Since January 26, 2015 a branch of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria called Wilayah Koharasan (Wilayah an Arabic word means to administer and Koharasan is a part of Afghanistan which in the past was with Iran) is active in Afghanistan which is not only an opponent of Afghan government but Taliban also. This group according to various sources killed 327 peoples and injured more than 670 from 18 April 2015 to 24 October 2016. Not only ISIS but the regular attacks of Taliban in the post 2014 period is an indication of the emergence of a new era of war in Afghanistan which is likely to exist between Afghan Forces and Taliban and ISIS.

Financial Weakness: Financially**,** Afghanistan is one of the poorest countries in the World. Afghanistan's domestic revenues accounted for less than 40 percent of the total budget in 2013, a figure that's unlikely to change soon.[27] Thus, the financial issue in Afghanistan is a big problem in the coming years because Afghanistan is among the poorest countries with low Gross Domestic Product and has been a rentier state since 2001.The evidence of low GDP and other parameters of developments in Afghanistan strongly suggests that Afghanistan lacks the capacity or ability to enhance financial, technical, managerial, or otherwise to maintain and support much of what has been built or established from the last 13 years through international assistance. Moreover,

Afghanistan lacks skilled labour, technological innovation, capacity building and training which are the important parameters of prosperity.

Lack of Coherent Strategy of Contracts and Inaccuracy: Afghan civil society does not know the financial utilization in Afghanistan development and reconstruction. Nobody knows how much we've spent on contracts for Afghan reconstruction since 2002. A 2013 SIGAR estimate put the value at roughly $37 billion between 2002 and 2013. Many of the contracts appear to lack overall management and controls for things like shoddy work and "widespread lack of compliance with published rules, policies, and standards." Plus, US civilian oversight officials can safely access only a fifth of the country.

Afghan Officials and Management of US Aid: For years, most American support to Afghanistan came in the form of contracts and grants. Afghan officials didn't have much control over how the money was spent. But since 2010, the US has tried to funnel more aid through the Afghan government. But pervasive corruption, lack of capability, and inadequate oversight leave Sopko thinking that Afghanistan's leaders can't manage the money going forward.

War and Reconstruction Issues: Planning for military success and reconstruction goals doesn't always mesh, and Sopko sees that problem getting worse in the months ahead. The failure to ensure that American efforts in Afghanistan are making things better, he writes, "threatens to cause agencies and projects to work at counter-purposes, spend money on frivolous endeavours, or fail to coordinate efforts to maximize impact.

United States Policy Towards Afghanistan After 2014

After 2014, United States again opened a new chapter in its Afghan policy by introducing the Resolute Support Mission. Train, Advise, Assist and Command (TAAC) emerged as the principal initiative as a part of US Policy in Afghanistan in the post 2014 era. With support from the Afghan government and the Afghan people, United States forces are conducting two well-defined and complementary missions as part of US policy, i.e. Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Freedom's Sentinel (OFS) to achieve US objectives and build upon the gains of the last 14 years. Regarding the missions of operation Freedom Sentinel US in Afghanistan after 2014, US Defence Secretary, Shunk Hagel, said that, the mission will include two important components:

working with allies and partners on Resolute Support and continuing counterterrorism operations against the remnants of Al-Qaeda to ensure that Afghanistan is never used to attack United States again.[28]

NATO led the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan from August 2003 to December 2014. ISAF was deployed at the request of the country's authorities and mandated by the United Nations. Its mission was to enable the Afghan authorities to provide effective security across the country and ensure that the country would never again be a safe haven for terrorists. ISAF conducted security operations, while also training and developing the Afghan security forces. Following a three-year transition process during which the Afghans gradually took the lead for security across the country, ISAF's mission was completed at the end of 2014. With that, Afghans assumed full responsibility for security. It is now fully in the hands of the country's 352,000 soldiers and police, which ISAF helped train over the past years.[29] However, support for the continued development of the Afghan security forces and institutions and wider cooperation with Afghanistan continue. ISAF helped create to a secure environment for improving governance and socio-economic development, which are important conditions for sustainable stability. Afghanistan has made the largest percentage gain of any country in basic health and development indicators over the past decade. Maternal mortality is going down and life expectancy is rising. There is a vibrant media scene. Millions of people have exercised their right to vote in five election cycles since 2004, most recently in the 2014 presidential and provincial council elections, which resulted in the establishment of a National Unity Government. While the Afghan security forces have made a lot of progress, they still need international support as they continue to develop. At the NATO Summit in Wales in September 2014, ISAF troop-contributing nations underlined their commitment to continue to support Afghanistan post-2014. Following the completion of the mission of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) at the end of 2014, a new, follow-on, NATO-led mission called Resolute Support Mission was launched on 1 January 2015 to provide further training, advice and assistance for the Afghan security forces and institutions. At the NATO Summit in Warsaw, Allied leaders decided to extend the presence of RSM beyond 2016. Some 13,000 personnel from NATO member states and partner countries are deployed in Afghanistan to support of the Resolute

Support Mission (RSM) led by NATO. The mission operates with one central hub (in Kabul/Bagram) and four spokes in Mazar-e Sharif, Herat, Kandahar and Laghman.

Key Functions of the Resolute Mission Include[30]

- ❖ Supporting planning, programming and budgeting;
- ❖ Assuring transparency, accountability and oversight;
- ❖ Supporting the adherence to the principles of rule of law and good governance;
- ❖ Supporting the establishment and sustainment of such processes as force generation, recruiting, training, managing and development of personnel.

Afghanistan war is not over, now after 2014; it is the war between the Government of Afghanistan and Taliban. The occupation of Kunduz province of Afghanistan by the Taliban forces put a question mark on the credibility of Afghan security forces as well as US training mission so called 'Resolute Support Mission'. It becomes clear that the Afghan war is still raging with no end in sight as the Taliban are ever more resurgent with deadly effect. The major shocking suicide bombing, led by Taliban was occurred on June 30, 2016 which killed 30 police cadets and injured another 58.[31] It took place in the capital, Kabul, presumably the safest city in Afghanistan. As mentioned earlier, the US and its NATO allies began Mission Resolute Support in January 2015 by giving the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) full security responsibility. More than 18 months on, ANSF continues to struggle with many security challenges, discipline, staffing, lack of adequate leadership, and so on. However, President Obama, calling the security situation precarious, announced that 8400 troops will remain in the country through the end of his term.[32] As President Obama reaffirmed on October 15, 2015, current U.S. strategy and objectives in Afghanistan are to disrupt threats posed by al Qaeda, support the Afghan National Security Forces , and give the Afghan people the opportunity to succeed as they stand on their own. The U.S. strategy in Afghanistan remains centred on working with NATO partners and the international community to provide financial and advisory support to the Afghan government to enable a well-trained, equipped, and sustainable ANDSF to provide security in Afghanistan; and continuing efforts to defeat the remnants of core Al-Qaeda and disrupt other extremist groups to ensure Afghanistan does not again

become a safe haven for terrorist groups to plan and execute attacks against the United States, United States persons overseas, or allies and partners.

The United States and Afghan governments agree that the best way to ensure lasting peace and security in Afghanistan is reconciliation and a political settlement with the Taliban. Success of an Afghan-led peace process will require the Taliban and other armed opposition groups to end violence, break ties with international terrorist groups, and accept Afghanistan's constitution, including its protections for the rights of women and under-represented groups. In the meantime, developing ANDSF capabilities, Afghan security ministry capacity, and supporting Afghan leadership are critical to enabling the Afghan government to secure the country against a persistent insurgent threat.

First, through OFS U.S. forces are continuing the counterterrorism mission against al Qaeda and its associates in Afghanistan to prevent its resurgence and external plotting against the homeland and U.S. targets and interests in the region. Second, in coordination with NATO Allies and Resolute Support partner nations, U.S. forces are conducting a TAA mission to continue building the capabilities and long-term sustainability of the ANDSF. The U.S. supports the institutionalization of ANDSF gains by conducting functionally based security force assistance (SFA) as part of the NATO RS mission. U.S. and coalition forces conduct TAA efforts at the ANA corps level, the ANP equivalent level, and with the Afghan security ministries to improve their ability to support and sustain the fighting force, and at the tactical level for special operations units and the AAF.

Based on the requirements of the U.S. counterterrorism mission and RS objectives, the U.S. presence in Afghanistan will undergo a phased reduction over the next two years. On October 15, 2015, after a review of the 2015 fighting season by the Commander, Resolute Support and the National Security Council, President Obama announced that U.S. forces will maintain their current force posture of up to 9,800 military personnel through most of 2016.[33] Additionally, rather than draw down to a normalized Kabul embassy-based presence by the end of 2016, the United States will maintain 5,500 military personnel at a small number of bases in Kabul and Bagram with regional outstations, including in Jalalabad in the east and Kandahar in the south. NATO Allies and RS operational partner nations will undergo a similar phased reduction in

2016 and may maintain a similar limited regional presence through a continued NATO mission. The planned reduction to 5,500 military personnel will allow the United States to tailor TAA efforts to continue developing key ANDSF capabilities in areas such as aviation and special operations as well as maintain a U.S. capability to deter threats in the region. This refocused force posture will maintain U.S. efforts to increase the sophistication and sustainability of the ANDSF and provide the presence necessary to achieve U.S. objectives in countering the remnants of al Qaeda or other extremist groups. This posture reflects a consolidation of U.S. forces as well as those efficiencies gained by working with and sharing functions with NATO partners and the ANDSF.

Conclusion

United States did not quit from Afghanistan, there is partial withdrawal of NATO led ISAF from Afghanistan. The policies in Afghanistan are being changed according to situation. Though there is withdrawal of ISAF from Afghanistan but, United States have changed the nature of its Afghan Policy aftermath 2014 from 'combat to support'. One of the major turning points of withdrawal is that the full-fledged combat mission has come to an end and in its place Operation Resolute Support has been initiated. As a part of Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA), 9800 US troops stationed in Afghanistan which subsequently reduces to 8600 in 2016. Moreover, currently there are three missions working in the development of Afghanistan; Resolute Support Mission led by United States NATO, EU Police (EUPOL) Mission in Afghanistan led by European Union and United Nation Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNMA) led by United Nations.

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QAJAR WOMEN
The Pioneers of Modern Women Education in Persia

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Abstract
Modern education for women in Persia would have been nothing more than wishful thinking, had it not been brought, both in terms of thought as well as practice, by some outstanding Qajar women of the 19th century like Bibi Khanom Astarabadi and Tuba Azmoudeh, and eminent Persian thinkers like Mirza Agha and Ruhi . Historically education for women in Persia had been limited to madrassah characterizing a parochial system of education and private tuitions at home until the beginning of the Qajar period. The Qajar era witnessed a path-breaking transformation in terms of a progressive approach that women should be educated on the modern lines because they are the educators of the young generation and that their social standing determines the fate of humanity. This approach initiated a complete break with the traditional past which gradually transformed the standing of Persian women from an insignificant status – za'ifeh (the weak sex); manzel (the home) and moti'eh (those obedient to men's will), to the status of murabiyyan (educators). It has been only about a century since girls were for the first time formally admitted to schools in 1835 and only about some 75 years since they experienced higher education for the first time. Towards the end of 19th century education for women expanded slowly with female enrollment of over 7200. In this paper at attempt has been made to sequentially highlight the status, work culture, literacy and the role of Qajar women in formal-cum-modern education of women in Persia.

Keywords
Qajar Women, Persia, Muslim women, Modern Education, Women Education, Anjomans, Constitutional Revolution, Majles.

Introduction

Struggling behind the closed doors at home and prohibited from every facility i.e. education, training and social life women were treated as mindless beings in pre-Qajar Persia. They were confined to a life of household drudgery and child-bearing, and were considered slaves of their husbands as observed by Bibi Khanum Astarabadi[1] an outspoken and prominent Qajar woman.[2] Similarly Seyyed Jamalzadeh a noted Persian novelist while describing women's absence in public commented:

"*No women can be seen in this country of men, but strangely half of the walking population in the streets is wrapped in black bags from head to the toe without even an opening to breathe*."

Clara Rice, a British orientalist, observed:[3]

"*Most trades are in the hands of men.... All occupations followed by them [women] call for manual work rather than brainwork*."

In the late 19th and early 20th century Persia was economically backward, politically chaotic and a patriarchal society. Its women while leading a secluded life were differentiated by class and were culturally diverse. The underdeveloped economy and polity, and the patriarchal tendencies intimately defined a woman's position although a few women's political activism culminated in what might loosely be called feminism.[4] Women's three piece dress consisting of the *chador* (a long cloth that covered them from head to toe), the *rubandeh* (a short cloth that masked the face) and the *chaqchur* (very loose trousers), signified their separate world carrying an identity as a *zai'feh* (the weak sex) and status as *moti'eh* (those obedient to men's will). Strictly forbidden the public domain, their houses or rooms had no windows facing the streets and the outside world, and their mobility was severely controlled. Elite and wealthy women, particularly, seldom went out as the men of their class would not approve. When they did, they sat in a closed carriage alone or with other women or children. Feminist activist of the time, Badr al-Moluk Bamdad, wrote that in Tehran after four in the afternoon, the streets would be segregated with men walking on one side and women on the other. In case a woman needed to cross the street to reach her home, she was required to obtain authorization from the street police. Even then she would be scolded and addressed as: "walk faster *zai'feh* and tighten up your veil," the police would say.[5] They spent most of their lives in the private world of the family. A common name for a wife was *manzel* (the home). Rich or poor, women were confined and devoted their entire lives to the household activities. A women's world was that of the *pardeh-neshin* - one who sat inside behind the curtained windows.[6]

Women generally experienced disapproval right from birth. Unless girls were born in well-to-do families, their birth was less enthusiastically welcomed. In some families it was traditionally a

nang (social disgrace) to give birth to girls. Wealthier families showed greater tolerance towards their daughters. They provided child care and hired private tutors to teach them reading and writing in Persian, Arabic and French as well as sewing and embroidery. In sum despite variations in different classes women were primarily confined to the private and secluded household life. Higher the women would be on the social scale, more secluded and less mobile they were. By contrast, less-privileged women were more mobile and less secluded. Class and patriarchy[7] acted together to shape women's lives.

Her work in the household and in the marketplace was intertwined.[8] Depending on the kinds of work they performed, working Persian women often combined child rearing with their routine house job. While the women encountered male domination both in household and marketplace, the economically secure women stayed home and experienced patriarchy more directly there. Gender subordination varied by class in so far as women's work was concerned. She performed diverse activities. Poor women worked as carpet weavers, vendors, domestic laborers, and seamstresses.[9] In the nineteenth century, in order to maximize profits, European firms set up organizations in cities for the systematic collection of Persian carpets. The carpet industry helped the domestic economy and it partially counterbalanced the system that took place in some areas of the economy, like textile production, handicrafts, and other works involving artisans. Women played a crucial economic role for this industry whose growth is described as "fortuitous" for the economy.

Another observation follows:

> "*Carpet weavers worked under deplorable conditions. The factories were damp and cold; with the looms crowded in back to back, and the workers crouched on a wooden plank shelf or scaffolding. The scaffold is more or less typical picture of a number of small factories, which average from six to fourteen looms with five workers at a loom. Some of the factories are doubtless even worse*".[10]

The typical earnings of female carpet weavers were a net wage of not more than two *Qerans* per working day. Women worked not at their own / for their interest but in the interest of the family. Carpet weaving formed an exploitative industry in which weavers worked hard, received little.[11] Girls usually experienced severe damage to their health as they

grew older. The struggle against poverty brought serious health hazards. But the work of poor women regardless of their marital status was often essential to the survival of the household in a fluid subsistence economy.[12] Women's work extended to other areas also. Those with superior needle skills produced embroidery, hand-crafted clothes, shoes, and fabrics, merchants who provided capital. Many women also worked as cheap domestic laborers for wealthy families, particularly, in Tehran and Tabriz. Some earned low wages, many received only food and shelter in return for their services, and a few were sexually abused by the household head or physically punished. A few drew small incomes as fortune tellers, *dallaks* (bath attendants), *rakhtshoors* (laundresses), prostitutes, dancers and singers for private parties. Some were saleswomen outside the bazaars selling jewelry, cosmetics and fabrics and travelled door-to-door. More professional women included healers, midwives, and leaders of religious ceremonies who conducted popular religious ceremonies such as the rituals of mourning, *Qoran-khani* (gatherings to read the Qur'an), *rouzeh-khani* (gatherings to commemorate religious rituals and history), and participating in *sufreh* (religious feasts). A few religious women also reached the level of *mojtahed*.[13] Economically secure women usually spent much time at home, make sweets and *sherbets*, practice the piano and such traditional musical instruments as the harmonica or the tar, and read poetry and literature.[14]

Royal Women and Education

Qajar histories, biographical dictionaries, and memoirs provide some information about educated women of the court. Mohammad Hasan E'temaad-al-Saltana mentions of forty women who were well educated, wrote poetry and prose, were accomplished calligraphers and painters, and were also versed in languages like Ottoman Turkish and French. Some also had private libraries and female scribes as attested by seals and inscriptions on surviving manuscripts. Among the most important writings by women of this period is *Ma 'aayeb al-rejaal* by an author identified on the manuscript as Bibi Khanom Estarabadi (b.1858) and *Kaateraat* by Taj-al-Saltana (b. 1883). Some medieval books on ethical instruction and counsel reveal that teaching women to read was recommended in royal families.[15] Girls were sometimes sent to *maktabs* until the age of eight or nine years to be taught rudimentary reading and

writing and to receive religious instruction. However there were also a number of women who were educated beyond such elementary levels at home like Amena Baygom[16] daughter of Molla Mohammad Taqi Majlesi (d.1659) and Hamida Esfahani (d. 1677) and her daughter Fatema.[17] Occasionally, women were described as *mojtaheda, faqiha, 'alema* and *mojaza,* indicating thereby, they had reached the highest levels of religious knowledge and had received permission to teach theology and grant their students similar authorization. One such figure in the 19th century was Nur Jahan Tehrani, author of *Nejaat al-moslemaat*, a 372 page manuscript written in 1809.

Reform in Educational Thought and Reconfiguration of Muslim Woman's Identity

As cultural interactions between Persia and Europe intensified, one of the issues defining the differences between the two cultures was the status of women. Women's total deprivation from literacy as a central problem of Muslim nations was repeatedly pointed out. A commentary on a statistical report issued by the Ministry of Commerce and Agriculture in France noted as under:

> "*The difference between women of the West and women of the East is noteworthy. In European countries women are engaged in any work and profession, even in sciences and literature; they are little different from men. To the contrary, in the East, women are not involved in any of this world's affairs; their work is limited to bringing up children and even in that work their low level of knowledge is well known*".[18]

The social lot of women gradually came to be linked to the fate of humanity by prominent literary figures such as Mirza Agha Khan Kirmani and Ruhi who stated that women are the teachers (*murabbi*) in the household and the fountainhead of all progress of humanity.[19] Though few 19th century reformers called for such radical gender parity as Kirmani and Ruhi, by the first decade of the 20th century the argument that women should be educated because they were educators of children, companions of men, and half of the nation got largely accepted. In the last decades of the 19th century education of women emerged as an important element of the modernist project. One of the biggest pushing factor behind this new thought was the Persian translation of a book "*The Liberation of Women"* translated and published by Yusuf Ashtiani

I'tisham al-Mulk in 1900 under the title *Tarbiat-i Nisvan* (Education of Women). Although it did not inspire any public debate but it was well received among the like-minded intellectuals. In its preface, Ashtiani noted that famous Egyptian writers as well as European thinkers had written extensively on women's rights to education but there were still no books in Persian that debated the advantages of women's education. Other reform minded Persian intellectuals also followed this conviction that women's education is the fundamental step in the nation's quest for civilization and expressed with regrets that Muslims have neglected this important matter and have done nothing to educate women. How could anybody hope for progress if their women, the first teachers and educators of children, are captives in the realm of ignorance.

In the first decades of the 20th century women's education came to be considered more important than men's for the fact that an entire educated nation would follow from educated women. One author is reported to have gone so far as to give women's education a higher national priority:

> "*The progress, uplifting, and civilization of every nation, every country, is dependent on three things: first the education of girls, second science, third law.... The education of girls... is far more important than the other two, because sons and daughters are educated by women until they reach school age*".

This shift in the concept and purpose of education proved to be critical for opening the possibility of education for women. Also the concept of education now became centered on literacy. The emphasis on reading and writing marked the transition from a largely oral culture to a print culture. The literacy-centered concept of education led to new techniques of teaching and learning. As literacy became the privileged core of education, the thought of mass education got promoted. Here, religion was also invoked to promote modern mass education. For instance, Mirza Taqi Khan Kashani,[20] stated that after Prophets sent by God to educate people, the task of education be shared by concerned people, the wise men and kings. He also advocated people who matter, should share the government's obligation to provide education. Zuka' al-Mulk, a prominent Qajar intellectual, also argued that people should not expect the government to do everything; the dissemination of knowledge and improvement of industries are among the duties of the nation.

Towards the early 20th century it became a burning issue that women's education should be considered a national priority if the nation were to catch up with progress.[21] Thinkers associated with the "Babi Movement" were also among the earliest advocates of women's literacy and education.[22] Even thinkers who were not Babis like Mirza Fath 'Ali Akundzada, praised the Isma 'ilis and the Babis for educating their daughters and sons in similar fashion. 'Abd-al-Rahim Talebof in his *Ketab-e Ahmad,* depicted Ahmad's sisters Mahrok and Zaynab as participating in his educational regime and benefiting from it.[23] Muslim leaders like Hajj Mirza Hadi Dawlatabadi, father of Sadiqa Dawlatabadi; Shaikh Hadi Najmabadi, father of Aaqa Beygom and Bibi Najmabadi; and Shaikh Mohammad Hosayn Yazdi, husband of Safiya Yazdi, supported establishment of new schools for girls, and female members of their own families turned out to be active educators. They realized that one of the central ways through which women could claim citizenship, was to take charge of female education by finding educational and occupational establishments for girls.

Depiction of Girl Education in Books

Girls began to appear as characters in books designed for the education of the young. A book of parables from 1876 highlighting good and bad character had as many female as male characters in its stories. One of the stories depicted a boy named Mas'ud who's New Year's present to his parents was to demonstrate that he could read any text they chose. Simultaneously, Kawkab, a frivolous girl was disliked by everyone because she was undisciplined and shameless, laughed a great deal for no reason, opened her mouth in front of people and made awful noises, ran around and paid no attention to others, did not greet people properly, talked nonsense, and eavesdropped on others' conversations. On the other hand, Khawrshid Khanum, a four year old exemplary girl is depicted to be impeccable, obedient, and well mannered. Everyone liked her. She got up in the morning with her parents without a fuss, dressed and cleaned herself, performed her ablutions, and prayed. She spent her whole day doing only good things, played by herself, did not bother adults, and was already in a Qur'anic school where she could read the Qur'an and other texts as well, and did not do anything without her mother's permission. This pattern of moral example continued throughout the book.[24] Other educational texts of the period similarly

marked gender distinctions through inclusion of girls. Miftah al-Mulk's *Ta'lim al-atfal* (Teaching Children) in 1897, a manual on teaching the alphabet more efficiently, had drawings of both boys and girls schools. A female character named Fatimah Khanum teaches fundamentals of religion and the names of the twelve Shi'i Imams. Subsequently Mirza Muhammad becomes a prayer leader for his classmates. Fatimah Khanum invites her classmates on a Friday to play with dolls and to sew, and thus they learn the science of housekeeping and the necessary arts.[25]

Identity of Muslim Woman Redefined

As educational thought got redefined, the institution of family also got reconfigured. It got relocated in relation to the national community rather than in relation to the kin and families. As family now became the foundation of country, the role of the Muslim woman also got re envisaged. Within the family, woman as a mother, became its foundation and was no longer a *za'ifeh*. Henceforth her intellectual development became the primary factor in determining the development of the country. Woman's role as nurturer and educator began to take precedence over her pre-modern function as a petty household runner. She became a mother both to her children and to the country, and replaced the father as the manager of the children's upbringing. It can be said that in a way the call for women's education was oriented more towards rearing an educated citizenry, and in order to fulfill this function adequately, a woman herself first had to have a broad education, immense experience and a wide range of knowledge. Also the goals of men's and women's education were different. Whereas man was to be educated in the new sciences so as to fulfill the demand of national politics, economics and modern industry, the woman was, above all, to be educated in the science of home management, this all stands argumented by the following:[26]

> *"A woman cannot run her household well unless she attains a certain amount of intellectual and cultural knowledge. She should learn at least what a man is required to learn up through the primary stage of education... It is important for a woman to be able to read and write, to be able to examine the basis of scientific information, to be familiar with the history, and to be able to acquire knowledge of the natural sciences and politics... A woman who lacks this upbringing will be unable adequately to carry out her role in society or in the family"*

The reconfiguration of the family thus empowered women by putting them in charge of making themselves, their daughters, their sons and husbands as the civilized citizens of a nation.[27] The redefined role of the Muslim women as a mother and wife and the proposition that the progress of the nation depended on the education of women, was discussed repeatedly in the constitutionalist press in the first decade of the 20th century. In the same period the establishment of new schools for girls started gaining momentum as women took charge of girls' education.[28] All of the girls' schools were initially established by women often in their homes. In 1907 women from Tehran presented a petition to the Shah asking for provisions to facilitate women's education. They wrote tirelessly in the press on female education, encouraged women of means to put their resources into the cause, organized fund-raising events, and provided free schooling for girls who could not afford to pay for their education.

Qajar Women - Founders of the Constitution

Studies on the Constitutional Revolution for the most part have hardly mentioned women's role. Such works have created an illusion that the revolution was strictly men's affair which it certainly was not. Indeed women were not only participants in transforming the essentially political revolution of 1906 into the beginnings of a social revolution but they were the very architects of the constitution. The secluded and veiled women exhibited political power that eventually changed the course of history for Persian women as well as men. The constitutional revolution discloses significant information regarding women's lives, their perspectives, national liberation struggles and aspirations for women's progress. Morgan Shuster, the American Treasurer General observed, "*Iranian women became almost at a bound the most progressive, not to say radical, in the world*."[29] He became convinced that the veiled women of Persia who with little or no experience had overnight become teachers, newspaper writers, speakers on political subjects, and accomplished what the women's movement in the West had taken centuries to achieve. Despite the persistence of seclusion and gender inequality women managed to leave their homes, organized *anjomans* and led the constitutional revolution. Torn and caught between the world of tradition and the tumultuous world of change, some women rose against patriarchal polity and society. Women wanted a constitution, education and enfranchisement. By 1906 some

women had organized separate women's societies that were first secret but subsequently became public. According to Morgan Shuster, about a dozen semi-secret women's societies existed in Tehran whose activities were coordinated by a central committee. Janet Afary's study, "*The Iranian Constitutional Revolution 1906-1911"* documents several such societies that were formed in 1907-1911. A few also made donations to the nationalist cause. In 1906 a large number of women protesters stopped the carriage of the monarch asking him to respect the wishes of the clergy and not succumb to foreign powers.

The revolutionary movement succeeded in compelling the monarch to sign a proclamation to create the *Majles* (the National Consultative Assembly) on October 7, 1906. Bayat Phillip and Morgan Shuster, unanimously agree that a large number of these women, particularly, those active in the *anjomans* and those who had formed the nucleus of resistance, came from wealthy urban classes and included daughters and wives of the king, princes, *ulama* and Majles deputies. Sultanzadeh suggests that this women's movement consisted of wealthy women without any participation by proletariat. It is probable that their class background played a significant role in their participation. Higher was the women's socio-economic background, the more extensive were political activities. The extent to which the Qajar women became assertive in the course of the constitutional revolution can very well be gauged from the below given quote:

> *"We shall make laws, coordinate the police, appoint governors, dispatch rules and regulations to provinces, uproot oppression and autocracy and do away with the unmerciful. We shall break into the wheat and barley soils of the rich and set up an organization for distribution of bread. We shall forcibly enter into the vaults of the ministries who sucked the blood of the nation and we shall set up the national bank. We shall expel the Ottoman forces, return the enslaved peasant women of Quchan to their homes, arrange the affairs of the city, give clean water to people, clean up streets and alleys, and set up an organization for the city's affairs, and after all this... tender our resignation and publicly announce that others should carry on the remaining reforms."* [30]

After the constitution got established, in order to uphold the country's economic independence the creation of a national bank

became a prerequisite. For this the collection of funds for the national bank became an issue around which women began to form societies and associations. But 1906 constitution enfranchised only men, not women. It denied women their political rights although it guaranteed equal rights and protection to all Persians. Article 5 of 1906 Supplementary Fundamental Law stated that Iranians are to enjoy equal rights before law. But equal rights applied to men only. Article I of 1906 Electoral Law identified the electors as men of various propertied and non-propertied classes. It implicitly excluded women. Article 3 of the same law explicitly prevented women from voting rights. Furthermore, Article 2 excluded women's representation in the *majles* on the pretext that they failed to be participants in the economic and political affairs of the country. But these discriminatory laws failed to pacify women who even called for the *majles* representatives to resign and hand over the reins of government to women for a short period of 40 days. They insisted on an educational reform that guaranteed the right of all women to education. As early as 1906, a woman whose identity remains unknown, tried to convince one of the prominent *ulama* delegates to the extent that such schools would train girls to become superior mothers and wives. Unable to receive support from the conservative parliament members and a faction of the *ulama* that was antagonistic to their education, women turned against the established authorities and began their own independent initiatives. On January 20, 1907, a women's meeting took place in Tehran and ten resolutions were adopted including the call for setting up girls' schools and abolition of onerous dowries since many believed that the money saved for a girl's dowry should, instead, be spent on her education.

Their next step was to file a petition and ask the *Majles* to officially recognize their *anjomans*. In 1908 they submitted their request but their action created uproar and a number of conservative *ulama* and wealthy merchants declared the *anjomans* as anti-Islamic and heretical. Supporting women, few argued that women's organizations had existed throughout Islamic history and could not be considered un-Islamic. However, the parliament did not discuss women's suffrage until 1940 although women continued their struggles by concentrating on their own specific gender interests. But these struggles cultivated the seeds of feminism indicating that women's real struggle had just begun.

Muslim Women and the Revolution of Modern Education

Initially, it was the American Presbyterian missionaries who established the first modern elementary school in Urmia in 1838 for Assyrian Christian children. However, two Muslim girls entered the school in 1891 and their numbers gradually rose to 120 in 1909. In 1865 "Daughters of Charity" opened schools for girls in Urmia, Salmas, Tabriz, and Isfahan and in 1875 one in Tehran. In 1895 the American school for girls was established in Tehran. Various other missionary denominations also sponsored schools for girls. For instance, the Armenians opened such schools in Tehran in 1870, in Qazvin in 1889, in Soltanabad in 1900, and in Isfahan in 1903. Ettehad, the first Jewish school for girls in Tehran was established by the Alliance Israelite Universelle in 1898. In Kerman Zoroastrians established *Enaat-e jamsidi* for girls in 1902. *Tarbiat-e banaat* was established in Tehran by Bahais in 1911.

Educational institutions for Muslim women did not exist until the turn of the century. Learning at home from tutors was primarily available to well-to-do women until the establishment of the first modern Muslim school for girls. It is these privileged Muslim women who became aware of the value of education from tutorials at home although they could not use it for public services immediately. Some young girls received insignificant training through *maktab khaneh* (informal educational system) under which the clergy taught classes but most teachers were nearly illiterate. Teachers offered some lessons from the Qur'an in Arabic but girls rarely learned to read or write. Moreover, a widely spread superstition was there that educated women would threaten the morality of the society, or once women learned the art of writing, they would write love letters and generally undermine the existing social order. Although, most women were unschooled, their education even though minimal represented a challenge to many men who were anxious not to lose their privilege over women's mind.[31] Nevertheless, Muslim women realized that education is a key to their advancement. Hence in an effort to restrain and confront the patriarchal control, they decided to establish schools for girls.

The first modern Muslim school for girls was *Parvaresh*, established in the Tehran home of Mirza Hasan Rosdiya in 1903 with Tuba Rosdiya his sister-in-law as its founder and first principal enrolling 17 students. However the government officials objected to the foundation of the school because of which it was forced to be closed. Then was *Dusizagan*

in 1906 established by Bibi Khanum Astarabadi. This school also faced a lot of opposition following which Astarabadi referred a complaint to the ministry of education but they responded that it was advisable to close the school. She then met Sani-od-dowleh the then minister of education and this time her request was granted on a condition that only girls between 4 to 6 years of age would be accepted and the word girl should be dropped from the board of the school. Ultimately it was *Namus* (Honor) established in 1908 by Tuba Azmoudeh near Hassanabad for 20 girls which grew into a large middle school for girls with 400 pupils.[32] This institute inspired the creation of many more girls' private schools in Iran and consequently similar schools were opened in provincial capitals like *Banaat* in Qazvin (1908), *Banaat-e eslami* in Rast (1911), and *Fatemiya* in Shiraz (1920).[33] By 1911 there were 47 schools for girls in Tehran alone with an enrollment of 2,187 pupils compared to 78 for boys with an enrollment of 8,344.

Daughter of a colonel, Azmoudeh, married at the age of 14 and learnt Persian, Arabic, and French from tutors hired by her husband. Devoted to women's education with no financial or moral support from the government, she held the first classes at her own house. She saw no contradiction between women's education and Islamic teachings. She incorporated religious texts and the study of Qur'an into the curriculum and with the teaching help of her female friends, her school offered women well-rounded education in Persian studies and home economics. Her opponents soon destroyed her small school and harassed her students in the streets with accusations of immorality and unchastity. Despite her fears she persisted in her ambitions of breaking away from the social norms and cultural traditions regarding women. Shortly afterwards she moved Namus to a larger building and even added secondary school classes and evening classes for adult and working women. She expanded the school to six more branches in Tehran with the help of her supportive husband. In absence of regular teachers Azmoudeh invited elderly men as substitute teachers because the employment of young male teachers would have caused a scandal. In a few years a number of well-trained and educated Namus graduates became teachers. This made Azmoudeh a pioneer in women's education.[34]

Impact of Educational Revolution

From this period modern female education got formally institutionalized

and recognized for the first time in Iran's history. An immediate outcome of the independent initiatives towards female education was that within a few years of the establishment of Namus, a number of well-trained and educated Namus graduates became Iran's first official female teachers. This revolutionary development intensified the challenge to the pre modern system of female education as now more women and men followed Tuba Azmoudeh's path. For instance in 1908 a notable Yusuf Khan Reyshahr Moa'ddab al-Mulk founded the Ecole Franco-Persane at his home for his daughters and relatives.[35] By 1910 more than 50 private girls' schools, literacy and night classes got established in Tehran alone with an enrollment of 2,187 pupils compared to 78 for boys with an enrollment of 8,344. The number of women teachers, journalists and activists in women's organizations increased. However schools encountered serious obstacles from hostile men especially conservative factions of the religious community who cursed, stoned and insulted teachers and students in public. Despite harsh opposition women persisted in their endeavors.

The most path-breaking outcome of the establishment of these schools was the pressure which they put on government to sponsor schools. In 1911 the constitutionalist government proposed subsidizing five elementary schools for girls with a large portion of the total of 4,000 *tomans* although it is not clear whether this scheme was ever carried out. In 1917-18 the first ten state schools for girls were established with a total enrollment of 938. In the same year a teachers' training college for women *Dar al-Mu'allamat* [36] was opened with Yusuf Khan Richard Mo'addeb-al-Molk as its principal. It was oriented towards training women to become teachers as there was a severe shortage of female teachers.[37] Two years later the first government intermediate school for girls was opened with a three year program. 45 girls graduated from this school in 1924. Many private girls' schools also began to extend their curricula beyond the elementary grades, though there was no state support for secondary education for girls beyond the three intermediate years until 1939.

At the same time the issue of female education became a point of contention between the pro and anti-constitutionalist forces. For instance, Shaykh Fazl'allah Nuri, a prominent anti-constitutionalist cleric associated the opening of schools for women's education and elementary schools for young girls with breaching the Islamic law and

this statement aimed at closing down the new educational institutions. Nevertheless women educationists defended girls' schools in the most articulate manner. Addressing Shaykh Fazl'allah Nuri directly, one of the women questioned his religious credentials. She insisted that her God unlike his was just and had not created men and women in such a way that one deserved the blessings of education and the other deserved to remain like an animal; that the prophet of her God had made it obligatory for all Muslim men and women to seek education, whereas his God had forbidden women to seek education. She challenged him to name a single woman close to the Prophet who was illiterate or ignorant, and also questioned his right to speak in the name of *shari'a*. She defended the structure and curriculum of modern schools over *maktab* explaining the benefits of education for women and eventually concluded that nothing in Islam forbade women's education. Unless he could answer all her arguments, he had to admit that he had spoken thoughtlessly.[38] The generation of teachers of the Qajar era was also instrumental in inspiring the later generations of women in becoming activists during the late Pahlavi period until the 1979 revolution.

Conclusion

The aforementioned analysis of events and facts leads to the observations that how the invisible Qajar women gradually made themselves known to the Persian society and the outside world. Their secluded and regressive life made them inwardly assertive rather than compliant to the societal mores. Even though struggling to live behind closed doors and windows, they were in wait of a spark that would ignite their otherwise hidden ambitions – schools for girls, constitution and enfranchisement though the latter vision had to wait many years to be achieved. The graduated women that the schools produced emerged as Persia's first official female teachers who carried on the legacy and mentored some eminent female educationists in the later years. As for the constitutional revolution, it was truly a landmark for the Persian women as for the first time in the history of Iran, women from all walks of life joined to promote national causes and advocate educational rights for women.

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GEOECONOMIC RESURGENCE OF SILK ROAD AND INDIA'S CENTRAL ASIAN STRATEGY

Deepika Saraswat

Abstract

In Central Asia, the Silk Road discourse has increasingly replaced the traditional geopolitical competition between great powers, dubbed as the Great Game. The resurgence of Silk Road as the new trope for defining space relations in Greater Central Asia is attributed to the economic globalization of the Post Cold War era and the consequent shift from geopolitics to geoeconomics, in both discourse and practice. The Silk Road discourse suggests that geopolitics is subsumed under geoeconomic thinking since various visions of Silk Road seek to fuse economic interests with political and security imperatives. The Silk Road states are betting on regional connectivity and economic linkages as new pathways to security. The paper explores three visions of Silk Road coming forth from Washington, Beijing and New Delhi from a geoeconomic perspective.

Keywords

Geoeconomics, New Silk Road Strategy, One Road One Belt, INSTC, Central Asia, Great Game, Connect Central Asia Policy, Cultural Freedom, Silk Road Discourse.

Introduction

The collapse of the Soviet Union and subsequent emergence of independent countries in Central Asia transformed the geopolitical balance on the Eurasian supercontinent. "The southern border of the USSR was the longest and most closed border in the world and all transport in Soviet times was based on a one-hub model centred on Moscow" (Starr, 2011). In the immediate aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Central Asia comprising newly independent republics of Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan, was one of the most isolated regions, both politically and geographically. This landlocked region was once at the heart of the transcontinental network of trade routes, called Silk Roads. "The Silk Roads were a complex network of overland routes, the main road running along the southern borderlands of inner Eurasia, a geographical region David Christian defines coterminous with lands ruled by the Soviet Union in 1990, together with Mongolia and also include parts of China's most

Western region, Autonomous Region of Xinjiang (Christian, 1994). The name Silk Road was given by the German geologist, Ferdinand Von Richthofen, who carried out extensive studies in China in late nineteenth century. Once again with the end of the bi-polar geopolitical order of the Cold War era and the subsequent prominence of geo-economic considerations led to the emergence of a rather positive discourse of the Silk Roads. The Silk Road discourse which appeared with the emergence of independent countries following the breakup of Soviet Union only underscores the fundamental importance of Central Asia and the Caucasus in creating modern day transcontinental transport – trade corridors connecting powerful peripheral entities of the Eurasia: China, India, the European Union and Russia.

In the wake of their independence the geographically landlocked, economically underdeveloped, technologically backward but resource rich countries of the Caspian Region and Central Asia were on the radar of major regional powers who sought to wean them away from Russian influence by developing and transporting the vast energy resources of the region. The multiple schemes of regional connectivity spearheaded by various powers drew on the historic Silk Roads for their nomenclature. The objectives underlying the Silk Road designs of major powers are to promote their own politico – military security and economic agenda and absorb these nations into their sphere of influence, while the key goal of Central Asian states is to strike a delicate balance of power and ensure the best deal for themselves by exploiting the rivalry between the major powers (Sahgal and Anand, 2011).

These fledgling states were faced with a host of problems in the task of nation-building, which they sought to ameliorate by founding and participating in various multilateral forums. Boris Rumer and Stanislav Zhukov (1998) note that the boundaries of these republics are in fact the product of a drive by the Russian state in the nineteenth century toward the southeast; state borders blindly traverse ethnic enclaves, turning Central Asia into a patchwork quilt rent by complex disputes (ethnic, regional, tribal) over land, water, and natural resources. The border disputes endemic in the region led leaders from the region to establish the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) – comprising China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan –as a confidence-building mechanism to resolve border disputes (Scheineson, 2009). The other important problem faced by them was

the need to diversify their economic and transport infrastructure. During Soviet time, four Central Asian republics – Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan were part of a single economic region for the purpose of territorial economic planning. The region therefore had an integrated Central Asian economy and an integrated transport infrastructure, centered on Moscow. Shireen Hunter (2004) argues that "independence in Central Asia largely means energy independence and multiple options for development." As a result the Central Asian states sought to engage with China and EU in order to attract investment in development and transportation of their hydrocarbon resources especially in case of Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan and Hydropower resources in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.

Though Central Asian republics have gradually embraced market economics but their common totalitarian past under Soviet Union and continued prominence of erstwhile communist elites influences their political culture and institutions. The political regimes in the region are characterised by dominance of a single strong leader with a very insignificant part of power subjected to legislatures (Tugsbilguun, 2013). Notwithstanding macro-economic and financial restructuring induced by the West, bleak success of political reforms in Central Asia remains a continuing fact. The state elites have tended to legitimate their authoritarian regimes by their economic achievements and as necessary to counter threats posed to state by religious extremism, separatist tendencies among minorities. Commenting on the abysmal progress of participatory political systems and economic reforms in the region, Martha Brill Olcott observe that:

> *"Given the strong performance of a number of Asian economies, the invocation of Asianness is a slippery concept, and is generally used by the Central Asian leadership to justify a model of economic development partnered with strong one man or oligarchic rule, and sees little value in political liberalization, at least until such time as economic growth rates are judged sufficient" (Olcott, 2003).*

The Central Asian leaders have sought closer ties with the so-called 'quasi-democratic' powers, such as Russia and China, perhaps at the expense of the U.S. and the West (Sahgal and Anand, 2011). For instance, during Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, NATO forces established military bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan and developed supply chains to Afghanistan, called the Northern Distribution

Network, a commercially-based logistical corridor connecting Baltic and Black Sea ports with Afghanistan via Russia, the Caucasus, and Central Asia (Kuchins and Sanderson, 2010). The OEF was supported by China, Russia and Central Asian republics as it suited their short-term security interest of eliminating terrorist safe haven in Afghanistan and legitimated their own clamping down of extremists and separatists within their borders. But US military influence in the region was eventually resisted by Russia and China and suffered a major blow after US project of promoting Western style democracies in the region backfired and with SCO urging all foreign forces to set a timeframe for withdrawal of their bases from the territory of SCO member states (Sahgal & Anand 2011). Moreover, geographical proximity with Russia and China means that Central Asian republics have to invest more in their relationship with Russia and China as compared to the West.

Geoeconimic Resurgence of Silk Route

The paper argues that in Central Asia, the Silk Road discourse has increasingly replaced the traditional geopolitical competition between great powers, dubbed as the Great – Game. This shift is indicative of the broader shift as geopolitics is increasingly subsumed under geoeconomics in the wake of economic globalization. "Globalization has reshaped the spatiality of politics, mobility and flows. The world we inhabit has changed from a "space of places" to a "space of flows," with networks being central to the explanation of global space" (Meena, 2014). The notion of networked spatiality and interdependence is the most characteristic attribute of Silk Road discourse putting in sharp contrast to the territorial competition typical of the Great – Games between great powers.

Deborah Cowen and Neil Smith (2009) argue that geoeconomics is shorthand for a complex notion: the intersection of economics and finance with global political and security considerations. Geoeconomics is inseparable from economic globalisation namely the constant need of finding outlets for investing accumulated capital and market control as means to accumulation of wealth and these goals go hand in hand with imperatives of stability and political order. The predominance of geoeconomics does not mean the end of power – struggle between different actors. Contrary to zero – sum games of Great – Game type, it is believed that the opportunities are at least as important as threats and

dangers. The geoeconomic strategies seek to fuse long term economic interests with political and security imperatives. There is geoeconomics in exploiting infrastructural links especially energy flows and pipelines as means of leveraging influence over others or as an instrument of tipping regional balance of influence. For instance the key Western interest in Central Asia from the end of the Cold War has been to prevent Russia from retaining a controlling position over energy flows from the region (Alterman, 2013). Geoeconomics is also about exploiting location to set up energy hub or trade hub in global networks and flows as means to prosperity and security. For instance Turkey has assiduously carved out a position as a trade and energy hub and argues for a policy of cooperation and open borders (Alterman, 2013). Similarly Silk Road strategies also envisage certain regions and countries as located on crossroads of the most viable trade and transportation routes and seek to develop them as transportation hubs. In geo-economic scenario centre stage is taken by private – sector organisations or multi - national companies who follow global strategies of production, finance and trade and the state also becomes a geoeconomic agent with the "reframing of territorial security to accommodate supranational flows" (Cohen and Smith, 2009).

Silk Road discourse is geoeconomic not only because of region wide strategies of securing free flow of strategic energy resources and market expansion but also in their approach to security which is defined as 'economic prosperity and social development, rather than the mere maintenance of political order and stability' (Tsygankov, 36). With all the geoeconomic logic behind the Silk Roads states are betting on regional connectivity and economic linkages as new pathways to security. The following three sections discuss three visions of Silk Roads coming forth from Washington, Beijing and New Delhi.

Washington: New Silk Road Strategy

Since the end of the Cold War, geopolitical engagement of United States and EU with Central Asian and Caucasus was largely within the ambit of what has been described as neoliberal geopolitics by Susan Roberts, Anna Secor and Mathew Sprake (2003). While developing the energy resources of the Caspian region and Central Asia and transporting them to the West was the prime motive of US and EU, long term vision was to integrate Post – Soviet space into global economy and world markets.

In year 1998, chairman of the subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific under Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives while discussing the Silk Road Strategy Act pertaining to Central Asian republics observed:

> *"Stated U.S. policy goals regarding energy resources in this region include fostering the independence of the States and their ties to the West; breaking Russia's monopoly over oil and gas transportation routes; promoting Western energy security through diversified suppliers; encouraging the construction of east – west pipelines that do not transit Iran; and denying Iran dangerous leverage over the Central Asian economies"*

This neoliberal geopolitical vision was a reversal of the Cold War era containment and centerpiece of this new vision was 'infinite openness and interdependency' while danger itself is being defined as disconnection from the global system (Roberts et al, 2003). It was believed that Russian dominance in the region could be best challenged by fostering the independence, sovereignty, and prosperity of the Newly Independent States of the Caspian Basin and Central Asia through rapid development of the region's energy resources and trade linkages (Gee, 1998). Changing the Region's energy flows from existing northern routes towards Russia to western, eastern, and southern routes towards Europe and Russia was initially thought to be integral to the developmental goals of Central Asian states (Sachdeva, 2011:120). Besides, these objectives were also reinforced by US interest in strengthening global energy security through diversification, and development of new sources of supply from Central Asia and the Caucasus.

The earliest of such initiatives was TRACECA program, created on the occasion of Brussels Conference in 1993 involving five states from Central Asia and three states from the Caucasus region: the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Azerbaijan and Georgia. During the conference there was signed an agreement for the implementation of the Technical Assistance Program, financed by the European Union, for the development of a transport corridor a west – east axis from Europe, across the Black Sea, through the Caucasus and the Caspian Sea to Central Asia (Briet,1999). TRACECA was joined by Ukraine and Mongolia in 1996, Moldova in 2002 and Republic of Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey in 2002. The TRACECA corridor has been conceived as an alternative to the North Trans – Siberian route and therefore effectively bypassing Russia. One of the stated objectives of the TRACECA

program has been to support the "political and economic independence of the CIS countries, and afterwards, of the participant states of the Basic Multilateral Agreement on International Transport Development of the Europe-Caucasus-Asia Corridor" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration, Republic of Moldova).

The European Union sought to foster liberal democracy and deeper political and economic integration with EU and former Soviet republics in East Europe and the Caucasus. GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova) was established in 1997 as these CIS countries were united by their opposition to Russian backed separatism within their borders and their shared preference to cooperation and integration with the Trans-Atlantic community (Kuzio, 2008). With Russian backed separatist movement in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts of Ukraine, all four of these countries are locked in 'frozen conflicts' with Russian backed covert operations to support secessionist movements starting in late Soviet era. The main goal of GUAM, now called Organisation for Democracy and Economic Development, in the words it's Secretary General "is to establish space of stability and integration in the Black sea-Caspian sea region; space of partnership, based on the European standards, criteria and practice" (Chechelashvili, 2012). The organisation's engagement with EU is conducted under the European Union policy instrument of Eastern partnership. The European and American approach to the region did not differentiate between economic and political objectives in the region, which can be defined as promotion of 'market democracy' in the region, with more emphasis on market component.

The leading transnational corporations and banks investing in development and transportation of hydrocarbon resources follow a global strategy, carefully weighing costs and benefits (Rumer and Zhukov, 1998). A critical component of US global energy security is to make energy resources of Central Asia available to Asian markets for if Asia's energy needs were not satisfied, it will put pressure on world markets, driving prices upwards everywhere. The epithet of Silk Roads is appropriate to the extent Central Asia is the crucial transit region for trade between China and Europe and conduit for transporting Middle Eastern and Caspian Sea region oil and gas to Asian markets including China, Japan, and South Korea in east India, Pakistan in south. Asia, with China and Japan as the major consumers, is calculated to be the single largest importer of Middle Eastern oil; this fact makes Central

Asia increasingly important as the transit region (Swantstrom, 2004).

The most commercially viable route connecting Central Asia to Indian Ocean would be through Iran, but given US sanctions on the country, Afghanistan was to be the other option. Afghanistan, which links Central Asia and South Asia, is a strategic bridge of great geopolitical significance (Sahgal & Anand, 2011). Since Afghanistan was ruled by Taliban, a government that America did not recognize, such a plan of transporting Central Asian energy to Asian markets remained unviable. The US led invasion of Afghanistan was as much about eliminating the Taliban government which harbored international terrorists; it was also about *enforcing* reconnection, logical extension of disconnection defines danger argument of Thomas Barnett. "A country's potential to warrant a U.S. military response in inversely related to its globalization activity. There is a good reason why Al Qaeda was based first in Sudan and then later in Afghanistan: these are two most disconnected countries in the world," argued Thomas Barnett in 2007. As US went about eliminating Taliban in Afghanistan, a strategy of connecting Afghanistan with the wider region was needed as Central Asia became a central region in the US war against terrorism and for US aid and investment (Swantstrom, 2005).

Fredrick Starr, chairman of the Central Asia-Caucasus institute at SOAS, John Hopkins University in a Foreign Affairs article in year 2005, conceived of Central Asia and South Asia as a single region and argued that "the reopening of region wide transport and trade is the only way to establish greater Central Asia as a major economic zone with Afghanistan at its heart. GCAP program should coordinate U.S. initiatives in the areas of highway infrastructure, border controls, and the development of region wide business" (Starr, 2005). The regional vision of GCAP was endorsed by the government and since the inclusion of Central and South Asia under a newly formed bureau in the U.S. State department, linking these two regions has been a declared U.S. foreign policy objective (Sachdeva, 2011).

In year 2011 New Silk Road Strategy was envisioned for the region, a policy driven by the global vision of almost infinite openness and interdependency. NSRS aims to link Central and South Asia in four key areas. First is developing a regional energy market, the Central Asia-South Asia electricity transmission project (CASA-1000) received $ 15 million from the United States to build transcontinental power grid

lines. The lines will transmit power from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to the Pakistan electricity market (Marat, 2014). Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline is another crucial project under NSRS. Second area is trade and transport and includes improving the 'hardware' of reliable roads, railways, bridge, and border crossing facilities and 'software' component of harmonizing national custom systems, bringing states into multilateral trade institutions, and getting neighbours to work together to break down institutional and bureaucratic barriers to trade. Third is streamlining custom and border operations to enable speedy and efficient transit while ensuring border security and fourth area is to promote business and people to people contact across two regions. New Silk Road initiative of Washington is a key component of post US-NATO strategy of fostering security after departure of Western troops from Afghanistan. NSRS follows a north – south track, creating new North-South trade and transit routes as against East-West connection across Eurasia, spearheaded by Chinese Silk Roads. Given that democracy promotion is a centerpiece of Washington's Silk Road Initiative and its linking of security assistance to democracy development package means quasi – democratic Central Asian regimes would be wary of Washington's designs in the region.

Beijing: Silk Road Economic Belt

In Central Asian republics, with their independence from Soviet Union started a process of 'national and religious liberation' which had direct implications for ethno-religious separatist movements in Xinjiang region inhabited by Uyghur Muslims of Turkic origin. "The internal conflict in Xinjiang is reinforced by a strong support for the re-establishment of East Turkestan among the populations in Central Asia, a support that is not necessarily shared by their governments" (Swantstrom, 2005), and therefore China "has increasingly sprinkled its economic engagement with larger security engagements with the member states of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)' (Swantstrom, 2015).

Regional stability is not only seen as a necessary precondition before extensive trade and energy infrastructure could materialize, but two ends of regional stability and economic prosperity are seen as a mutually reinforcing. China has direct stakes in upholding stability and security in the region, given the geographical proximity and ethno – religious affinities between Xinjiang Uygur autonomous region and

Central Asia Countries. In its fight against the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, waging violent struggle for establishing a separate Uighur state called East Turkestan, China cooperates with Pakistan, who joined SCO with India and Mongolia in July, 2015. It was the imperative of fighting and eradicating trans-border threats of terrorism, extremism, and separatism brought Russia and China, two great powers of Eurasia Central Asian republics to cooperate under the framework of SCO. The rationale behind regional security architecture under SCO was defined by two agreements signed respectively in 1996 in Shanghai and in 1997 in Moscow as confidence building in military sphere in the border areas and on mutual reduction of military forces in border areas. Beijing has used the Shanghai accord to pressure Central Asian states to deter their ethnic minorities from supporting separatism in Xinjiang and to guarantee extradition of Uighurs fleeing China (Xu et al, 2014).

China has sought to establish itself as the most preferred partner for Central Asian states in areas that range from security to trade and investment in energy and infrastructure projects. As China goes about pursuing a Central Asian strategy informed by issues relating to direct internal security and energy security, we see a great power different from United States and Russia. Martha Brill Olcott (2013) argues that "China's leaders seek to win over their Central Asian counterparts by demonstrating respect, offering generous trade and loan terms, and taking hands – off approach to domestic issues." China unlike Russia "does not bind them into restrictive trade policies or seek to influence political outcomes behind the scene" and in contrast to Washington, "Beijing doesn't press Central Asian leaders to agree to a timetable and agenda for internal reforms" (Olcott, 2013). During a visit to Kazakhstan in 2013, where President Xi Jinping unveiled his Silk Road Economic Belt initiative, President stated that "China will never intervene in internal affairs of Central Asian countries, seek leadership in regional affairs, or operate sphere of influence" and argued for mutual support in major core interests including that state sovereignty, territorial integrity, security and stability and joint crackdown on the "three evil forces" of terrorism, extremism and separatism (Jinping, 2013). Silk Road Economic Belt, the flagship foreign policy instrument of China under President Xi Jinping is dedicated to make "economic ties closer, mutual cooperation deeper and space of development broader between the Eurasian countries" (Jinping, 2013). He argued for five gradual steps in the direction of

building modern Silk Roads; first one being policy communication on economic development strategies and regional cooperation through consultation. Second is to open up the transportation channel from the Pacific to the Baltic Sea and to gradually form a transportation network that connects East Asia, West Asia, and South Asia. Third step is about making appropriate arrangement for trade and investment facilitation and fourth is to enhance monetary circulation and promoting realization of exchange and settlement of local currency and fifth is to strengthen people to people exchange.

Silk Road economic belt is a combination of geo-economic and geopolitical strategy as its narrative of trade and economic cooperation is underwritten by security logic as well. It is noteworthy that Xinjiang is the "core area" of the *Silk Road Economic Belt* and China's Central Asia policy; economic development through increased trade and connectivity with wider region is seen as instrumental to stabilise this insurgency affected region. The geographical location of Xinjiang at the western end of China and the fact that it shares borders with three of five Central Asian republic: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and also with Mongolia and Russia in North and Indian and Pakistan towards west, permits it to be the "gateway for mutually beneficial cooperation between China and other Eurasian countries" (Jiabao, 2012). Xinjiang has so far opened 107 international road transport routes to adjacent countries, accounting for 43 percent of the total number in China, according to transport authorities of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region ("Xinjiang set to embrace Silk Road Economic Belt initiatives", 2015).

Interestingly, Beijing's Silk Road vision has parallels with Washington's New Silk Road Strategy, which seeks to stabilise precarious economic and security situation in the Afghanistan by putting it at the heart of region wide transport and trade networks. Through Silk Road Economic Belt Beijing aims to orient China's economic and development strategy towards Western China positioning it as the crossroads between prosperous coastal China on one hand and Central Asia, Middle East and Europe on the other. With its emphasis on developing Western China, Silk Road Economic Belt is in a way extension – both in terms of geographical extent and economic scope – of 'Develop the West' campaign launched in year 2000 and sought to bridge the development gap between China's western hinterland and coastal China.

Moreover, China's quest for energy security by diversifying its sources of energy supply plus routes and the imperative of powering Beijing's development efforts in Western China has led it to reinvent the historical ties with the hydrocarbon rich Central Asia and beyond. Lin (2011) argues that "China's strategy toward Central Asia has centred on using financial means to create dependency, building on increased oil/ gas and politico-military cooperation." "In December, 2010, a 1,833 kilometre pipeline carrying gas from the Saman – Depe gas fields of eastern Turkmenistan to China's Xinjiang region went online" (Swami 2011). In addition to that CNPC of China outmanoeuvred ONGC of India in competition for Kashagan oilfield in Kazakhstan and is developing Dauletabad and Galkynysh, world's second largest gas field in Turkmenistan that would supply gas to China by 2016.

As China increases its footprint in the region that Russia considers as 'near abroad,' it has sought to allay Russian fears of Chinese dominance by avoiding economic influence as a tool for political leverage in Central Asia and strengthening bilateral ties with Russia. First Russian economy remains overwhelmingly dependent on energy export and given Western sanctions on Russia following Russian annexation of Crimea in March 2014, there were good reasons for renewing Russian – Chinese partnership based on complementarities between an energy surplus Russia and an energy guzzling Chinese economy. "In May 2014, by signing a 30-year energy agreement, estimated a $ 400 billion, CNPC and its subsidiary PetroChina –one of the world's 10 largest companies – both secured essential natural gas supplies to fuel future Chinese economic growth and further increase Beijing's influence on Russian economy" (Piet, 2015). Second, Russia's incessant campaigning for a multi-polar world and cooperation between two countries in forums such as BRICS and non-intervention ethic of China means that rising Chinese profile is seen less threatening and more palatable than Western influence.

China has set up $40 billion Silk Road Fund to be used to "provide investment and financing support to carry out infrastructure, resource, industrial cooperation, financial cooperation and other projects related to connectivity for countries along the "Belt and Road" ("China's Silk Road Fund makes first investment in Pakistan's hydropower project", 2015). China has been at the forefront of constructing financial architecture for its elaborate program of infrastructure development

across Asia under the banner of One Belt One Road initiative. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank launched by China was readily joined by fifty countries as founding members including many European countries such as United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Italy. "This development adds momentum to China's efforts to build a multipolar financial network comprising the AIIB, the New Development Bank of BRICS states and the proposed Development Bank of Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and promote economic integration and common development through the 'Belt and Road initiative" (Lei, 2015).

China has been portraying its Silk Road initiative as its most important 'constructive engagement' and in – fact is a great image building exercise and offsets its assertive and hegemonic posture in territorial disputes in South China Sea and elsewhere. In the words of Chinese president Xi Jinping "One Belt and One Road' is a huge and inclusive platform, which aims to combine the rapidly expanding Chinese economy with benefits to all parties involved" ("China to Speed up construction of new Silk Roads: Xi", 2014). In addition, China is also capitalising on Silk Road narrative to enhance its tourism potential, especially in north – western China. The ethnically diverse and culturally rich Xinjiang and its history as the key port of historic Silk Roads is the hub of mushrooming Silk Road tourism. As the core region of Chinese stretch of Silk Roads, Urumqi in Xinjiang has been the site of China Eurasia Expo, a commodity and trade exposition. Theme of the fourth edition of the event in 2014 was "Building the Silk Road Economic Belt through Opening – Up and Cooperation." One of the key national tourism development projects, Silk Road Economic Belt tourist service center also located in Urumqi was promoted during the 2014 Expo. The Center will provide tourists with information and services to all attractions in Xinjiang and other countries on the economic belt. In January 2015, China National Tourism Administration chose Xian, the starting point of Silk Road Economic Belt, to declare 2015 the "Inspired by Silk Road Tourism Year."

New Delhi: Connect Central Asia Policy

The ancient Silk Roads connected India and Eurasia through Khyber and Bolan Passes, both in Pakistan. Therefore, in order to connect with Central Asia, India counts on Afghanistan and Iran as its gateways to the region while circumventing its geopolitical rival Pakistan. Since

India considers Afghanistan to be a potential bridge to Central Asia, it has backed US led *New Silk Road Strategy* centred on Afghanistan. India has strategic partnership with both United States and Afghanistan and the three have a trilateral dialogue in place since 2012. The idea was to allow better consultation and cooperation between the three governments in dealing with common challenges and opportunities such as "combating terrorism and violent extremism and reviewing cultural exchanges and increasing regional trade, investment, and economic integration" (Ministry of foreign Affairs, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2012). India's Connect Central Asia policy was unveiled by E. Ahamad, MOS, External Affairs at the backdrop of the First India-Central Asia Dialogue held in June 2012 in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. The stated objectives of the policy were "embedding Afghanistan into a more meaningful regional economic and security framework" and "pro – active political, economic and people – to – people engagement with Central Asian Countries, both individually and collectively" (Ahmad, 2012).

Through its Connect Central Asia policy, India has tried to play its part in NSRS initiative regional connectivity centred in Afghanistan. India is denied cross-border transit to Afghanistan via Pakistan as it was excluded from Pakistan Afghanistan Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA) signed in 2011, under NSRS. But recently during his first state visit to India in May 2015, the Afghan President Ashraf Ghani, argued that land transit for Afghan imports from India was a question of "sovereign equality" as Pakistan, Afghanistan and Tajikistan are about to sign trilateral transit agreement that will Pakistan access to Tajikistan via Afghanistan. The Afghan President insisted Pakistan must accept the "national treatment" clause agreed to in APTTA, which gives each country equal access up to the national boundaries of both (Haidar, 2015). Once the Wagah land transit is open for Afghan imports from India, it will go a long way in supporting presence of Indian goods in "virgin markets" of Afghanistan. Indian investment and economic presence in the country become significant as Afghanistan's economy has been called a "virgin market" given that years of conflict have left the country virtually untouched by foreign investment (Haidari, 2015). Afghan government has been keen to attract investment from India. In June 2012, at Delhi Investment Summit on Afghanistan, the Afghan ministry of commerce and industry presented to potential investors

a list of "Investment Opportunities in Afghanistan" in key sectors of energy, minerals, transport, agriculture and agribusiness, small and medium industries, ICTs, finance, health services and construction (Haidari, 2015).

Given that security situation in Afghanistan remains unstable and infrastructure on ground still underdeveloped, Iran, and especially Chabahar port in Sistan and Baluchestan Province of Iran is India's crucial link to the landlocked Afghanistan and the key port of International North South Transport Corridor or INSTC, the modern southern Silk Road of India. The INSTC was initiated by Russia, India, and Iran in September 2000 to establish transportation networks among the member states and to enhance connectivity with the landlocked regions of Central Asia and it was later extended to include eleven other countries of Caucasus and Central Asia along with Turkey, Ukraine, Belarus, Oman, Syria, and Bulgaria as observers (Singh Roy, 2015).

It was in 2002, following the removal of Taliban regime in Afghanistan, India began developing Chabahar port as a part of its strategy to check Pakistan from developing undue leverage over Afghanistan. Chabahar port is an open sea port located outside chokepoints of Strait of Hormuz and Persian Gulf in Arabian Sea. "In 2003, Afghanistan, India, and Iran signed an agreement to develop the Chabahar-Zaranj-Delaram route. Later that year, India began work on rebuilding the highway running from Zaranj to Delaram, connecting Southern Afghanistan, and Iran" (Swami, 2015). "Delhi has also expressed interest in building a 900km railway linking Chabahar to Hajigak, Bamiyan province in central Afghanistan, where a consortium of Indian state-run and private companies have been awarded rights to mine Afghanistan's largest iron deposit" (Keck, 2013). However, India's plan to develop railway, highway infrastructure connecting Iran and Afghanistan to facilitate Indian development aid in Afghanistan and Indian business ventures in developing country's rich mineral wealth are hanging in balance given the deteriorating security situation as result of US troop withdrawal from Afghanistan. India's Silk Road strategy is based on increased connectivity, regional trade and openness with Afghanistan, a point underlined by foreign minister Sushma Swaraj in the 'Heart of Asia' conference in Islamabad on December 9, 2015.

In the absence of transit trade with Afghanistan through Pakistan, the port of Chabahar remains most important. The port would be operational

by December 2016 and Kandhla Port Trust and Jawaharlal Nehru Port Trust would be operating cargo terminals at Chabahar. INSTC is a multi-nation and multi-modal transport corridor initiated by India. The INSTC will have its starting point from JNPT Port in Mumbai, and via trans-shipment the goods will reach Bandar Abbas Port (near Straits of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf) in Iran; then a railway link connects Persian Gulf to the Caspian Sea region, Turkey and to North Europe via Russia (Khagani, 2015). During his visit to Turkmenistan in July 2015, PM Modi sought India's inclusion in 2011 Ashgabat Agreement on trade and transit. India wants to connect Chabahar and Central Asia through recently inaugurated three nation Iran-Turkmenistan-Kazakhstan rail line. INSTC is central to Indian government's market diversification strategy to help Indian exporters reduce their dependence on traditional markets in the West where there is currently not much demand and instead gain more access to in growing markets in Asia, Africa and Latin America not tapped as much previously (The Hindu, December 30, 2015).

To Indian foreign policy makers, Central Asia is as an energy surplus region and consequently Indian geopolitical imperative is seen as ensuring energy flow from the region while advancing Indian investment in oil and gas exploration business. Given the overbearing Chinese presence in the energy sector of the region, India is hard-pressed to increase its footprint in the region, a move that is welcomed by Central Asian countries keen to avoid Chinese stranglehold of their energy sector. India's energy security strategy aims at diversifying both its energy mix and sources of energy imports; seriously pursuing overseas acquisitions of energy assets; and initiating policy reforms to attract foreign investment as well as improving domestic production, distribution and consumption (Sachdeva, 2011:114-17). A key logic of Connect Central Asia' Policy is the compatibility of aims in the energy field. In words of Minister E. Ahmad "Central Asia's desire for diversifying hydropower and energy export routes would correspond to India's quest for diversifying its imports."

The Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline is a long talked about project, stretching all the way back to the first Clinton administration and part of U.S. global energy security of linking Asian economies with hydrocarbon reserves of Caspian Basin and it remained stuck until Taliban ruled Afghanistan. It was only in 2012 that India,

Pakistan, Afghanistan and Turkmenistan signed a gas sale purchase agreement (GSPA) for the TAPI $7.6-billion gas pipeline ("TAPI pipeline Gas Sale Agreement Signed", 2012). Later in 2014, TAPI pipeline company was established with "Turkmengas", Afghan Gas Enterprise, Inter State Gas Systems (Private) Limited, and GAIL (India) Limited owning equal shares of the company, under the supervision of Asian Development Bank, the transaction advisor to the pipeline project. TAPI will carry gas from Turkmenistan's Galkynysh field, from the field the pipeline will run to Herat and Kandahar province of Afghanistan, before entering Pakistan; in Pakistan, it will reach Multan via Quetta before ending at Fazilka (Punjab) in India ("TAPI Gas pipeline to take five years: Afghan President Ashraf Ghani", 2015). As feasibility of the project remains compromised given the dismal security scene in Afghanistan and Baluchistan region troubled by a separatist movement, India has sought change of route to redirect TAPI pipeline to Chahbahar. In his visit to Turkmenistan, PM Modi proposed that possibility of land sea route through Iran for pipeline from Turkmenistan should be explored ("Modi pitches for early implementation of TAPI project", 2015). During fifth World Energy Policy Summit in New Delhi, in December 2015, Alireza Kameli, managing director of Iran state owned National Iranian Gas Export Company (NIGEC) said the 1,400-km pipeline would transport up to 31.1 million standard cubic meters per day of natural gas via Oman Sea and Arabian Sea;' pipeline would bypass Pakistan's exclusive economic zone in Arabian sea ("Iran may seal $4.5-bn undersea gas pipeline agreement with India," December 8, 2015).

In Central Asia, Indian investment in energy business is led by public sector enterprises. Following a contract for oil and gas exploration signed with KazMunayGas (KMG) and the Ministry of Oil and Gas of the Republic of Kazakhstan and ONGC Videsh in 2010, the international petroleum company of India recently started exploratory drilling in Satpayev block in Kazakhstan's oil rich North Caspian region ("PM Narendra Modi's Central Asia Tour: India set to push trade with resource-rich Kazakhstan", 2015). Responding to Tajikistan government's invitation to India for exploring its massive hydropower potential, state-run BHEL completed the renovation, modernisation and upgrading of the 2x4.75 MW Varjob hydro power plant in Barki Tojik in Tajikistan ("BHEL commissions hydro power plant in Tajikistan",

2013). Besides that India imports uranium from both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan for production of atomic power. During Prime Minister Modi's visit to Kazakhstan in July 2015, India renewed a contract to procure 5000 MT of Uranium, as India goes about creating a 'strategic uranium reserve' to ensure its atomic power reactors do not face shortage of the crucial nuclear fuel ("India to Build a Strategic Uranium Reserve", 2015).

Apart from regional connectivity and energy security, counter-terrorism is another key area of engagement between India and Central Asia. Under *Connect Central Asia* policy India has sought to revive its security ties in the region especially in the area of counter – terrorism as the security situation in the region has direct implications for security in Indian province of Jammu and Kashmir and beyond. Moreover the withdrawal of International Security Forces from Afghanistan and simultaneous search of ISIS for foothold in the region has raised stakes for Indian involvement in the region. India is increasingly directing its engagement with greater Central Asia through its participation in SCO and BRICS, a fact that was underlined as Prime Minister Modi visited the five Central Asian republics en-route from BRICS and SCO summits in Russian city of Ufa.

As discussed in above sections the cross – border threat of terrorism, organized crime, drug – trafficking have necessitated multilateral efforts and a key area of India's involvement with SCO has been counter-terrorism. India engages particularly with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan in the area of counter-terrorism and coordinates its counter-terror efforts with the two countries under the framework of Joint Working Group (JWG). The activities of Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and the Jund al-Khilafah (JuK), the two major terrorist groups operating in the region, are concentrated in and around the Fergana valley in Uzbekistan (Patil, 2015) which is located at the tri- junction with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. IMU has been long associated with Taliban and Al-Qaeda and had fought alongside following US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001.

Conclusion

The discourse of modern Silk Roads is brimming with economism with regional connectivity, trade, and market integration seen as stabilising forces and universal remedy for economic, political and security troubles of states. The modern Silk Road strategies are therefore envisaged as a

holistic solution to intractable security situation, where networks of trade and economic prosperity are seen as the best bet against destabilising forces of separatism, extremism and terrorism. Many analysts would argue that establishing trade and business networks in security deficient areas amounts to putting cart before the horse, but the states espousing and participating in Silk Road strategies believe that Silk Roads are long term security solutions to frozen conflicts.

The economic appeal of Silk Road Economic Belt has ensured that Central Asian countries are aboard the Chinese Silk Roads but worsening security situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan means that Central Asia remains cautious in forging linkages with Washington led NSRS, given their legitimate fears of spillover of drug trafficking and insurgency from Afghanistan. For India modern Silk Roads or Central Asian strategy focuses on geopolitical and economic goals. The Indian strategy is to secure its geopolitical footprint in Afghanistan, something that is resisted by Pakistan and help stabilize the region. The economic objectives of India are to secure energy supplies and utilize investment and market opportunities in the region at a time when traditional western markets have reached saturation.

The participant states to modern Silk Roads have to appreciate that lack of political and cultural freedoms for many a people in the region is the main bottleneck in recreating the historic Silk Road region of prosperity. The three evils of terrorism, extremism and separatism are also related to if not result of perceived lack of freedom by people in the region. The modern version of Silk Roads will remain an exercise in furthering the economic and geopolitical interests of powerful entities such as China, EU, and America until political and cultural repression of people is substituted for meaningful political participation for people as necessary preconditions for development.

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INDO-IRAN RELATIONS
Reassessing India's Iran Policy

Tabasum Firdous

Abstract

Neo-liberalism as an international perspective has focused on the concept of complex interdependence among the nation-states to enhance cooperation and ensure peace. Accepting the nation-state centrality, the neo-liberals have concentrated on the international regimes, agreements and norms to enhance cooperation among the actors of international system. With liberalization and privatization as the basic trends of globalization, foreign investments are dominating the global discourse. Thus, investments in foreign nations for building network and communication infrastructure have been accepted as a shifting trend from the tradition of power politics. Thus, any bilateral relation in contemporary world is mainly influenced by the neo-liberal doctrine that has build complex structures to exaggerate interdependence among the nation-state actors. The focus of this paper, thus, is to examine the Indo-Iran relations in different eras and to indentify the possibilities for further strengthening ties and scope for improved regional cooperation.

Keywords

Strategic Ties, India, Iran, Neo-liberalism, Nation State, Strategic Cooperation, Regional Cooperation, International System, Globalization, Asian Actors, Post-cold War, Diplomacy, Indo-Iran Summits.

Ancient to Medieval Era

India and Iran have had long and close cultural links, and their ancient and modern histories have been intertwined. Indeed, although little known, the history shared between India and Iran is extremely dense, in such a way that India has been described as the 'closest Asian country to Iran'. This history, which dates back to the beginning of the Indo-Aryan civilization in the seventh century B.C., displays cultural, linguistics, religious, commercial and diplomatic characteristics. The two Asian counties are among the old civilizations of the world. Both have contributed immensely to the enrichment of human civilization in many of its aspects. As such, they have their special place in the comity of nations.

Indo-Iran relations date back to thousands of years in terms of cultural and economic ties. Most of the experts often refer to historical

and civilization links between the two nations as an important factor for cooperation. As such, language and culture are important areas that led to the strengthening of relations between the two. Both the countries focus on a wide spectrum of bilateral issues including energy security, closer cultural and strategic ties and the fight against terrorism. Cultural relations between the two countries were cordial during the Mughal rule in India which coincided with the reign of Safavi rulers in Iran. The eighteenth century was marked by the decline of the Safavid and Mughal dynasties in parallel with the expansion of the British presence in India, which led to the end of diplomatic relations between the two countries.

Post-Colonial Period

However, when India passed under British rule, the colonialists did not allowed the country to continue her foreign relations. Thus, from mid-18th century, India's relations with Iran remained cut off and no exchange of emissaries took place. This condition continued till India attained freedom in 1947. After independence, Iran was the first among foreign countries to send her ambassador and establish Iranian embassy in India. India reciprocated. Thereafter began regular exchange visits of VIPs, ministers and businessmen, and a 'Treaty of Friendship' was signed in 1950, by two governments which called for "perpetual peace and friendship".[1] However, during the Cold War, India-Iran relations were largely shaped by different ideological directions. Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi of Iran was effectively under the American led bloc. Iran as a member of the Baghdad Pact also maintained close ties with Pakistan. Pandit Nehru, on the other side, was a champion of Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Iran also provided diplomatic and material support to Pakistan during the Indo-Pak wars of 1965 and 1971.[2] However, Iran never halts supplying oil to India that reflects her willingness to sustain ties with India.

To counter the differences during the course of Cold War, India's then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and Iran's Shah paid corresponding visits in 1974 to the respective states. The intention was to change the equations for the betterment as the former was engaged to dissipate the misconceptions created by the India-Soviet Friendship Treaty of 1971 and the latter intended to play a significant role in West Asia. Again, the establishment of the Islamic regime in Iran did not halt the relations but

created some hindrances to improve or increase the pace. The situation became more complex with the Iran-Iraq war. This war put India in a difficult situation, as the country did not want to annoy any of the two, as both were important exporters of oil.

Post-Cold War Scenario

The early phase of post-cold war witnessed the world facing new situation. The changing circumstances at international level forced India to evolve suitable responses while breaking the old tradition of dealings with the world. The changing regional situation, threats to India's security, nuclearization of China and Pakistan, and the state sponsored terrorism from across the borders compelled India to act in according to these realities. India's realization of economic development as a new and effective tool to influence world affairs also paved the way for her changes in foreign policy orientations since the beginning of post-cold war era. India's foreign policy priorities were to prevent any threat to her unity and territorial integrity, ensure geopolitical security by creating a durable environment of stability and peace in the region and create a framework conducive to the economic well-being of the people. The then Prime Minister of India, P.V. Narasimha Rao's visit to Central Asia, Iran, Oman and other places were the steps to assure the same policy initiatives.[3]

Iran on the other hand experienced strategic loss in terms of her economic weakness and poor relations with the United States. The two wars and the increased military presence of the United States in Persian Gulf reduced Iran's regional influence. The country saw the US efforts to encircle her militarily as admitted by the US Secretary of State James Baker on his first visit to Central Asia in February 1992 that the US policy design is to counter Iran. Subsequently, in May 1993, the US articulated a "dual containment" policy to equate Iran with Iraq and to impede Iran's economic development.[4] Moreover, the states to the north of Iran were politically unstable, and Iran was also concerned about ethnic conflicts which could spill over into her territory. Iran also got the realization that her relations with Russia and the Persian Gulf states were also central to her interests. Thus, Iran's foreign policy accommodated the changing dynamics in the region while promoting regional ties and consolidating her relations with rest of the countries.[5] It was because of these domestic, regional and international compulsions that India and Iran came close in post-cold war era.

Ushering in New Era of Relations

With the end of cold war, India and Iran became closer due to their security threat perceptions as well as the emergence of Pan-Americana in the West Asian region. The 1990s phase witnessed improved relations between the two nations due to many factors. Firstly, both the nations focused long-term partnership in energy sector. Secondly, both of them were in favour of a peaceful settlement in Afghanistan through the establishment of a broad-based government representing all ethnic groups. Thirdly, both were concerned for security reasons and economic dealings in Central Asia. The dominance of Taliban in Afghanistan during 1990s concerned both India and Iran and the common challenge of Islamic fundamentalism in Afghanistan and Pakistan brought them together. Thus, in post-cold war era both nations realized the significance of enhancing their wider relations instead of representing divergent views on certain issues such as Kashmir. This convinced them on improving mutual relations and led to a series of formal high-level state visits between the two. So a new era of relationship began since early phase of post-cold war when India's then Prime Minister Narsimha Rao visited Iran after the Islamic revolution followed by the reciprocal visit by Iran's then President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani to India. With the establishment of "Indo-Iran Joint Commission" in 1993 began the institutional mechanism with the purpose to guide the bilateral relations on economic issues at the foreign ministerial level.

India's then Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee paid a four-day visit to Iran in April 2001 that was described by Iranian then President Muhammad Khatami, as "a new chapter in the field of human and international relations".[6] During this visit Tehran Declaration was signed that included bilateral cooperation in the areas of energy, transit and transport, industry, agriculture and service sector as well as to promote scientific and technological cooperation including joint research projects, short and long-term training courses and exchange of related information on regular bases. Thus, the Tehran Declaration accelerated India-Iran cooperation on a wide array of strategic issues, including defense cooperation. The two countries also signed four accords in areas of information technology, training in professional and technical areas, trade and economic cooperation and an accord for cooperation in customs.[7] The first meeting of Indo-Iran Strategic Dialogue was held in October 2001 that focused three areas of mutual concern viz. regional

and international security perspectives, security and defense policies of India and Iran, and issues related to the international disarmament agenda.[8]

Strategic Cooperation

The relations got a boost when the Iranian President Mohammad Khatami was invited as the Chief Guest during India's Republic day celebrations in 2003. The visit led to the signing of the famous "New Delhi Declaration", the "Road Map to Strategic Cooperation" and seven other agreements regarding economic exchanges, science and technology, information technology, educational training, reconstruction of Afghanistan and anti-terrorism.[9] The most substantial framework guiding Indo-Iranian relations is the 'New Delhi Declaration' alongwith seven additional Memoranda of Understanding.[10] The declaration assured the deepening of engagements extended to military cooperation. The agreement also focused upon international terrorism, the role of United Nations in Iraq, shared interests in the reconstruction of Afghanistan, enhancement of cooperation in the areas of science and technology, hydrocarbon and water issues and mutual interests in exploring education and training opportunities.[11]

Another key instrument signed during Khatami's 2003 visit was the "Road Map to Strategic Cooperation" with the focus on diversifying areas of engagements beyond hydrocarbon trade and increasing the level of interactions in national security issues. Regarding the cooperation in energy sector, the Delhi Declaration described that: India and Iran have complementarities of interests in the energy sector, which should develop as a strategic area of their future relationship. Iran with its abundant energy resources and India with its growing energy needs as a rapidly developing economy, are natural partners. The areas of cooperation in this sector include investment in upstream and downstream activities in the oil sector, LNG / Natural Gas tie-ups and secure modes of transport. In June 2005, the two nations signed a deal, under which Iran will supply India with 7.5 million tons of liquefied natural gas annually for 25 years beginning 2009 and India will participate in the development of the Yadavaran and Jufeyr oilfields in Iran. The trade between the two countries also witnessed remarkable increase after the Delhi Declaration. India, under the current regime of Modi-led BJP, has focused on establishing and strengthening ties with

neighbours and other world nations on realist and functional principles. The visit of India's Prime Minister, Narendar Modi to Iran in May 2016 has been interpreted by the foreign policy pundits as an opportunity to establish ties with a liberal Iran, as the country has opened her economy after her successful peace deal with world powers. This visit attested India's committed policy to engage Iran for her future foreign policy objectives including the essential topics of oil, gas trade and Chabahar Port.[12]

India is one of the fastest growing economies and intends to maintain the growth rate. The country looks for stable and economically viable hydrocarbon suppliers. Thus, Iran is significant for India to sustain her fast growing economy. Iran has the strategic and economic significance for India. With a huge population and an increasing growth rate, India desires reliable suppliers of energy and Iran has the potential to address these ambitions of India. Iran also holds her importance to regional and world politics even under the shadow of her much controversial nuclear programme. India calculates it as a diplomatic and strategic blunder not to try to sustain ties with Iran if the country has to extend her influence beyond the South Asian region to Middle East and Central Asia. The industrial sector, transportation, the steel industry and the oil sector provide a lot of room for India to cooperate with Iran.[13] For India, Iran is an important regional player in West Asia and has the geo-strategic significance. Significantly, Iran has the intention as well as resource potential to be a regional power in West Asia. India, on the other hand, with her expanding population and growing energy consumption presents an enterprising market for Iran. Iran, increasingly being subjected to international scrutiny would not want to lose the friendship with an emerging power center like India.

However, there are many challenges faced by India in pursuing her policy towards Iran. Iran has been insensitive to many issues, which are of great concern to India. The country has never supported India's case in the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) but has rather supported Pakistan consistently.[14] For instance, the OIC appointed a special envoy on Jammu and Kashmir in October 2009 that New Delhi viewed as part of Pakistan's efforts to internationalize the Kashmir issue.[15] Iran's response to the Mumbai terrorist attacks on November 26, 2008 also matters for India. When the United States, Britain and India more or less held Pakistan responsible for the attacks because of the inability

to control terrorist groups operating out of her soil, Iran expressed a different opinion in this regard. Moreover, the Arab countries are important for India taking into account her energy interests and the presence of migrant labour therein. Thus, the country cannot ignore the significance of Arab countries while formulating her Iran policy.[16]

One of the progressive yet controversial ventures between India and Iran is the proposed 2,775 kilometer Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) gas pipeline. The internal situation in Pakistan is making it difficult to materialize this project. The government and military in Pakistan are largely busy in dealing with the terrorism existing therein. Even the Iranian officials have hinted at the possibility to include China into the proposed trilateral project. The relations between these two nations have come under serious strain since India's increasing engagements with the United States. The Indo-US nuclear deal came at a time when suspicions were rising against the Iranian nuclear programme. Under the Presidency of ultra-Conservative Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iran's relations with the United States "touched the abyss and the nuclear impasse worsened".[17]This has affected the India-Iran relations. India's economic and military engagement with Israel is another hindrance that gives a setback to Indo-Iranian relations. However, despite all these hindrances, both the nations sustained their comprehensive relations and high-level visits. As stated by C. U. Bhaskar, former head of the Indian Institute for Defense Studies and Research, "Although it is true that over the years India has got itself closer to the United States; India never desires to see the improvement of its US ties destabilize New Delhi's relations with Tehran".[18]

Scope of Regional Cooperation

India and Iran could extend cooperation in Afghanistan as both of them have common economic, strategic and commercial interests in this war torn nation.[19] Both of them oppose the Taliban and previously they had backed the Northern Alliance in the run-up to ouster the Taliban regime.[20]The cultural and religious ties between Iran and Afghanistan are strong, and can provide Tehran with a substantial amount of political advantage,[21] even after US withdrawal. This can help India to sustain her presence in Afghanistan. There are prospects of trilateral dialogue between India, Iran and Afghanistan on transit routes to Central Asia. The trilateral agreement between these three nations to develop the

Chabahar route through Melak, Zaranj and Delaram can facilitate regional trade with Afghanistan and Central Asia, thus contributing towards enhanced regional economic prosperity. The significance of Chabahar Port was highlighted by India's then foreign secretary Nirupama Rao by stating thatthis project is "at the heart of the common vision that India and Iran have for Afghanistan and the region as a whole, of increased and easier flow of goods, and creation of a network of transport routes and energy pipelines that will bring our people together in an arc of stability, prosperity and peace".[22] India has already completed 200 km of road in Afghanistan, linking Zaranj and Delaram that connects the Iranian border and there is the possibility to extend this road to Tajikistan and Uzbekistan that, if happened, will improve regional trade and transit.[23] There is also a need for cooperation between the two nations in dealing the economic reconstruction of Afghanistan, assuring the representation of all ethnic groups in Afghan polity as well as dealing the fundamentalism and terrorism in Af-Pak region. Both the countries, as a joint venture, can help stabilizing Afghan crisis and assuring an inclusive democracy capable of representing all ethnic groups therein. In relation to Chabahar Port, India is keen to complete the project for turning its outcomes as an immediate support for her foreign policy ambitions. With India set to invest $500m for the trade transport corridor that would entirely bypass Pakistan, the deal, apart from helping India build closer ties with Iran and Central Asia, would also help it to directly compete with China's growing influence in the region.[24]However, there are certain issue areas that can hamper or at least delay the progress in building the port. For instance, Tehran's open invitation for Pakistan and China to participate in building the port[25] is alarming for India.

Moreover, the current bilateral trade between the two countries is about $14bn, while Indian exports to Iran were around $4.2bn in 2014.[26] The two nations have also signed an agreement in April 2008 to establish a new rail link between Iran and Russia. Iran is looking for a market to export her resources. India's large and financially growing market is a good destination for Iranian resources. India can help in preventing the spread of terrorism in the region as well as minimizing the drug trafficking. Nonetheless, with the lifting of western sanctions, Iran is once again considered as a very resourceful country with greater political stability than many of its neighbours. It is also now recognised

to have the largest combined oil and gas reserves in the world, with 9.3 per cent of global oil reserves and 18.2 per cent of gas reserves.[27] That is to say, the following time period is likely of greater significance for both the Western oil and gas companies and non-Western countries like India to invest in Iran. Whatever India has gained in relation with Iran is the outcome of her goodwill and diplomatic tactics, instead of the use of force or threat of use of force. This is a significant and a welcome approach in contemporary international politics. Both the countries are with their perspectives and processes of foreign policy decision-making and are bound to have differences. However, in an interdependent world as portrayed by the neo-liberal perspective of International relations, they have to remain selective in their engagements.

India has to engage private sector in Iran for infrastructure and industrial development. Iran has to assure her foreign investment policy for Indian companies. There is a requirement to bridge the communication gap between the think tanks, universities and other agencies of both the countries. They have to enhance the high-level visits. Enhancing people-to-people contact must remain at the center of their foreign policies. The bilateral relations must be based on the reciprocity and mutuality of the interests. Thus, both the countries have to enhance the cooperation in energy sector as well as the security issues. Besides being experienced and influential member of Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), India's high influence at the international organizations and institutions will open a new front for supporting Iran in confronting or reengaging with the West.

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CHALLENGES OF DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION IN TAJIKISTAN

Kammuanmung Thangniang

Abstract

The sudden demise of the erstwhile Soviet Union in 1991 has resulted in the destruction of communist political system that subsequently led to the introduction of liberal democracy in Tajikistan as in any other newly independent countries that sprang out from the ashes of the Soviet Union. Despite the abolition of the communist political system, however, the Soviet legacy of authoritarian rule continues to be very strong while the newly installed democratic values remain largely weak. As such, Tajikistan has neither been able to break with the past practices nor bridge with the newly adopted liberal political system. Thus, its transition process from communism to democracy has proven unsuccessful. This article looks into factors hindering Tajikistan's transition to democracy which are divided broadly into three major categories. First, the democratic institutions which include the separation of state power among the executive, legislative and judicial branches; the multiparty system; the civil society and the independent media. Secondly, the civil war of 1992-97 that has a far reaching impact on the Tajik society in the aftermath of the civil war period. Thirdly, the role of external actors, particularly, the US and Russia on the political transition process of Tajikistan.

Keywords

Democracy, Authoritarianism, Transition, External Actors, Political Parties, Independent Media, Civil War, Separation of Power, Civil Society, Multi-party System, Satellite Parties.

Introduction

The induction of liberal democracy following the collapse of Soviet Union in 1991, ushered the beginning of transition in Tajikistan. The newly established liberal political system, unlike the previous Socialist political system, permitted individual freedoms and allowed different political parties with varying ideologies to exist and compete for political power. Consequently, relative political pluralism emerged in Tajikistan and the prospect for transition was bright at least at this initial stage. In fact in 1991, Tajikistan was comparatively having better democratic values in the whole of the post-Soviet Central Asia and better one among the post-Soviet countries.[1] Even then, as the transition process began,

it soon appeared that the transition was neither smooth nor successful.[2] As early as in May 1992, a civil war broke out in the country that brought large scale destruction in the society that seriously enhanced authoritarian rule. Thus, the newly initiated transition process came to a standstill within a short period of less than one year. With the end of the civil war in 1997, a limited political pluralism re-emerged that opened a new opportunity for Tajikistan to restart the process of transition. The ban imposed on independent media and opposition parties was lifted and they were allowed to re-emerge.[3] The re-emergence of independent media such as television, radio and newspapers, resulted into more open public debates about politics, albeit, to a limited extent. The re-emergence of opposition parties once again ushered multiparty system in the country[4] and made political competition among different political parties possible once again.

Nevertheless, the post-civil war transition remained largely problematic. President, Imomali Rahmon, has been steadily deviating from democratic path and was increasingly turning toward authoritarian rule, particularly, from 2001. He suppressed or sidelined political opponents, curbed the freedom of independent media and strictly controlled the activities of the civil society organizations. After the 2005 parliamentary elections and the presidential election of 2006, it became clear that Tajikistan was far from being democratic. Now, the regime at best is soft-authoritarian[5] and at the worst, it is consolidated authoritarian regime.[6] Various factors are responsible for Tajikistan's unsuccessful transition to democracy which can be broadly classified into three categories: weak democratic institutions, negative impact of the civil war and the lack of strong external pressures for promoting democracy.

Weak Democratic Institutions

Democratic institutions such as separation of power, multiparty system, civil society and independent media emerged in Tajikistan as a result of the abandonment of the socialist political system and the introduction of liberal democratic political system. Nevertheless, these newly emerging democratic institutions are weak and ineffective to serve as an agent of democracy and change.

Weak Power Segregation

The Tajik constitution of 1994 introduced American-style presidential system that separates and distributes state power into executive, legislature and judiciary.[7] The same constitution also embodied many elements of the Russian constitution of 1993 that vested enormous power with the president. As a result, state power in Tajikistan is highly concentrated in the president. The president dominates the executive branch, the legislative assembly and the judiciary; and the parliament and judiciary are greatly subordinate to the president.[8] The president controls the judiciary by virtue of having right to nominate the judges of the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court, the Supreme Economic Court, the procurator-general and the military procurator. Due to lack of independent judiciary, the rule of law was weak in Tajikistan. The judiciary being subordinate to president's political authority, was used for prosecuting political opposition. In politically sensitive cases, the court ruled according to the instruction of the ruling regime. For instance many of the opponent members, particularly, members of Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan, were selectively persecuted for crimes committed during the civil war. Between 2004 and 2005, many prominent opposition leaders were convicted and jailed for long periods. Eventually they were barred from contesting the parliamentary elections of 2005 and the presidential election of 2006.[9]

Also, the president has dominating influence over the legislature by virtue of the enormous powers, particularly, the power to appoint the legislatures and local deputies. Of the 33 members of the upper chamber of the parliament, eight members are appointed by the president and the remaining 25 are elected by local deputies who also are appointed by the president. The second chamber, in this way, is composed of almost the representatives of the president.[10] Further, since the president can circumvent the legislative function of the parliament by ruling with referenda and decree, the parliament is ineffective to control the functions of the president.[11] The already powerful president has been made more powerful through various referenda; among others were the referenda in 1999 and 2003. While the constitutional amendment in 1999 extended the period of presidential term from five to seven years with one term limit[12] the 2003 constitutional amendment broke the one term limit and extended the presidential term to two terms.[13] Using the 2003 constitutional amendment to claim that the presidential election

of 2006 is the first term in office since that was the first presidential election under the new constitution, President Rahmon undermined the country's constitutional two term limits for presidency and contested the November 2013 presidential elections. Winning with 84 percent of total votes, his rule now extends up to 2020.[14] By concentrating enormous powers in the executive branch, the separation of power in Tajikistan in reality bluntly violates the principle of "separation of power" and "checks and balances". Thus neither the parliament nor the judiciary was capable of checking or balancing the president who exercises the executive power from his undemocratic move. This consequently paved the way for the emergence of authoritarian regime.

Weak Multi-party System

Unlike the previous Soviet period of single party rule of the Communist Party, independent Tajikistan allowed different political parties with varying ideologies and varying support bases to operate in the country. Broadly, the country's political parties can be divided into three: the ruling party or the party in power; the opposition parties and the satellite parties; pro-government parties.[15] Yet, despite the existence of various political parties, there is no real political pluralism in the country.[16] In much bias against the opposition, the government used state resources to promote its own party / parties being pro-government,[17] while making all possible efforts to sideline or eliminate opposition parties from active politics.[18] Opposition leaders were frequently harassed or attacked, and their workers were intimidated. Operating under difficult political environment of intimidation and suppression, the opposition parties were weak and ineffective. Consequently, Tajikistan's politics has been dominated by President Rahmon's party, the People's Democratic Party of Tajikistan (PDPT), which enjoyed the country's resources and the patronage of the government.[19]

The dominance of the PDPT, however, was neither the result of good governance nor the existence of strong support among the people. Rather, it was the outcome of the authoritarian rule of the government. In close similarity with the Soviet rule, the government was intolerant to the opposition and was reluctant to provide free space to them for fair political competition for power. The government selectively targeted potential opposition leaders, charged them with politically motivated cases such as criminal and corruption cases, imprisoned

them, and subsequently disqualified them from contesting elections.[20] For instance, major contenders of President Rahmon were removed from active politics in early 2005.[21] Thus, the parliamentary elections of 2005 and the presidential election of 2006 were held in the absence of strong opposition forces. Similar measures against the opposition could also be seen in the 2013 presidential election and 2015 parliamentary elections.[22]

Besides sideling or eliminating important opposition leaders from politics on the eve of elections, the government was also unfairly treating the opposition during election campaigns that clearly signifies that "free political competition" – a basic tenet of democracy, has been outrightly denied to opposition parties. The government officials openly made campaigns for candidates of the ruling party, the PDPT, and pressurised the residents to vote for them. In addition, they intimidated the workers of the opposition parties and prevented them from free and fair campaigning for their candidates.[23] Moreover, the government used state-run media to promote the candidates of the ruling party while exerting series of pressures on independent media to restrain from voicing the views of the opposition parties.[24] Unsurprisingly, weakened by the repressive rule of the government, the opposition parties were unable to make strong inroads to the parliament. In 2000 elections, only 15 seats of the total 63 were won by the opposition: 13 seats won by the CPT and 2 seats by the IRPT. The opposition share of seats in parliament sharply declined in 2005 from 13 to 6 seats: four seats won by CPT and two seats by IRPT.[25] The share further declined in 2010 parliamentary elections in which the opposition won only four seats out of the total 63 seats: two seats each by the IRPT and CPT. Worse than ever before, all the opposition parties including IRPT and CPT failed to reach the five percent threshold to enter parliament in the recently concluded 2015 parliamentary elections, although the CPT at least captured two seats on single mandates.[26]

The opposition parties blamed the government for their poor performance in the elections. After every election result is declared, they complained that the results were manipulated and the parliamentary seats allotted to them were far lower than they actually won.[27] For instance in the 2010 parliamentary elections the IRP claimed to have secured 30 percent of the votes as against the official result of 8.2 percent, and the Social-Democratic Party claimed to have secured 12 percent as against

less than 1 percent official result.[28] Going by the reports of the OSCE which claimed that the elections in Tajikistan were neither free nor fair, it may be argued that in case free and fair elections were conducted, and important opposition leaders were not suppressed especially before the elections, the opposition's performance could have been far better and the number of seats they secure could have been drastically increased. In consequence, the opposition capability to check the government from authoritarian move may be largely enhanced.

For now, unable to make strong presence in the parliament, the opposition has little or no influence in the political process of the country. Specifically, the opposition were neither capable of pushing for better democratization nor checking the government from drifting towards authoritarian rule. Clearly, this is mainly the result of the government's reluctance to provide to the opposition parties the freedom to freely participate in politics and compete for political power. This bluntly violates the principle of democracy and shake the whole of the existing multiparty system and, thus, create a condition unfavorable for the country's ongoing transition process.

Weak Civil Society / NGOs

Though the history of civil society in Tajikistan dates back to pre-Soviet period, Western-style NGOs emerged in the country only in the mid-1990s, that too, with the active initiative of international donors, particularly, from the US.[29] The government welcomed the suddenly mushrooming NGOs in the country, primarily, for two reasons. First, many NGOs such as the Aga Khan Foundation, were working on socio-economic development much to the relief of the people who were plagued with deep crises of widespread poverty.[30] Second, the government authorities initially did not consider the NGOs as a threat to their political power since they did not foresee that NGOs would engage in politics.[31] With the spread of color revolution in the Soviet space in the early 2000s, however, the government's perception about civil society gradually changed. Frightened by the events of color revolutions, the authorities became highly critical about civil society in Tajikistan.[32] Consequently, they closely watched and tightened its control over the activities of the NGOs. Although their activities were not banned, strong warnings against foreign-financed NGOs were released. On 14 January 2005, for example, the elections officials warned that any candidate

found to be receiving money from abroad would be disqualified from contesting the elections.[33] In the same year, restrictive laws that greatly hindered the activities of NGOs, were passed. It was made obligatory for NGOs to submit their financial reports to the authority. Moreover, foreign embassies and international organizations were required to inform the government about the dates and topics of their meeting with local NGOs, political parties and journalists.[34]

Strict rules were imposed for registration and renewal of the existing registration. NGOs thought to be threatening the regime were removed either by denial of registration or denial of renewal of registration. In 2006, the authorities denied registration to Freedom House by applying complicated registration requirements. Another international NGO, National Democratic Institute, which has been actively operating in the country since 2002 in building the capacity of civil society and political parties, was denied re-registration in 2008.[35] The complexity of the re-registration laws on NGOs passed in 2007 were more crude.[36] In order to prevent the NGOs from achieving genuine political reform output, the government directly attacked or harshly dealt with NGOs working on liberalisation or democratization[37]. However, it was comparatively soft on those working on socio-economic development. For this reason, NGOs in Tajikistan choose to refrain from working on sensitive areas, such as, democracy-building[38]and shifted to engage on relatively uncontroversial issues, such as, rule of law, training and workshops for lawyers and judges.[39] In consequence, despite existing in numerous numbers, Tajik NGOs were weak and incapable of exerting effective influence on the policies and programs of the government, particularly in matter relating to democratisation.

Weak Media

In contrast to the previous Soviet period of state monopoly over media outlets, independent Tajikistan has witnessed the emergence of numerous media outlets including privately owned independent media. Even then, the government continued to enjoy dominant influence, particularly, over the broadcasting television which is the most important source of information in the country. Despite the fact that broadcasting television stations were owned both by the government and private organizations, all the nationwide television stations were owned by the state alone.[40] In this sense, independent media refers mainly to print media or newspapers. State-owned television stations promoted the

views and interests of the government while refusing to cover the views of the opposition.[41] Being intolerant to criticism, the government made serious efforts to restrain independent media from raising critical issue about the government.[42]For instance, in what came to be the darkest period for independent media in Tajikistan, the government imposed a ban on independent media in 1990s by taking advantage of then on-going civil war in the country.[43]

However, following the end of the civil war, independent media slowly re-emerged beginning from 2001. Yet, this limited media freedom could not continue for long since the authorities quickly resumed its practice of intervening in the affairs of independent media. As such, as early as in 2005, the government was successful in closing down without much difficulty the country's independent media including newspapers, radio and local television channels.[44] Remarkably, the country's two most critical weekly newspapers (Nerui Sukhan and Ruzi Nav) had been frequently denied printing with the direct or indirect intervention of the government. Thus, the two papers were forced to frequently shutdown their publications.[45]

After the parliamentary and presidential elections held in 2005 and 2006 respectively, government's control over independent media was slightly relaxed, yet the government remained intolerant to critical media. Critical independent media personnel were regularly intimidated and charged with cases such as criminal and corruption.[46] Among others, the government leveled case against the Editor-in-Chief of the newspaper Ovoza, Saida Ourgonova and two of its reporters in 2007 and journalist Tursunali Aliev in 2008.[47] Also in 2010, the government filed a defamation case against three critical independent newspapers, Ozodagon, Farazh and Asia-Plus, two of which were among the country's most three read newspapers, for publishing articles about a press conference held by a lawyer who protested against what he believed to be local judges' unfair sentencing of 33 businessmen.[48]This seriously weakened the independent media.[49] Because of government's tight control over independent media, and indeed because of the government's suppression of critical media, many independent media in Tajikistan choose to practice self-censorship for fear of government's retaliation. The result is obvious. Despite existing in numerous number, independent media in Tajikistan was neither free nor vibrant, and thereby, they failed to serve as an agent of democratization.

Impact of Civil War

As already mentioned, the transformation of Tajikistan's political system from communism to liberal democracy released political freedoms that allowed the people to participate in politics and compete for political power. Unfortunately, the competition for political power quickly turned violent and eventually led the outbreak of a civil war. The five years disastrous civil war (1992-97) brought large-scale destruction to the lives and properties of the people in Tajikistan. It claimed the lives of an estimated number of 50,000 people[50] and displaced about 600,000 people constituting one-tenth of the country's total population.[51] The war also turned about 25,000 women as widows and 55,000 children as orphans.[52] The dreadful memories left by the war continued to haunt and shape people's thoughts and way of life in the post-civil war period much to the disadvantage of the country's transition to democracy.[53]

Triggered by the controversy over the presidential election of 1991, Tajik's first experiment with the working of liberal democracy, the civil war carried with it the image of democracy. Being gravely destructive, Tajiks learnt from that civil war that democracy released chaos and social division, and brought pains and sufferings into the society. Therefore, they associated democracy with lawlessness while associating authoritarianism with strict law and order.[54] Correspondingly, they preferred authoritarian regime over democratic regime,[55]and thus, the demand for democracy was predictably low and the level of acceptance for authoritarianism was unsurprisingly high. Such negative attitude of the people about democracy was highly inhospitable for democracy to prosper.[56] Using this post-civil war political environment for their political gain which worked quite effectively, Rahmon and his ruling authorities manipulated the destructive consequences of the civil war to stabilize and safeguard their authoritarian regime. On the one hand, they accused the opposition of provoking the civil war and warned not to repeat the same,[57]while on the other hand, they not only credited themselves but also projected themselves as the best guarantor of peace and stability in post-civil war Tajikistan.[58]

This policy produced two closely related results favoring authoritarian rule in Tajikistan. First, seen by the people as the best guarantor of peace and stability, Rahmon's regime was generally accepted by the people[59] despite its democratic deficiency merely because it was successful in maintaining social peace and political

stability.[60] Not surprisingly as such, as in many post-conflict societies, political stability in Tajikistan, delayed the process of democratization rather than enhancing it.[61] Secondly, frightened by the civil war based intimidations, the people to a great extent were discouraged to actively participate in politics and competition for political power, a highly essential condition for successful democracy. Weak participation of citizens in politics in fact is a common feature of the post-Soviet countries' political process which to a large extent is the legacy of the Soviet authoritarian rule. In Tajikistan, however, citizens' role in politics was limited not only by the legacy of the Soviet rule but also by the impact of the civil war.

Role of External Actors: US and Russia

External powers such as Russia and the US had been playing a crucial role in the transition process of post-Soviet countries and Tajikistan in particular. Russia, the colonial master, play the role of protecting Rahmon's regime with its financial and military might whereas the US, the sole super power of the post-Cold War era, played the role of supporting political reforms by pumping financial assistance. The different interests and roles that these two external players had played left the ruling authorities in Tajikistan, the choices to either take the path of democracy or authoritarianism. The US had been engaging in Tajikistan soon after independence with the mission, 'democracy promotion' high on its agenda. Nevertheless, despite being the chief campaigner of 'global democracy' with special focus on post-Soviet countries, the US lacked genuine interest to promote democracy in Tajikistan.[62] It did not effectively use its influence to promote democracy. As such, the relationship between the two countries, even at its zenith point, did not lead to genuine democratic reforms in Tajikistan.[63] Also, despite the enhanced cooperation emerging from the terrorist attack on US in 2001, the US influence on Tajikistan remained limited. The accusation that the US was supporting the color revolution that erupted across the post-Soviet countries in early 2000 created suspicious about its engagement in the region. As such, as was in many post-Soviet countries, the US suffered back lashed in Tajikistan.[64] Consequently, Tajikistan slowly drifted away from the US and moved closer and closer towards Russia, the country which unlike the US was not uncomfortable with authoritarian rulers.[65]

Highly concerned about the Islamic rule in Afghanistan and its possible spill in to its neighbouring Central Asian countries through Tajikistan, the US supported Rahmon's regime, despite the fact that it was authoritarian, simply because he was capable of maintaining stability in the country and preventing the infiltration of the above mentioned Islamic rule. The US feared that 'regime change' in Tajikistan would result into domestic instability that would create favourable condition for Islamic rule to emerge, and thus, it wanted Rahmon to remain in power.[66] In addition, satisfied with Rahmon's cooperation on its war against Taliban in Afghanistan, the US turned a blind eye on his authoritarian regime,[67]thereby undermining its mission for democracy. While Tajikistan has been following the policy of engagement with the West, particularly, the US, it has also been maintaining its relationship with Russia in even stronger terms. Indeed, Russia has been serving as a provider of security to Tajikistan from internal unrest and external pressure since its independence. During the civil war the Russian army guarded the Tajik-Afghan border to check the penetration of opposition from their hide outs in Afghanistan and also fought against the opposition with the government side by side.[68] In the absence of a standing army of its own, the military assistance provided by the Russian army proved extremely helpful for Rahmon's regime to survive in the face of strong opposition forces. In fact, it was the assistance of Russia that enabled Rahmon to remain in power throughout these trouble times of the civil war.[69] Russia continued to extent its support for authoritarian regime in Tajikistan in face of mass protest against authoritarian regimes during the post-Soviet color revolution in the early 2000s and also during the Middle East unrest in the early 2010s.[70]

The influence of Russia, the colonial master of Tajikistan and a staunch supporter of authoritarian regime, remained strong and stable in Tajikistan which to a great extent promoted and strengthened Rahmon's authoritarian regime. By contrast, the US lacked strong historical, political and economic ties with Tajikistan as Russia does. In addition, it lacked genuine interest to promote democracy since its strategic interest in Tajikistan and Central Asia as a whole often overshadowed its concern for democracy. Consequently, there is no strong pressure from external actors including the US for genuine democratic reforms in Tajikistan. This made the international environment suitable for authoritarian regime to survive and consolidate rather than to enhance democracy.

Conclusion

The problems hindering the transition of Tajikistan from communism to liberal democracy has been emanating broadly from three factors: weak democratic institutions, the negative impact of the civil war and the lack of external actors' genuine commitment to and strong pressure for democracy. First, democratic institutions such as separation of power, multiparty system, civil society and independent media which emerged soon after independence were weak and immature. Though power is separated among the three branches of the state, it is largely bias in favor of the executive branch. Vested with inadequate power, the legislature and judiciary were unable to check the executive power. In addition, political parties were weak and lowly rooted in the society. Despite the existence of multiple political parties, the opposition parties were denied free and fair competition for political power. Likewise, the independent media outlets were neither genuinely independent nor vibrant. The government owned most of the famous media outlets and used them as its mouthpiece while putting the independent media outlets under tight grip of the state, thereby, prevented them from freely publishing, airing or broadcasting the views of the opposition. Similar tight control of the state was also imposed on civil society. As such, the civil society was weak and incapable of playing effective role in voicing or promoting people's views and interest, especially on matter relating to politics. Not surprisingly, none of the above mentioned democratic institutions effectively served as an agent of democracy, thereby leaving the ruling regime uncheck from its path to authoritarianism.

Secondly, the civil war created a bad image for democracy. Because of the devastating impact of the civil war, the people associated democracy with lawlessness while they associated authoritarian rule with strict law and order. Thus, many people favoured authoritarian rule over democracy. In this sense, it may be argued that the Soviet legacy of authoritarian political culture that has been existing in Tajikistan has been enhanced by the civil war. Haunted by the memories of the civil war, the people felt reluctant to actively engage in politics fearing that doing so would invite a backlash from the ruling regime that would lead to a new civil war in the county. Finally, the Western actors particularly the US lacked genuine commitment and capability to promote democracy in Tajikistan. Its commitment to democracy has often been overshadowed by its geopolitical interest. Moreover, its influence or capability to

promote democracy in Tajikistan has also been undermined by the presence of Russia's stronger influence. Thus, the West and the US in particular not only lacked the interest but also the capability to promote democracy in Tajikistan. This allowed the ruling regime to abandon democratic reforms and inclines towards authoritarian rule. It may be pointed that whereas the first and the second problems were common in many of the post-Soviet countries, the third problem prevailed only in Tajikistan. This meant that being the only post-Soviet country to have been experiencing a disastrous five years civil war in the immediate aftermath of independence, Tajikistan has an additional challenge for its transition to democracy i.e. people's reluctance to actively participate in politics for fear of a new civil war.

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CENTRAL ASIAN MIGRATIONS AND KUSHAN MATERIAL CULTURE IN KASHMIR

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Abstract

The most important feature of the history of Central Asia has been the *movement of the nomadic races which not only affected the sedentary population of the region but brought about far-reaching changes in the history and cultures of the Persian, Chinese and the Indian empires. Kashmir somewhat secluded in nature and having tough topographical position still fell prey to these nomadic tribes. Kushans (Yu-Chi's in Chinese literature) were one among these tribes, who's invasion of Ki-Pin (Kashmir) has been rendered one of the greatest landmarks in the history of the region. Besides Rajatarangini of Kalhana, Kushan conquest of Kashmir has been mentioned by the Chinese historical as well as religious texts. Kalhana has mentioned that three Kushan Kings Hushka, Jushka and Kanishka have founded four towns in Kashmir valley. This literary evidence has been attested by the archaeological and numismatic evidence, which confirms the Kushan presence in Kashmir valley. There are more than sixty Kushan sites in Kashmir but very few sites have been excavated till now. Besides throwing light on the architecture of the Kushan period, these sites have yielded terracotta tiles and sculptures in large number. The hundreds of coins of Kushan Kings were also found from different corners of the Kashmir valley. With this background, this paper makes an attempt to highlight the importance of Kashmir valley during the Kushan period through the archaeological data retrieved from excavations and explorations. Also, an attempt has been made to understand the possible routes of Kushan migration into Kashmir valley.*

Keywords

Excavations, Explorations, Migration, Kushan, Material Culture, Kashmir, Routes, Central Asia, Archaeological Evidence.

Origin and the Early Conquests

The name *Kushan* occurs in several slightly different forms in various Indian and Central Asian sources. In the Indian Kharoshthi inscriptions it is written as "*Gushana*"[1], *Kushana*[2], *Kursana*[3] and *Kusana*[4]. The Chinese version of the name is mentioned in *Hou-Han-Shu*, by *Fan-ye* as "*Koei-Shuang*" or "*Koei-Choang*" or "*Kwei-Shwang*"[5]. In the legends of dynastic coins the name *Kushan* is represented as, "*KOPANO*"[6], "*KOPΣANO*"[7], "*KOCANO*"[8] and "*XOPAN*"[9]. In 165 BC, a war broke

out between two nomad hoards living on the borders of the Chinese empire, the *Yueh-chih* and the *Hiung-nu*, in which the former were completely defeated and ousted from their territory. The *Yueh-chih* then marched westward with their flocks and herds in search of lands and pastures. On their way they faced another nomad horde, the *Wu-sun*. In the fight which ensued, the *Wu-sun* were wasted, their chief *Nan-teou-mi* was killed. After this the *Yueh-chih* still marching westward, attacked the *Se* or *Sok* (*Se, Sok, Sai or Sakas*) which abandoned their territory to the *Yueh-chih* and migrated into *Ki-pin* to the South[10]. As the name *Sai*, considered to have been pronounced as *Sak* in Archaic Chinese, is equated with that of *Sakas*[11], the great *Yueh-chih* seem to have conquered the country of the *Sakas*. Thus as an indirect result of the *Yueh-chih* conquest of the Issik-köl area, a *Saka* kingdom was established in the north-western part of the Indian sub-continent[12]. As *Ki-pin* was a term rendered to Kashmir by the Chinese historians it seems most probable that this *Saka* kingdom was established exactly in Kashmir. The famous Chinese source *Hou-Han-Shu* (Annals of the Later Han) compiled by *Fan Yeh* (445 AD) covers the period (25-220 AD) of the Han Dynasty clearly mentions that Kashmir (*Ki-pin*) was incorporated in the *Kushan* empire by its illustrious founder *Kujala Kadphises* sometime after his conquest of Kabul, parts of Western Bactria and North-West India. *Fan-Yeh* gives the following account of the *Kushan* conquest of India:

In old days the *Yueh-chih* were vanquished by the *Hsuing-nu*. They then went to *Ta-hsia* and divided the kingdom among five '*Yabgous*', viz, those of *Hieou-mi*, *Choung-mi*, *Kouei-Chouang*, *Hitouen* and *Tou-mi*. More than hundred years after that, the *Yabgou* of *Kouei-Chouang* (*Kushan*) named *K'ieou-tsieou-kio* or *Ch'iu-chiu-ch'üeh* (*Kuzoulo* or *Kujala Kadphises*) attacked and vanquished the four other '*Yabgous*' and called himself King; the name of his kingdom was *Kushan*. He invaded *Ngan-si* and took possession of the territory of *Kaofu* (Kabul). He also overcame *Pouta* and *Ki-pin* (Kashmir) and completely possessed these territories. *Ch'iu-chiu-ch'üeh* died at the age of more than eighty years, and his son *Yen-kao-chen* succeeded him as king. He in his turn destroyed *T'ien-chu* (India) and placed there general to control it. Since then, the *Yueh-chih* has been extremely rich and strong. In the various (Western) countries (their ruler) is always referred to as 'the king of *Kuei-shuang*', but the Han, basing themselves upon the old appellation,

speak about "the Great *Yüeh-chih*"[13]. The mentioned literary evidence of Chinese, Buddhist and Indian chronicles about the description of *Kushan* rule in Kashmir valley and its neighbouring regions has been confirmed by the archaeological discoveries from time to time. There have been no serious archaeological investigations in Kashmir so far, but a number of *Kushan* sites have come to light albeit by chance. Sixty eight (68) Kushan sites have been reported from Kashmir valley so far. Among all these only four sites have been to some extent excavated systematically, viz: Harwan, Semthan, Ushkur and Kanispore. The work at other potential sites such as, Hutmur, Hoinar-Lidroo, Doin Pather, Kutbal, Gurwet, Wangdoora and Ahan have not progressed beyond trial trenches.

Routes and Migrations

The archaeological evidence scattered along the ancient routes is the best evidence to look into the migrations during the *Kushan* period. There were three main routes traversed during the *Kushan* period in Kashmir valley (Figure 1). The route on which the exciting discovery of *Kujala Kadphises* coins were made at Turukpora[14] in Bandipora district links Kashmir valley with Astor, Gilgit, Chitral, Yasin, Badakshan, Tibet and further to Central Asia and China, via Bandipora-Gurez road[15]. This area was home to the *Kushan's* long before they entered into Kashmir valley. *Kushan* inscriptions have been discovered in Chilas, Hunza and Gilgit also[16]. Mukherjee[17] points out that "A few dated graffiti on rock at Alam Bridge (Gilgit) refer to different years probably of the *Kanishka* Era. Those datable to *Kanishka-I*, may indicate authority of the king concerned over that area in the upper region of modern Kashmir". According to Dani[18], Kharoshti inscription at Chilas shows that *Kushan's* have advanced into this part very early in their reign. His reading of the inscription, *Vimakadaphasa*, suggests that *Kushan* rule could be traced from the period of *Vima Kadaphises* onwards in upper reaches (Northern region) of Kashmir valley. At another place, Dani[19] has also recorded the three line inscription of the *Kushan* king *Vajheska*; the father of *Kanishka-II*, with a royal title *Kaisara* (seems Sassanian association). Dani[20] has also tried to read the name *Maharaja Uvima Kadhatphisa* in graffiti on a famous rock at Hunza. Apart from Kharoshti and Brahmi, Chinese inscriptions were also found in Bactrian, Parthian, Middle Persian and Sogdian languages[21] in and

around Chilas, Gilgit and Hunza is an excellent example of diverse ethnicity and frontiers of human civilization, which played a pivotal role in the moment of population from all directions. The rock carvings and inscriptions dating to 4th – 5th century AD, has been also found at Helor Das[22] as well as at Nokkono Ghwand in Swat valley[23]. The valuable observation made by Jettmar[24] that, "Since the first century AD, a route used by merchants, Buddhist missionaries and pilgrims, artists and political envoys of the *Kusans*, existed between Kashmir and the Tarim Basin". He on the basis of the extensive studies in the area and available inscriptions suggested that Chilas was a frontier district of the *Darada*-kingdom, which had its capital in the *Nilum/Kishanganga* valley (Dawar in Gurez valley, Kashmir could be identified as a capital of Darad territory), wherefrom trade between Central Asia and North-west India brought them substantial gains. Since 1979, over ten thousand petroglyphs and thousands of inscriptions were systematically explored in the Northern areas of Pakistan[25] including Gilgit, Baltistan, Diamir, Hunza, Chilas, which lie very close to the northern most districts of Kashmir valley, such as Gurez in Bandipore, where the presence of rock art is yet to be discovered, as no archaeological explorations were conducted due to the political turmoil in the area. Once done, it will surely add a lot of information to the present scenario of rock art and will highlight the relations between Central Asia and Kashmir through this region in the past.

The highest concentration of *Kushan* sites is in Baramulla district numbering more than forty six (46). These sites are located on the ancient route which connected Kashmir valley with Hazara (Urasa), Taxila (Jandial) and other important sites of the Kushan period in Pakistan[26] through Baramulla Jehlum valley road. Aurel Stein in his supplement to the translation of *Rajatarangini* of *Kalhana*[27] and elsewhere[28] has given a clear picture and description of these routes and there importance in ancient times as the entrance to the valley of Kashmir. The mention of Baramulla route has come from *Hieun Tsang* (7th century AD) and *Ou-Kong* (8th century AD), who while coming from ancient Gandhara and Urasa, followed it on their way to Kashmir and this route was known to *Alberuni* (11th century AD) as well. As Baramulla route passed through Hazara and Taxila, (*Kushan* sites in Pakistan), it enjoyed great importance during *Kushan* period. *Rajatarangini* has mentioned about *Kushan* kings, who have built three cities in Kashmir (Hushkapur,

Fig. 1
Ancient Trade and Migration Routes from Kashmir Valley to Central Asia



Jushkapur and Kanishkapur by *Hushka*, *Jushka* and *Kanishka*), among which two (Hushkapur and Kanishkapur as modern Ushkur and Kanispur) have already been located in Baramulla district. As per the third city (Jushkapur) is concerned it has been located by Cunnighum[29] in Srinagar near Zukur. There is strong need to re-think on the identification of the third city made by Cunnighum as Zukur, where no such archaeological evidence has been confirmed. To Mani[30] it seems that Jushkapur lies near to other two cities and therefore the village Zugiyar near Fatehgarh may represent it, as later temples, sculptures and

images have been noticed in the area. This fact could be confirmed by the statement of *Hieun Tsang*, who mentions about spending the night at a temple after visiting many monuments at Ushkur[31]. Local traditions also support this, as people believe that there are many sites deep into the forest around Ushkur of huge archaeological importance. Due to some unavoidable circumstances and restrictions these sites could not be located and hence remains hidden for the future archaeologist to explore. Except from *Kalhan's Rajatarangini* there is no other evidence of Jushka as a *Kushan* king, as not even a single coin bearing the name Jushka has been found so far. *Kalhana* not only credits this King with the foundation of Jushkapur, but he even mentions him as a founder of another town Jayasvamipura, which Aurel Stein himself was unable to trace. Whatever be the case, it is quite clear that Baramulla owing to its geographical position on the trade route as well as its close proximity and connectivity to other major *Kushan* sites such as Taxila in Pakistan has remained one of the favourable spots for the building activities during the *Kushan* period.

The strong evidence has come from the Khaltse inscription of Ladakh in Kharoshti, mentions the name of *Vima Kadphises* as *Uvima Kavthisasa* of the year 187[32]. This inscription is situated on the ancient trade route from Kashmir towards Central Asia and China. Apart from these inscriptions the only monument which could be linked traditionally with *Kanishka* in Ladakh is "*Kanika Chorten*", near Sani monastery in Zanaskar, as the name refers to *Kanishka*, the *Kushan* king[33].

Archaeological Evidence

The extensively excavated site of Harwan has revealed the structural evidence in the shape of pebble, diaper-pebble and rubble masonry. The structures excavated at Harwan are the best examples of the method employed by the *Kushan* artist can be seen either as an independent development of building activity in Kashmir or may have been influenced from Taxila, where same masonry has been adopted during *Kushan* period[34]. The Apsidal temple, the three tier stupa and monastery are the important structures at Harwan. The other excavations at Ushkur[35], Semthan[36] and Kanispur[37] have also yielded similar type of constructional techniques employed during *Kushan* period. Some of the sites, such as Hoinar, Hutmur, Kutbal and Ahan, where only trial excavations have been undertaken have also revealed similar evidence.

One of the important features of *Kushan* sites in Kashmir valley are the terracotta tiles. These tiles have been reported from almost all sites which have been subject to minor or major excavations. The first site which revealed terracotta tile pavement around apsidal stupa is Harwan. Same tile Pavements have been reported from Hutmur and Kutbal in Anantnag district. On the basis of the study of these tiles from the then only site of Harwan many theories were propounded by scholars. The theories which related these tiles with Parthians[38], Huns[39] and Ajvikas[40] can now be easily refuted on the basis that tile making industry has its origin in Kashmir and that too within the *Kushan* period[41]. The evidence available now from more than twelve sites in Kashmir has revealed the stages of development of this unique art. The other important art which flourished during the *Kushan* period in Kashmir valley is terracotta sculptural art. Due to the non-availability of the raw material of schist stone of Gandhara or red sand stone of Mathura, the *Kushan* artist was confined to terracotta in Kashmir valley has been proved from many excavated sites. Not even a single complete sculpture of the period has been reported from anywhere in Kashmir, but fragmentary parts of the body, life size terracotta heads and some ornamental decorations of Sculptures have come from the excavations at Ushkur, Harwan and Kanispur. Small figurines have been reported from Semthan and Ushkur as well. Scholars are not unanimous on the date of these sculptures. Paul[42] has dated these terracotta heads to 6th century AD, while as Fabri believes that these belong to the Lalittaditya's period, and hence dated as 700-730 AD. In the light of the new evidence from Kanispur in Kashmir[43] and Akhnur in Jammu region[44], where terracotta and stucco fragments have been reported it can be safely suggested that these terracotta heads are very much *Kushan* rather than of pre or post-*Kushan* period. The abundant finds of comparable material has come from the Taxilan monasteries like Dharmarajika, Kalawan, Mohara Moradu, Bhamala and Jaulian. Marshall[45] dated the terracotta and stucco art of these places between fourth-fifth centuries AD.

Coins form one of the main constituent of the *Kushan* studies in Kashmir valley. There are more than five hundred *Kushan* coins found in Kashmir valley and are stored in different museums. These coins starting from *Kujala Kadphises* to *Vajheshka* (*Vasudeva*) is an important source to know about the *Kushan* period, their religion, aesthetics, and metallurgy. In 1984, a coin hoard of *Kujala Kadphises* was discovered

at Turukpora in Bandipora district[46]. One more coin hoard was reported from Chogul in Kupwara district, which yielded three coins of *Kujala Kadphises*[47]. Very few coins of the *Kushan* period have been retrieved from excavations. Deities like *MAO, MIIRO, NANA, OESHO, OADO, MANAOBAGO* and *ATSHO* have been depicted on *Kushan* coins found so far in Kashmir valley. The existence of mint centres has not been confirmed yet from anywhere in Kashmir.

Conclusion

The group of rocks at Hunza, and the evidence from Chilas, Alam Bridge and Khaltse (Ladakh) bears several inscriptions indicating *Kushan* rule spanning from *Vima Kadphises* to *Kanishka* and further to *Vajheshka*, suggesting these regions could well have been in Ki-*pin* (Kashmir) conquered by *Kujala Kadphises* according to the Chinese Annals. The coins of *Kujala Kadphises* found in Kashmir further testify this fact. At the same time it is certain that the amount of evidence we have does not testify directly that any ruler of *Kushan* dynasty had ever reached Ladakh. The most probable inference seems that the whole region from Ladakh to Pamirs might have accepted overlordship of *Kushan's* and the popularity of these rulers among people might have caused to inscribe their names on stones throughout this vast region. The pattern of evidence along these routes has certainly shown that the conquest of Kashmir was first undertaken by *Kujala Kadphises* through northern route of Gilgit. Later on the distribution and rise of settlements along the river Jehlum on the *Karewas* in Baramulla district further flourished during *Kanishka's* time. Besides the cities founded by *Kanishka* and *Huvishka*, Baramulla was an important centre of activity during the *Kushan* period as it lies near to Taxila- one of the important centre of the *Kushan* period in Pakistan. The scattered evidence of terracotta art in Kashmir valley in the form of tiles and sculptures with structural evidence presents an emerging picture of the flourishing *Kushan* art in Kashmir valley. Archaeological evidence gathered across Kashmir valley suggests that the *Kushan* period in Kashmir was one of the important epochs in the ancient history of Kashmir.

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POST-INDEPENDENCE DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES IN UZBEKISTAN
A Regional Analysis

G. M. Shah

Abstract

Uzbekistan is a landlocked country located in the heart of Central Asia. It is bordered to the north and north-east by Kazakhstan, to the west and south-west by Turkmenistan, to the south by Afghanistan and to the east by Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Uzbekistan has an area of 447,400 square kilometers. It has a diverse terrain comprising sandy deserts, intensively irrigated river valleys and high mountain ranges. The climate of Uzbekistan is of continental type, with long hot summers and short mild winters. The Syr Darya is the main source of water for Uzbekistan. Being a multi-ethnic country, it has been estimated that in the year 1996, Uzbek constituted 80 percent population of the country. The other important ethnic groups of the country include Russians (5.5%), Tajiks (5%) Kazakhs (3%), Karakalpaks (2.5%), Tatars 1.5%) and others 2.5%). After the disintegration of former Soviet Union there has been a very significant change in the ethnic composition of Uzbekistan. The Slavic groups of population such as Russians, Ukrainians and Belorussians have registered a declining trend in the country. The country has undergone numerous demographic changes since its independence in which the geographical setting and ethnicity has contributed directly / indirectly. An attempt has been made in this paper to highlight these changes which will have long bearings on future developmental planning of this country.

Keywords

Demographic Changes, Socio-economic Transformation, Multi-ethnicity, Provinces, Uzbekistan, Geophysical Features, Migration, Pull-push Factors.

Demographic Changes in Uzbekistan

As a result of political, economic and social transformation in Uzbekistan following its independence in 1991, the country has experienced major demographic changes over the past more than one and a half decade. The major socio-economic changes during the country's transitional phase has not only impacted the present demographic situation of Uzbekistan, but will have also the long term consequences for the country's socio-demography and economic development. The important indicators selected for understanding the post-independence demographic changes in Uzbekistan for the period 1991-2007, include, population distribution, density and growth as well as the indicators

like longevity, literacy level, employment rate, incidence of poverty, urbanization in the country. Besides analyzing the temporal changes in the occurrence of these demographic characteristics of Uzbekistan, an effort has been made to study their regional variations as well, so as to identify the provinces which are much behind in the race of demographic development of the country.

Changes in Population Distribution

By a cursory look at Table-I, it reveals that Uzbekistan had a total population of 26.6 million persons during the year 2005. The population of Uzbekistan is very unevenly distributed over the length and breadth of the country. The highest population concentration is found in Samarkand, Tashkent and Ferghana provinces, where more than 2 million persons are concentrated in each province. The Dzhizak, Syrdarya and Navoi provinces are having the lowest population concentration in the country with less than one million population in each province. The Andizhan and Kashkadarya provinces have joined recently the category of high population concentration provinces. Whereas, Bukhara Province falling in the second category of populous provinces in1991, has dropped to the third category in the year 2001; because of forming of the Navoi province. The Karakalpakstan has risen from the third category during the late Soviet period to the second hierarchy among the most populous provinces over the last one and a half decade of independent Uzbekistan. The Khowrezm province has, however, retained its position in the third category of the most populous provinces of Uzbekistan over the entire post-independence period from1991 to 2005.

Table-I

Demographic Indicators of Uzbekistan (1990-2005)

Indicator	1990	1995	2000	2003	2004	2005
Age- dependency ratio	0.8	-	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.6
Birth rate	33.9	-	22.2	-	-	19.9
Death rate	6.1	-	6.1	-	-	6.4
Fertility rate	4.1	-	2.6	2.3	2.3	2.2
Population below 15	40.9	-	37.2	34.8	34.0	33.2
Population 65 and above	4.0	-	4.3	4.6	4.7	4.7
Population density	48.2	51.4	57.9	60.1	60.8	61.5
Annual population growth	2.4	-	1.0	1.2	1.2	1.2
Total population (in million)	20.5	-	24.7	25.6	25.9	26.6

Source: World Bank, 2007.

Population Density Changes

The average population density of Uzbekistan has increased from 48.2 persons per square kilometer in1991 to 61.5 persons per square kilometer in 2005. A close examination of Table-II reveals that the average population density of Uzbekistan has increased from 55.5 persons per square kilometer to 58.8 persons during the year 2006. The difference of -2.7 persons per square kilometer from 2005 to 2006 can be just because the estimation error of different agencies involved in the generation of demographic data on Uzbekistan. Over the past years starting from 2001 there has never been a negative growth in the population density of Uzbekistan.

Density is highest in the Ferghana Valley whose provinces occupy only 4 percent of the country's territory but 27.8 percent (over 7million) of the country's entire population lives there, with an average density of 414.4 persons per square kilometer. In Samarkand, Syrdarya and Tashkent provinces (including Tashkent city) which comprise 8 percent of the Uzbekistan's territory, 31.5 percent (over 8 million) of the population resides, with an average density of 218 persons per square kilometer.[1] Another 10 million people inhabit the rest of the country, with an average population density of 49.8 persons per square kilometer in Dzhizak Province and 83 persons per square kilometer in Kashkadarya Province. The lowest population density is in Navoi Province and the Karakalpakstan Republic where only 7.3 to 9.5 persons per square kilometer were living during the year 2006.

The average population density of Uzbekistan increased from 55.5 persons to 61.5 persons per square kilometer between 2001 and 2005. The population density of Ferghana Province has increased from 404 persons per square kilometer in 2001 to 431.5 persons per square kilometer in 2006. During the same period the population density of Namangan province increased from 264.8 to 285.1 persons per square kilometer. The population density of Andizhan Province increased from 529.2 to 567.1 persons per square kilometer before, 2001and 2006. The lowest increase in population density was recorded in Navoi Province as it did increase by just 0.1 percent from 2001 to 2006.

Changes in Population Growth

The population of Uzbekistan has increased from 20.5 million in1990 to 26.6 million in 2005.The country witnessed a crude birth rate of 34.5 per thousand and a crude death rate of 6.2 per thousand in the

Table-II
Population Density and Rural Population Distribution (2001-2006)

Region	2001		2002		2003		2004		2005		2006	
	Persons/ Km^2	% Rural	Persons/ Km^2	% Rural	Persons/ Km^2	% Rural	Persons/ Km^2	% Rural	Persons/ Km^2	% Rural	Persons/ Km^2	% Rural
Uzbekistan	55.5	62.8	56.2	63.0	56.9	63.3	57.5	63.5	58.2	63.7	58.8	63.9
Karakal-pakstan	9.2	51.6	9.3	51.1	9.3	51.0	9.4	51.3	9.4	51.3	9.5	51.6
Andizhon	529.2	70.0	536.5	70.0	544.2	70.1	551.2	70.2	559.2	70.4	567.1	70.5
Bukhara	35.38	69.2	36.2	69.5	36.7	69.8	37.1	70.0	37.5	70.3	38.0	70.5
Dzhizak	47.0	69.9	47.7	70.0	48.3	70.2	48.9	70.1	49.5	70.0	49.8	70.1
Kashkadarya	77.5	74.7	78.9	74.9	80.3	75.1	81.8	75.2	83.3	75.2	84.7	75.3
Navoi	7.2	59.7	7.2	59.9	7.2	60.1	7.3	60.2	7.3	60.3	7.3	60.5
Namangan	264.8	62.5	268.7	62.5	272.9	62.5	275.3	62.5	281.0	62.7	285.1	62.8
Samarkant	161.8	73.2	164.2	73.5	166.5	73.8	168.7	74.1	171.2	74.3	173.6	74.5
Surkhandarya	88.3	80.3	89.2	80.4	91.5	80.5	92.9	80.6	94.5	80.7	96.0	80.8
Syrdarya	152.0	68.0	153.7	68.2	153.3	68.5	157.3	68.6	157.2	68.7	158.3	68.8
Tashkent	291.1	59.9	292.3	60.1	293.8	60.3	294.8	60.5	296.2	60.6	297.5	60.7
Ferghana	404.4	71.1	409.2	71.2	414.6	71.4	419.6	71.6	425.8	71.8	431.5	71.9
Khorezm	221.3	76.5	224.9	76.8	228.4	77.1	231.1	77.4	235.3	77.6	238.7	77.8

Source: National Human Development Report Uzbekistan, 2006/2007.

year 1991, thus, registering 28.2 per thousand natural change in the population (Table-III). During the year 2006 the crude birth rate had declined as low as 20.6 per thousand and the crude death rate had came down to 5.2 per thousand, thereby, giving a natural change of just 15.4 per thousand population. The annual growth of population dropped from 28.2 per thousand in 1991 to 21 per thousand in 1996. The country registered a decline in annual growth of population from 1996 to 2006 as well but the decline from1996 to 2001 was very steep as compared to the period between 2001 and 2006. During the period 1991 to 1996 the live births declined from 723, 420 babies to 634,842 babies, but the number of deaths increased from 130,294 to 144, 829 persons. From 1996 to 2001 there was a decline in both annual birth rate as well as annual death rate. From 2001 to 2006 the annual birth rate witnessed an increase whereas the annual death rate registered a slight decrease. The economic conditions of the country during 1990's had deteriorated which had negative influence on the annual growth of the population. However, after a decade of economic transmission the economy of the country did stabilize which had a positive impact on the demography of the country as well.

Table-III
Population Growth in Uzbekistan (1991-2006)

Indicator	**1991**	**1996**	**2001**	**2006**
Average Population (000)	21,009	23,319	25,090	26,947
Live births	723,420	634,842	512,950	555,946
Deaths	130,294	144,829	132,542	139,622
Natural change	593,126	490,013	380,408	416,324
Crud birth rate (per thousand)	34.4	27.2	20.4	20.6
Curd death rate (per thousand)	6.2	6.2	5.3	5.2
Natural change (per thousand)	28.2	21.0	15.1	15.4

Source: CIA, World Fact Book, 2006.

The average annual population growth rate in Uzbekistan fell from 1.5 percent in 2001 to 2003 and reached 1.2 percent between 2003 to 2005. The fertility decreased in all provinces. In 2004 the lowest fertility was registered in Tashkent city (16 person1000); the highest rate was registered in Surkhandarya (22.1) followed by Kashkhadarya (22.7) Dzhizak (22.7) Samartkand (22.5) and Khawarezm (22.0) provinces. The number of births is expected to increase in the next few years as women born during the baby boom will reach reproductive age.

Status of Life Expectancy

The life expectancy in Uzbekistan in 1990 was 69.71 years which dropped as low as 67.47 in1994 and has since then followed an upward trend.[2] A thorough examination of Table-IV reveals that the longevity in Uzbekistan increased from 69.1 years in 1995 to 71.8 years in 2005. Uzbekistan's relatively high life expectancy reached 72.5 years in 2004 (compared with 69.3 in1990), while between1990 and 2004 the nationwide difference between life expectancy for men and women dropped by an average of 1.9 years to 6.3 years and 4.4 respectively.

Table-IV
Trends of Longevity and Literacy in Uzbekistan (1995-2005)

Indicator	**1995**	**1996**	**1997**	**1998**	**1999**	**2000**	**2001**	**2002**	**2003**	**2004**	**2005**
Life expectancy at birth (years)	69.1	69.2	70.1	69.9	70.1	70.8	71.3	71.2	71.6	71.2	71.8
Mean years of schooling	11.4	11.4	2.74	11.4	11.4	11.4	11.5	11.6	11.6	11.7	11.5
Literacy rate	98.96	99.06	99.1	99.2	99.2	99.2	99.2	99.2	99.2	99.3	99.4
Literacy Level	2.74	2.74	2.74	2.74	2.74	2.74	2.74	2.74	2.76	2.75	2.75
Gross first, second & third enrolment ratio (%age 7-22)	76.0	76.0	70.6	70.1	70.6	76.0	76.0	76.0	77.3	76.5	76.5

Source: State Statistical Committee, Uzbekistan, 2006.

However, the life expectancy in Uzbekistan is higher than in other CIS countries but lower than developed realm whose life expectancy rages from 75 to 82 years. The total morbidity and mortality rates need to be brought down and child mortality rates need to be brought down significantly in order to bring about an increase in the life expectancy at birth in Uzbekistan. Though the life expectancy of males has increased from 66.1 in 1990 to 70 in 2004 but the female life expectancy has reached from 72.4 in 1990 to 74.7 in the year 2004.

Changes in Sex Ratio Scenario

In Uzbekistan the sex ratio increased from 97.8 in 1990 to 98.2 in1995 but remained very constant from 1995 to 2005. Since more than 3.5 percent population of Uzbekistan belongs to the Russian, Ukrainian, Belorussia and German ethnicity with comparatively lesser sex ratio (males per 100 females) the overall sex ratio is, therefore, lesser than other republics of Central Asia and also shows a declining trend. Uzbekistan is having a very high sex ratio because of both biological and economic reasons. The infant mortality among the female children is universally lesser than among the male children. Secondly, after the disintegration of former Soviet Union, the male specific migration to other CIS countries like Russia and Kazakhstan, increased very much that had led to an increase in the sex ratio of Uzbekistan.

Changes in Age Structure

The age structure of the population reflects a high birth rate over the last few decades. During the year 1995 children aged 0-18 years represented 48.7 percent population of Uzbekistan. In 2006 children aged 0-18 years represented only 42 percent of the country's population. The share of the working population in Uzbekistan was 49.1 percent in 1990. It has risen to 59.5 percent or over 10 percentage points by 2007. During the year 1990, the share of women entering child bearing age was only 23.4 percent, but by 2007 it has risen to 28.3 percent. Uzbekistan's birth rate had been in decline since the mid-1990's which has caused the current slow growth in the share of people under 16 years of age, is thus, set to rise again. This will presumably lead to an eventual increase in the share of the total population under 16 years of age and could depreciate the 'demographic dividend.'[3] The proportion of people in the age group of 65 and above formed 4 percent of Uzbekistan's total population in the

year 1990. The proportion of elderly people is constantly on increase over the last 15 years but it could not surpass 4.7 percent of the total population of the country by the year 2005.

Literacy and Employment Trends

The literacy rate in Uzbekistan has remained very high during the entire post-independence period. During the year 1995 as high as 98.96 percent population was classified as literate. The literacy rate of the country in 2005 has reached 99.4 percent. The average years of schooling was 11.4 years in 1995 which increased to 11.7 years by the year 2004 thought it dropped to 11.5 years in 2005. The gross enrolment ratio of students in first, second and third level as a percentage of people in the age group of 6 to 22 years was 76 percent in 1995 and reached 76.5 percent by the year 2005 (Table-V). There are, however, male-female and rural – urban variations in the literacy rate and literacy levels in Uzbekistan.

Table-V
Trends of Employment in Uzbekistan (1991-2006)

Indicator	1991	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Able bodied working age population (millions)	10.2	10.9	13.4	13.8	14.2	14.7	15.1	15.5
Able bodied working age people (% of total population)	49.1	52.5	53.5	54.5	55.6	55.6	57.5	58.3
Employment rate (% of able bodied working age population)	80.6	69.4	68.4	67.7	67.5	67.7	67.7	67.7

Source: State Statistical Committee, Uzbekistan, 2006.

The regional variations in literacy rate and literacy levels are also very much present in Uzbekistan. The proportion of able bodied working age people within the population of Uzbekistan has been growing over the last 15 years, creating considerable pressure on the labour market. The working age population accounted for 58.3 percent of the total population of the country in 2006 compared to just 49.1 percent in1991. In the year 2006 alone the working age population grew by 9 percent. The employment rate expressed as the percentage of the able bodied working age population has registered a declining trend from 1991 to 2006. The employment rate of the able bodied working age population of Uzbekistan was 80.6 percent in 1991 but in 2003 it dropped to the lowest level of 67.5 percent. However, it remained constantly higher

by 0.2 percent than the previous year in 2004 to 2007. The employment rate during the first decade of independence in Uzbekistan dropped from 80.6 per cent in 1991 to 68.4 percent in 2001. The employment rate over the next five years, from 2001 to 2006, continued to remain lower though the gradient of declination remained by and large smooth during this perid.[4]

There is evidence that a section of the employed population is engaged in low productivity and low wage jobs, often in the informal sector. These jobs do not always secure enough income to ensure the employed and their dependents with a decent standard of living. Thus the problem of many is not unemployment but under-employment. I n the formal sector there has been a marked decline in employment in the agricultural sector. Agricultural sector represented 42 percent of all formal employment in 1991 compared to only 28.3 percent in 2006. The sharp decline in formal agricultural employment has been largely due to the process of transforming the previous collective forms into cooperatives (*shirkats*), and more recently into private farms. Since early 2000's the process of converting *shirkats* into private farms has taken place.

Incidence of Poverty

Since poverty is directly / indirectly related to some demographic variables, so covered in this study. The poverty line in the government of Uzbekistan's Household Budget Survey is defined as a daily caloric consumption of less than 21,00 kcal. The incidence of poverty in Uzbekistan has declined from 31.5 percent in 2001 to 23.6 percent in 2006. The decline in urban poverty has been steeper than the rural poverty. In 2001 the incidence of urban poverty was 27.8 percent which has declined to 17.6 percent in 2007, whereas the rural poverty has declined from33.6 percent in 201 to 27.1 percent in 2007.

The rural-urban distribution of poverty is highly uneven. During the year 2005 the poor people constituted 25.8 percent of the total population in Uzbekistan. The incidence of rural poverty was 30 percent, which represented 64.4 percent of the total population and 74.7 percent of the poor population of Uzbekistan in the year 2005.[5] The urban poor formed 18.3 percent of the total urban residents 35.6 percent of the total population and 25.3 percent of poor population of Uzbekistan in the year 2005 (Table-VI).

Table-VI
Regional Distribution of Poor Population in Uzbekistan (2005)

Oblast / Region	Poverty headcount (%)	Share of total population (%)	Share of poor population (%)
Total	***25.8***	***100.0***	***100.0***
Urban	***18.3***	***35.6***	***25.3***
Rural	***30.0***	***64.4***	***74.7***
Karakalpakistan	44.0	5.1	8.7
Andizhan	23.1	9.5	8.5
Bukhara	20.8	6.4	5.1
Dzhizak	29.6	3.7	4.3
Kashka darya	41.0	8.5	13.5
Navoi	26.3	3.9	3.0
Namangan	33.4	7.9	10.2
Samarkand	23.9	11.2	10.4
Surkhandarya	34.6	7.3	9.8
Syrdarya	32.6	2.4	3.0
Tashkent Oblast	20.4	10.1	8.0
Ferghana	15.8	11.6	7.1
Khorezm	31.0	5.1	6.1
Tashkent city	6.7	8.2	2.1

Source: National Human Development Report, Uzbekistan, 2007.

The regional distribution of poverty in Uzbekistan was still more non-ubiquitously concentrated in Uzbekistan in the year 2005. It is clear that the headcount ratio of poverty varied from 6.7 percent in Tashkent city to 44 percent in Karakalpakstan in the year 2005. The other provinces with high incidence of poverty included Kashkadarya (41%), Surkhandarya (34.6%), Namangan (33.4), and Syrdary (32.2%). The provinces having less than the national average concentration of the poor people include Ferghana (15.8%), Taskhent (20.4%), Bukhara (20.8%), Andizhon (23.1%) and Samarkand (23.9%).

Conclusion

The impact of post-independence socio-economic transformation in Uzbekistan had serious consequences for the people of the country. The demography of Uzbekistan was negatively impacted due to the

decline in the standards of living in the country during the early years of its transition from the command to the market economy. The birth rate declined very sharply and death rate registered net increase with the result the annual growth of population almost halved from 1990 to 2005. The proportion of poor people increased in the early years of independence but during the last five years 2001 to 2005, the poverty showed a declining trend. The proportion of the urban population also decreased from 1995 to 2005. The employment rate also reduced in the country from 90.6% in 1991 to 67.7% in 2006.

The regional variations in the density and distribution of population, rate of urbanization, unemployment and incidence of poverty have increased during the post-independence period. The high concentration of population continues to remain in the Ferghana region and most of the country is sparsely populated except Tashkent and its adjoining areas because of the very harsh geo-ecological conditions. Due to the decline in industrial production and labour absorption in cities the people have either remained mostly confined to their rural habitats or have migrated to other CIS countries like Russia and Kazakhstan to work as the migrant labourers to earn livelihood for themselves and their families.

The planners and policy makers of Uzbekistan have to pay special attention to the issues of high levels of child mortality, maternal mortality and under-employment as well as to the low level of skill formation, counter- urbanization and labour migration in the country. The region-specific, age-specific and gender-specific human development strategies need to be devised for addressing the demographic issues of the country, in general, and the target groups and target areas, in particular.

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TOURISM MODEL OF J&K STATE
A Study of Conflict on Macroeconomic Variables

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Abstract

Jammu & Kashmir state, in the context of development, has some inherent economic disadvantages and from past few decades, simultaneously, has been suffering badly due to extremely adverse situations which has not only hampered the size and nature of its developmental scenario, but gave rise to the critical problems like unemployment. Notwithstanding the state is unique tourist destination in the sense as it offers attractions for varied type of tourists, as Jammu being known for pilgrim tourism, Kashmir for scenic and Ladakh for adventurous tourism. This kind of distinctiveness is seen only in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. The state has a huge tourist potential while the growth and development of other sectors was restricted due to certain natural limitations. Being a hilly region, the state's peculiar features did not allow its industrial sector to gain momentum. Agriculture, being the mainstay of the state economy, has its own limitations, like single crop season and small size of holdings. With the growth of population, there has been increase in the work force that needs to be engaged. Given the capacity of other sectors in the state, tourism has been the main sector which offers great scope to the growing able body work force. However, the on-going situation in the state has not only squeezed the space for adjustment but also left already absorbed large chunk jobless and adversely affected macroeconomic variables of the state economy. In this backdrop, the present study tries to evaluate the impact of conflict on the macroeconomic variables and explores that how it affected the physical, social, human and institutional capital of the state. However, the inferences have been drawn on the basis of time series data for 26 years (1990-2016) with the help of Multi Regression Model and Johnsen's Co-integration Test.

Keywords

Tourism, Conflict, Co-relational Analysis, Economic Sectors, Impact, Able Body, Macroeconomic Variables, Agriculture, J&K State.

Introduction

Contemporary growth of tourism[1] is the gradual consequence of the increase of wealth in societies and the greater availability of goods and services that were once considered to be luxury. Tourism activities that used to be limited to those who are rich and have plenty of spare time,

now have become a way of life, and a consumption habit for many people in both the developed and the developing world. Tourism is a growth rather an export growth engine and employment generator having the capacity to create large scale employment both direct and indirect, for diverse sections of society from the most specialized to unspecialized work force and gives tremendous fillip to the economy. The landmass of Jammu & Kashmir[2] has a great promise for development of various sectors, especially, tourism in view of its innate potential which placed the state on the map of national as well as international tourist destinations. It is an admitted fact that with the increase in the arrival of tourists, more economic activity gets generated which has multiplier effect on the income levels of the population dependent on this sector. But because of the lull of conflict[3] Jammu & Kashmir has to experience the cauldron of macroeconomic instability[4] rather volatility[5] since 1989 which augmented the precautionary savings[6] that eventually reduces the investments which halted the macroeconomic variables of the state economy and affected the physical, social and institutional capital of the region as a whole.

A host of researchers across the country have theoretically investigated the issue of impact of conflict on tourism sector, but, as such, no one has examined empirically the dynamic and causal relationship between conflict and macroeconomic variables of the state economy.

Methodology

In order to investigate the impact of conflict on macroeconomic variables of the state economy, the following regression model has been adopted:

$$Y_i = \alpha + b_1X_1 + b_2X_2 + b_3X_3 + b_4X_4 + b_5X_5 + b_6X_6 + b_7X_7 + b_8X_8 + b_9X_9 + b_{10}X_{10} + b_{11}X_{11} + \text{----------} + b_{24}X_{24} + \mu$$

In order to measure Jammu & Kashmir tourism Model the dynamic, causal and co- relational relationship among various macroeconomic variables of the state economy, the following model has been used

$$ln.RGSDP = \beta_0 + \beta_1 lnFTOAR + \beta_2 lnFER + \mu$$

where:

RGSDP = the real gross state domestic product;
FTOAR = the foreign tourist arrivals and
FER = the foreign exchange earnings.

However, the above regression model is subject to check the stationarity of time series data with the help of Augmented Dickey Fuller and Phillip Perrons Unit Root Tests.

$$\Delta Y_t = \beta_1 + ZY_{t-1} + \alpha_i + e_t (Equation\ 1) > Intercept\ Only$$

$$\Delta Y_t = \beta_1 + \beta_{2t} + ZY_{t-1} + \alpha_i + e_t (Equation\ 2) > Trend\ \&\ Intercept$$

$$\Delta Y_t = ZY_{t-1} + \alpha_i + e_t (Equation\ 3) > No\ Trend\ \&\ No\ Intercept$$

Impact of Conflict on Macroeconomic Variables

Conflict or any kind of dispute and distrust, decelerates sustainable growth of the economy if it leads to violence and threatens peace. Minor conflicts, however, which are manageable, have often been conducive to peace if the issues are addressed in a timely manner and involve cooperation among the concerned parties. Nonetheless, macroeconomic variables of an economy are perceived as an approach which can supplement social, political and economic reconciliation efforts in post-conflict settings. If macroeconomic variables are operating with sustainable principles and practices, it can have positive impacts in reducing the tensions of the host economy. The potential role of macroeconomic variables in contributing to peace from socio-cultural, political, human rights, social justice, environmental(climate-change), corporate social responsibility, health, globalization, intergenerational tourism. Such initiatives highlight the cor-relational and causal relationship between the macroeconomic variables and peace and support the theory that can be helpful in mitigating conflict and accelerating peace and also there are interconnections among the 'impact of conflict on tourism'[7]; 'impact of tourism on conflict'[8]; and 'impact of peace on tourism & conflict'[9]. It has been found from the empirical results that there is significant impact of conflict on the various macroeconomic variables of J&K state (Table-I).

Table-I
Regression Results of Macroeconomic Variables of J&K State

Coefficients					
Macroeconomic Variables	**Unstandardized Coefficients**		**Standardized Coefficients**	**t**	**Sig.**
	B	**Std. Error**	**Beta**		
(Constant)	1987.268	2.370		838.594	0.000
$GSDP_{FC}$ of Agriculture(X_1)	1.717E-006	0.000	0.057	0.389	0.723

$GSDP_{FC}$ of Industry(X_2)	1.500E-005	0.000	1.061	0.773	0.496
$GSDP_{FC}$ of Services(X_3)	1.895E-005	0.000	2.908	2.367	0.099
$GSDP_{FC}$ of Manufacturing(X_4)	-4.377E-005	0.000	-1.004	-1.243	0.302
$GSDP_{FC}$ of Construction(X_5)	-3.376E-005	0.000	-1.006	-1.372	0.264
$GSDP_{FC}$ of Banking & Insurance(X_6)	0.000	0.000	-1.907	-1.235	0.305
Gross Capital Formation(X_7)	0.000	0.001	-0.115	-0.324	0.767
Net Fixed Capital Formation(X_8)	0.000	0.001	0.083	0.319	0.770
Capital Expenditure(X_9)	-0.147	0.187	-0.494	-0.788	0.488
Fixed Capital(X_{10})	-0.001	0.001	-2.040	-1.352	0.269
Working Capital(X_{11})	0.000	0.000	-0.463	-1.919	0.151
Invested Capital(X_{12})	0.000	0.000	-1.073	-1.188	0.320
Social Sector Expenditure(X_{13})	0.249	0.183	1.073	1.356	0.268
Gross Fiscal Deficit(X_{14})	0.409	0.200	0.831	2.049	0.133
Revenue Deficit(X_{15})	-0.394	0.193	-0.706	-2.042	0.134
Own Tax Revenue(X_{16})	0.020	0.433	0.052	0.046	0.966
Own Non-Tax Revenue(X_{17})	0.193	0.412	0.196	0.469	0.671
Number of Workers(X_{18})	-0.001	0.001	-1.417	-1.130	0.341
Total Person Engaged(X_{19})	0.001	0.000	1.338	1.549	0.219
Total Emoluments(X_{20})	0.004	0.003	1.505	1.510	0.228
Total Inputs(X_{21})	0.000	0.000	1.454	2.600	0.080
Net Value Added(X_{22})	5.985E-005	0.000	0.130	0.235	0.829
Tourist Inflow(X_{24})	0.018	0.006	0.323	3.061	0.003
Tourist Earnings(X_{23})	0.031	0.006	0.513	4.860	0.000

R	:	1.00(Coefficient of multiple correlation)
R Square	:	0.7384(Coefficient of multiple determination)
Adjusted R Square	:	0.993
Std. Error of the Estimate	:	0.656

From the multi-regression model analysis, it is implied that most of the macroeconomic variables were affected since 1991 which had adversely impacted the economic growth of the state economy. Taking as the whole of $GSDP_{FC}$ of Agricultural(X_1) ($b_1 = 1.717$) is not significant (p=0.723), and the coefficient resulted positive which indicates that conflict has largely impacted agriculture sector. The $GSDP_{FC}$ of

Industry(X_2) (b_2 = 1.500, p=.496) and the $GSDP_{FC}$ of Services(X_3) (b_3 = 1.895, p= .099) and net value added(X_{22}) (b_{22} = 5.985, p= 0.829) were insignificant and their coefficients were positive which means that conflict has greatly affected the industrial and services sector of the state economy as well. Importantly, it was because of state's peculiar geographical location, remoteness and isolation from the main markets and political uncertainty and vulnerability to externalities and thereby resulting in limited capacity in public and private sectors and has not been a preferred destination for industrial investors.

Taking together the $GSDP_{FC}$ of manufacturing(X_4) (b_4=-4.77, p=0.302); $GSDP_{FC}$ of construction(X_5) (b_5=-3.376,p=0.264); Capital Expenditure(X_9) (b_9=-0.147,p=0.488); Fixed Capital(X_{10}) (b_{10}=-0.001,p=0.269); Revenue Deficit(X_{15}) (b_{15}=-0.394,P=0.134); Number of Workers(X_{18}) (b_{18}=-0.001,p=0.341) were not significant but have negative coefficients which indicates that conflict had minor impact on these variables all together during the reference period(1991-2016). While the $GSDP_{FC}$ of Banking & Insurance(X_6) (b_6=0.00,p=0.488); Gross capital formation(X_7) (b_7=0.00,p=0.767); Net Fixed Capital Formation(X_8) (b_8=0.000, p= 0.770); Working Capital(X_{11}) (b_{11}=0.000, p=0.151); Invested Capital(X_{12}) (b_{12}=0.000, p=0.230) and Total Inputs(X_{21}) (b_{21}=0.000, p=0.080) were all insignificant but having the coefficient's zero which indicates that conflict had no impact on these variables throughout the reference period.

However, the Social Sector Expenditure(X_{13}) (b_{13}=0.249, p=0.268); Gross Fiscal Deficit(X_{14}) (b_{14}=0.409, p=0.133); Own Tax Revenue(X_{16}) (b_{16} = 0.020, p=0.966); Own Non-tax Revenue(X_{12}) (b_{12}= 0.193, p=0.966); Total Person Engaged(X_{19}) (b_{19}=0.001,p=0.219); Total Emoluments(X_{20}) (b_{20}=0.004,p=0.228); were statistically insignificant having coefficients approaching to zero which indicates that conflict had low impact on these macroeconomic variables but tourist inflow(X_{23}) (b_{23}=0.018, p=0.003) and tourist earnings(X_{24}=0.031, p=0.000) were statistically significant which means that these variables had been impacted adversely but at the same time it has been computed from given regression model(2) that there is 87.5% impact of real exchange earning and foreign tourist arrivals on the RGSDP. However, the value of *R Square* in our multi-regression model(1) is 0.7384, which implies that there is 73% impact of conflict on the macroeconomic variables of Jammu & Kashmir state which halted the growth process of the state

economy since 1991 to till date. However, from the given regression model (2) implies that 87.5% of growth rate of RGSDP has been affect by foreign tourist arrivels and foreign exchange rate.

lnRGSDP = 0.093 + 0.0373 lnFTOAR + 5.15 lnFER...…….(2)
(0.17)* (0.47)* (17.80)*
R-Sq = 87.5% and R-Sq(adj) = 87.1%

Tourism Model of J&K

On the basis of regression model (2), tourism happen to be an important source of foreign exchange earnings, can support the economic growth with equity, has great capacity to create large scale employment of diverse kind – from the most specialized to the unskilled and hence can play a major role in creation of additional employment opportunities. Nevertheless, By using the E-Views, the results of the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test shows that all the variables except economic growth were not stationary at level while the Phillip Perron (PP) test suggested the presence of a unit root for the variables at level. Therefore, entire series were subjected to further test at first differencing. It is evidence that all the variables achieved a stationary trend process after the first differencing for both the ADF and PP test. Hence, the null hypothesis of unit root could no longer be accepted for the variables at this level. This means that the series could be regarded to be integrated to order 1 process.

Table-II

Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) Unit Root Test Statistics at

Variable	Level*	Intercept*	Intercept & Trend*	1st Difference*	Remark
lnRGSDP	0.334250 (-1.945823) (p=0.7790)	-0.482833 (-2.906210) (p=0.8873)	-2.033196 (-3.479367) (p=0.5725)	-7.967208 (-1945903) (p=0.0000)	Integrated to order 1
lnFTOAR	0.226070 (-1.948686) (p=0.7471)	-3.040391 (-2.931404) (p=0.0137)	-3.785154 (-3.518090) (p=0.0271)	-7.327695 (-1.948886) (p=0.0000)	Integrated to order 1
lnFER	1.641598 (-1.945987) (p=0.9745)	-0.647371 (-2.907660) (p=0.9900)	-1.673349 (-3.481595) (p=0.7517)	-6.280932 (-1.945987) (p=0.0000)	Integrated to order 1

** Stationary trend at 5% level of significance*

Table-III
Phillips Perron (PP) Unit Root Test Statistic at

Variable	Level*	Intercept*	Intercept & Trend*	1st Difference*	Remark
lnRGSDP	0.334250 (-1.945823) (p=0.7790)	-0.482833 (-2.906210) (p=0.8873)	-2.045232 (-3.479367) (p=0.5660)	-7.967208 (-1945903) (p=0.0000)	Integrated to order 1
lnFTOAR	0.215731 (-1.948686) (p=0.7441)	-3.706732 (-2.931404) (p=0.0074)	-3.941900 (-3.518090) (p=0.0185)	-9.006466 (-1.948886) (p=0.0000)	Integrated to order 1
lnFER	1.975551 (-1.945823) (p=0.9878)	0982480 (-2.906210) (p=0.9960)	-1.489619 (-3.479367) (p=0.8234)	-6.103568 (-1.945903) (p=0.0000)	Integrated to order 1

** Stationary trend at 5% level of significance*

The Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test results indicated that all these variables were non-stationary in their levels and stationary at first difference I(1).[10] Therefore, it is necessary to determine whether there is co-integrating relationship between real gross state domestic product/ economic growth, foreign tourist arrivals and foreign exchange earnings of the state economy by applying *Johansen's Co-integration Test* which utilize both the trace and maximum Eigen statistic in determining the significance or otherwise of the co-integrated series as suggested by the unit root results. However, evidence from the trace and maximum Eigen statistics revealed at least one co-integrated equation for both statistics. The existence of a co-integrated series from the result thus implies the existence of possible long- run relationship (long-run association-ship or move together) among the variables over time then we can run restricted VAR that is VECM but if the variables are not co-integrated, we cannot run VECM, rather we shall run unrestricted VAR, but our variables are co-integrated so we can easily run restricted VAR.

Table-IV
Johansen's Co-integration Rank Test of (Trace) & (Max-Eigen Value)

Hypothesized No. of CE(s)	Eigen Value	Trace Statistic	Critical Value (5%)	Prob.**	Max-Eigen Statistics	Critical Value (5%)	Prob.**
None *	0.619601	45.65614	29.79707	0.0004	39.62787	21.13162	0.0001
At most 1	0.135237	6.028276	15.49471	0.6922	5.957306	14.26460	0.6187
At most 2	0.001729	0.070970	3.841466	0.7899	0.070970	3.841466	0.7899

Trace and Max-Eigen value test indicates 1 co-integrating equation(s) at the 0.05 level.[11]
* Denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level.
**MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values.

Analysis of the normalized coefficients reveals a significant long-run relationship between tourism arrival, foreign exchange earnings and real gross state domestic product(economic growth) in Jammu & Kashmir state. Importantly, a percentage change in tourist arrivals results to 3.62% change in economic growth of the state. This indicates that the degree of the responsiveness of economic growth to changes in tourism arrival is highly elastic. Foreign exchange earnings shows a significant relationship with economic growth such that a percentage change in foreign exchange earnings leads to 4.72% change in economic growth holding other factors constant. Moreover, the foreign exchange earnings coefficients show that the degree of responsiveness of economic growth to changes in foreign exchange earnings is also highly elastic within the domain of the current study.

Table-V
Johansen's Normalized Co-integrating Coefficients

Co-integrating Equation(s)	**Log Likelihood**	**-83.68552**
Normalized co-integrating coefficients (standard error in parentheses)		
Ln_RGSDP	Ln_FTOAR	Ln_FER
1.000000	3.628727 (0.42807)	-4.727954 (0.23684)

Table-VI
Vector Error Correction Model (VECM)

Error Correction	**D(ln_RGSDP)**	**D(ln_FTOAR)**	**D(ln_FER)**	**Prob.**
CointEq1	-1.031109	-0.032709	-0.051941	0.000
Std. Error	(0.09912)	(0.07138)	(0.03674)	
t-value	[-10.40313]	[-0.45823]	[-1.41360]	

The vector error correction model was applied given the existence of a co-integration thus it become imperative to determine the direction of causality between economic growth, tourism arrival and foreign exchange earnings in Jammu & Kashmir state. We find that there is long-run causality running from FTOAR and FTR to RGSDP because our error correction term means that RGSDP has negative sign and is significant.[12] However, in order to show the short-run relationship running from FTOAR and FER to RGSDP we have to use Wald Test.

Table-VII
Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) of Wald Test

Test Statistic	FTOAR	FER	Probability
F-statistic	36.03216	27.77543	0.0000
Chi-square	108.0965	83.32630	0.0000
Null Hypothesis: C(5)=C(6)=C(7)=0		Null Hypothesis: C(8)=C(9)=C(10)=0	

In the above table it is evident that the value of is highly significant at 5% level of significance, therefore, we accept the null hypothesis which means that there is short-run causality running from tourist arrivals and foreign exchange earnings to economic growth of the state economy. Henceforth, it is proved that tourism sector has both long-run as well as short-run causality running from GSDP to other economic variables of the state economy during the conflict situation. So any underperformance in this sector would be detrimental for the growth of state economy. To determine the nature of the causal relationship among the included variables in the growth model, the study is further tested to a granger causality test.

Table-VIII
Granger Causality Test

Null Hypothesis	F-Statistics	Probability
Ln_FTOAR does not Granger Cause Ln_RGSDP Ln_RGSDP_does not Granger Cause Ln_FTOAR	3.25731 0.25688	0.0334 0.8559
Ln_FER does not Granger Cause Ln_RGSDP Ln_RGSDP does not Granger Cause Ln_FER	7.97495 0.58574	0.0002 0.6285
Ln_FER does not Granger Cause Ln_FTOAR Ln_FTOAR does not Granger Cause Ln_FER 3.00167 0.58574		 0.0439 0.6285

The results presented in Table 1.6 shows that the causal relationship between foreign tourist arrival and foreign exchange earnings indicates no causality from either side. It could be observed that neither economic growth granger causes foreign exchange earnings nor foreign exchange earnings granger causes economic growth. However, it is important to note here that unidirectional causality runs from tourist arrivals to economic growth; exchange earnings to economic growth and tourist arrivals at 5% level of significance. This implies that tourism granger causes growth through no evidence of causality is observed from arrival

to growth meaning that growth does not granger causes tourism arrival.

Conclusion

From the above analysis, it could be easily concluded that the conflict has adversely impacted the state economy and directly affected the large chunk of masses involved in the trade. In order to revive the sector there is urgent need to invite all the stakeholders and evolve a strategy providing required incentives and concessions, to put the state back on the confidence map so that the tourism sector would cope with the difficult situation and regain the sheen of its normal functioning. Such performance would engage the masses in great numbers and benefit the state economy as well. All this will go a long way to help in bringing prosperity in the state.

References & Notes

1 The activities of persons traveling to and in places outside their usual environment for not more than one consecutive year for leisure, business and other purposes.

2 The landmass of Jammu & Kashmir is having vast natural resources, which promises prosperity to the people when such resources are properly conserved and exploited.

3 The economic cost of the conflict cannot be confined to a particular sector of industry or investment prospects rather it has affected the important sources of livelihood of local people such as tourism, horticulture, handicrafts and industries of the state.

4 Macroeconomic instability is 'a situation of economic depression where the economy does not seem to have settled in a steady position'. It can take the form of volatility of key macroeconomic variables and of un-sustainability in their behavior. In addition to volatility, unsustainable performance in the macroeconomic variables like low and unstable growth rate, high inflation, large unemployment, unsustainable and current account deficits are also the attributes of macroeconomic instability. Macroeconomic volatility refers to fluctuation in macro variables and to the uncertainty associated to them.

5 J&K economy is not experiencing normal volatility but 'crisis volatility' which refers to extreme shocks exceeding certain cut off points. The continued curfew in the state due to unrest is the instance of 'Crisis volatility'. The major costs of macroeconomic instability are significant in terms of i) Welfare loss ii) Increase in inequality and poverty and iii) Decline in long term growth.

6 In Kashmir Valley people save more for future shocks that are caused due to conflict economy. During the unrest of 2016, we could see that the people of the valley could sustain only when they had kept good savings apart on which they sustained during 5 month long inactivity.

7 Tourism is perceived as an approach which can supplement social and political reconciliation efforts in post-conflict settings. If tourism is operating with sustainable principles and practices, it can have positive impacts in reducing

tensions between visitors and host communities. The potential role of tourism in contributing to peace from socio-cultural, political, human rights, social justice, environmental (climate change), corporate social responsibility, health, globalization, intergenerational tourism. Such initiatives highlight the co relational *and causal relationship* between tourism and peace, and support the theory that tourism can be helpful in mitigating conflict and accelerating peace.

8 Conflict, a state of dispute and distrust, decelerates sustainable growth of the tourism sector if it leads to violence and threatens peace. However, minor conflicts which are manageable have often been conducive to peace if the issues are addressed in a timely manner and involve cooperation among the concerned parties. Destinations are less appealing to tourists if they are insecure or likely to experience serious conflict – war, political unrest , terrorism, violations of human rights or heavy crime regardless of the abundance of scenic or cultural attractions. Although, there are instances of tourist attractions based on war and atrocities, tourism in general is highly vulnerable to turmoil and can thrive only under peaceful conditions.

9 Peace is a state that not only indicates the absence of direct violence but also sustains peaceful relationships among all levels and segments of society and between society and nature. It is based on human rights, economic wellbeing, and socio-political equality for all the people. It is also found to have a direct relationship with tourism.

10 Rule-1: If the (absolute) test statistics is *greater than* the critical value (absolute) then we can reject null hypothesis and accept alternative hypothesis. But if the (absolute) test statistics is less than the critical value (absolute) then we cannot reject null hypothesis rather we accept the null hypothesis. Symbolically, If *test-statistic* > *Critical value* = reject the null hypothesis and if *test-statistic* < *critical value* = accept the null hypothesis.

Rule-2: Secondly, if the P-value is less than 5% (0.05) we can reject null hypothesis and accept alternative hypothesis. But if the P value is greater than 5 % (0.05) we cannot reject null hypothesis rather we accept null hypothesis. Symbolically, *if P-value < 5%(0.05)* = Reject null hypothesis and *if P-value > 5%(0.05)* = accept the null hypothesis.

12 If the error correction term is negative in sign and is significant, then we can say that there is a long run causality running from the independent to dependent variables so far as the rule is concerned.

SCHOLARSHIP AS HERITAGE
Commonness Between India and Central Asia

P. L. Dash

Abstract

India and Central Asia have maintained a historical relationship through the millennia. It is of significance to note that the Great Silk Road connected our peoples in the days of yore. The interconnectedness was prominent in the Pre-Islamic years, when Buddhism travelled from India to Central Asia and beyond and made its impact widely felt. The caravans carried goods and tradable items from India to Central Asia, brought back with them goods from China via the Taklamakan and Central Asia to India. And this exchange was going on a regular basis for centuries before Islam entered Central Asia and India. There was rapprochement and camaraderie in these interactions and relations flourished on the basis of mutual reciprocity. However, what made an indelible imprint in the minds of the people as sterling contribution of bilateral importance was the exchange of ideas, language, literature, religious sermons, methods of medical treatment, exchange of musical instruments and so on. Middle Ages hastened this cooperation between the two regions and took India's ties along the Silk Road to new heights when Islam came to India and Islamic culture began rapidly spreading. India was the mother of an ancient civilization, the fountainhead of Hinduism and Buddhism – two of the world religions. It was also a storehouse of knowledge and famous for mathematics, science and medicine. Indian scholarship was held in high esteem and Kautilya's Arthashastra was already making as much ripples the world over as the medical anthologies of Charaka and Susruta. The world required this knowledge and India was ready to disseminate them. The ancient universities in Nalanda and Taxila were famous in those times where scholars from China, Central Asia and other places came and interned in various disciplines and returned back to their countries armed with knowledge to disseminate it among knowledge seekers. India was alluring one and all from ancient times to the middle ages. With this background, this paper seeks to focus on some important hallmarks of knowledge spread in Middle Ages with specific reference to the Central Asian space and India's interaction with that area.

Keywords

Al-biruni, Architecture, South-Central Asia, Silk Road, Religion, Foreign Relations, Kitabul-Hind, Bilateral Ties, Mythology, Heritage.

Kautilya at the Source

Kautilya or Chanakya, as he is otherwise known, was an Indian scholar counselor to the kings of his time. As a mastermind of statecraft he wrote immortal injunctions to run a perfect state. His teachings have outlived the onslaught of time and conquests, sieved through the ages the principles of what a king should do and what he ought not do, while running the state. In Central Asia Mirzo Ulugbek's predecessor, Amir Timur and his successors Babur and Akbar had all must have followed what Kautilya had left behind. His famous classic *The Arthashastra* is a must read for any intellectual and administrator in any age. Given that the Central Asian space along the Oasis stretches of Amu Darya and Syr Darya, had flourished Bactrian, Sogdian, Scynthian and Parthian empires before they were destroyed by Chengiz Khan, the science of statecraft was apparently very developed along the Kautilyan principles. Kautilya emphasized on ten major principles: 1. Perfect king, 2. A well-organized state, 3. Revenue sources and their judicious spending, 4. Civil services, 5. Branches of the government, 6. Law and justice, 7. Foreign policy and diplomacy, 8.Defence and war, 9. Covert operations and 10. Allied aspects.[1] From all these ten broad principles, Kautilya filtered his thoughts to six crucial directions of pursuing foreign relations, which h are an essential manual for a contemporary diplomats. These six principles of foreign relations included:

- *Samdhi: Making a treaty, putting therein terms and conditions of war and peace.*
- *Vigraha: The policy of hostility.*
- *Asana: The policy of remaining quiet and not planning any march of expedition.*
- *Yana: The policy of Marching on Expedition.*
- *Samsarya:The policy of seeking shelter with another king.*
- *Dvaidhabhaba: Friendship with one king and hostility with another king at the same time. The principle is: Granted that your neighbor is your enemy; your neighbor's neighbor ought to be your friend.*[2]

These principles have transcendental values in time and space. Written some one thousand five hundred years ago during the Nanda and Maurya dynasty, Kautilya's theses on perfect statecraft was researched and first published in three volumes by a Professor of Bombay

University, R.P.Kangle, between 1960 and 1965. They contained: Firstly, a definitive, critically edited text with precise numbering of sutras and verses, Secondly, an English translation with detailed notes which took into account all other prior translations and Thirdly, an exhaustive study. Kautilya was earlier translated by R. Shamasastry of Mysore, which was published 1904 and 1915, first the text and then the English version respectively. Besides, there has been Sanskrit commentaries on Kautilya's work many times in the past, most famous being the commentaries by T. Ganapati Sastri.

Kautilya wrote his theses in Sanskrit, the ancient Indian language, which is considered as mother of other Indo-European and Asian languages. It was primarily in verse form that has been appreciated, adored and translated into English and other languages. A German translation by J.J. Meyer as well as a Russian translation exists apart from many Indian languages. His teachings were as much moral as ethical and defined the code of conduct for the King and his subjects, thereby dealing with many issues of statecraft and good governance.In the particular context of conquests that had happened quite frequently in ancient and Middle Ages, Kautilya had never lost his significance. These principles also were applied to all those expeditions of Timurid and Baburid rulers, who came all the way to India to conquer and rule. What holds today good is the versatile heritage value of these immortal principles.

Kautilya wrote that there was great belief in astrology and similar predictive sciences as well as in the occult sciences of witchcraft, sorcery and black magic. Without the knowledge of Mathematics, such deeds were impossible to practise and it shows clearly that ancient and medieval India was famous for mathematics and related sciences with it contribution "0" to the numerical that revolutionized the entire process of calculations.[3]

India in the Eyes of Al-Biruni

Al-Biruni was one among the first orientalists who brought to the Central Asian space the distinctive narratives about India of his time. He wrote 80 chapters on various aspects of the Hindu way of life, their religion, practices, yoga, the calculations of time and space that he saw for himself as practiced in India and various other aspects of life in India.[4] Al-Biruni lived through a fertile time of creative production and

singlehanded brought the two people understand each other. He ushered in an era of rapprochement between the peoples of South and Central Asia as well as West Asia. Coming from Central Asia and straddling a space bordering Persia and then coming to India they cultivated the virgin fields of confluence in bilateral and multilateral relations between the regions through which they passed.

Al Biruni is considered 'as the first of scientific indologists', who tried his best to understand India sympathetically and to present India to the people of his country in a manner they would better appreciate it. He took enormous pains to pen down his book famously known as Kitabu'l Hind. Born in 973 AD in the outskirt of Khorezm, then under the Samanid ruling dynasty of Transoxiana and Persia and now Khiva province of Uzbekistan, Al Biruni demonstrated his skills in linguistics and learning languages. He was also an astronomer and astrologer and had deep knowledge of Arabic and Persian and learned Sanskrit to understand India. He himself has mentioned consulting Sanskrit manuscripts. The way he has depicted the Indian panorama to the people of his own country is too marvelous to describe. That's why Kitabu'l Hind has remained the masterpiece in literature in Persian, Arabic, English and many other Central Asian languages.

How Al Biruni captured the imagination of other linguists the world over is evidenced by the simple fact that his exhaustive notes on India were first published in English in two volumes in London in 1888 under the patronage of the India Office in London. Once the text and its English translation were in the public domain, popularity for the book poured in and endeared the book to the public. By 1926-1928 his book was already translated into Hindi in Allahabad by the Indian Press Limited. The fact that Al Biruni traversed through the treacherous terrain of Hindukush and came to India to study the country and its peoples, their religions and their traditions, their social mores and practices, their rivers and their oceans, their philosophy, their scientific literature and civil laws, their social organizations and manners, their geography and weather, their festivals and rituals and all the details of weight and measurement, astrology, astronomy and many related subjects evince the reader about the inquisitiveness of the man. He indeed knitted the true fabric of bilateral ties between the peoples of South and Central Asia with India being the gateway to the East. He devoted altogether 80 chapters to eighty different subjects some of which have been stated

above and other subjects are too obviously important in the content of Kitabu'I Hind. The book is considered as a masterpiece of Indological literature and preserved with great care in the libraries of India, Central Asia and elsewhere. The book inspires the youngsters to hark back to the literary heritage of our past and draw inspiration for the future.

Al Biruni's knowledge of India was too intimate to describe. He wrote about Magadha and Kalinga, Avanti (Ujjain) and Sindhu, Madura and Kulinda. All these are parts of India. He also wrote about Lanka and Ramayana, Dasarath and Rama and Ravana thereby implying that he knew Indian history and culture in detail, understood the essence of India's mythology in its proper spirit. In fact he wrote more about India than any of his contemporaries and more about India than about his native Khorezm. In reality by virtue of hailing from Central Asia, Al Biruni was the connect between the East and the West and between the north and the South.

Writers at the Forefront

Of all the arts in which the humans excel, nature's best masterpiece is to write well. Therefore writers of repute – whether they wrote religious scriptures or novels - occupy a central place in the historical and cultural annals as literary heritage of any country. The wealth they create is permanent and immortal. Writers depict the social order, social mores, economic system, human behavior, prevalent customs and practices and many more things including nature, environment, science, space, mythology and what not! If reading habits of individuals are any indication, the writers are at the roots of it. For a writer to choose a theme and pen a novel or poem the field is vast and versatile, the sky is the limit for character creation and narratives, nature provides the breadth of the milieu. What makes them last long and live forever is the presentable way they portray their characters. From short stories to big novels, from anthologies to plays, writer's creativity endears them to the people. The Chilean poet Pablo Neruda is as popular as Alisher Navoi of Uzbekistan and Patrick White of Australia.

The transcendental values of some of the epic works created in the Middle ages by its rulers like the Babur nama and Din Elahi by Akbar from the Moghul years continue to inspire people because their contributions have heritage value in literature. The former inspires people in the direction of mutual understanding while the later portrays

the basic principles of multi-religiosity and secular ethos. The authors are no more with us, but their work remains of sterling importance. If they left behind the written heritage of the Baburid epoch as their spiritual contribution, their farsightedness left behind a material culture that stands tall today across northern part of India, mainly in the vicinity of Delhi and Agra. Many buildings of the Moghul era like the Red Fort, Jamma Masjid, Turkmen Gate, Delhi Gate, Humayun Tomb and Taj Mahal are all evidence of it. Most of these monuments are Heritage sites declared by the UNESCO.

Babur became the king of Samarkand at the age of 12. He trekked his journey along the Silk Road from Andijan where he was born to Samarkand, which he ruled. Samarkand became the crossroads of uniting three Asias –Central, West and South Asia. In the city of Samarkand he planned his future strategy of conquests and marched with his soldiers from Central Asia, toward the Hindukush. In those distant years Hindustan was divided from Central Asia by the Hindukush mountains. Having crossed the Hindukush, he ferried through River Indus and entered into mainland Hindustan. His conquest of India heralded in a period of Baburid rules over Hindustan. His successors embarked upon a great journey of construction – building edifices and monuments that remained through the passage of time architectural marvels of India. Thereby these Baburids proclaimed the sum total of their contribution to the common cultural space they shared with India and India shared with them. Some of these buildings are masterpieces of cultural synergy between the two regions –Central Asia and South Asia.

This common cultural space extended from Samarkand to Bukhara to Kandahar to Delhi and beyond. They also extended to Xinjiang and Mongolia and farther to eastern Siberia. Not far away from the city of Ulan Ude one finds today, functional Buddhist monasteries preserving Buddhist era palm leaf inscriptions in special libraries. A religion that was born in India traveled along the Silk Road running through Bukhara and Samarkand to many countries because of its appeal and popularity. Similarly the spread of Islam in the 7^{th}-12^{th} centuries was swift and all embracing. As a result we find today a sizeable Indian population spread all over India and continuing to espouse Islam as their confession.

In the immediate neighborhood of India there are three major Islamic countries- Pakistan, Bangladesh and Afghanistan. They all belong to the same geo-cultural space and share the same heritage is evidenced

by the fact that all those who lived in Bangladesh today were Pakistanis before December 1971, before the country gained independence after a sanguinary war between India and Pakistan. Similarly all those who live in present day Pakistan before August 1947 were Indians ruled by the British. Likewise before the British came to India the Baburids were the rulers of Hindustan. They ensured a common geo-cultural space between two places through which they shuttled between – their homeland in Central Asia from where they came and India which they conquered and where they lived and ruled.

There was great interaction between the two regions along the very route through which Babur came to India. It added Indian dimension to the Silk Route. India was very developed in science and culture. The main thing that passed through this route was ideas and technology. Mathematics was India's forte. Indian artisans were very skillful and ready to disseminate their technical knowledge from fields ranging from architecture, pottery, terracotta art, paintings, building construction, material sciences, canal construction, astrology and astronomy and all those areas in which India was strong. In the Middle Ages, astrology, astronomy and mathematics played a cementing role between India and Central Asia in general and India and Uzbekistan in particular.

Mirzo Ulugbek's Contribution

The man who elevated the name of Uzbekistan in the science map of the world in the Middle Ages was none other than Mirzo Ulugbek, the noted astronomer of his time, whose team of disciples compiled the "Catalogue of the Starry Sky'. For the first time they studied the behavioral pattern of 1018 stars and included them into the Catalogue thereby eliciting attention of the world to what the Ulugbek Madrassa/ Observatory in Samarkand was doing. The Ulugbek Madrassa was the centre for exchange of ideas on mathematics and astronomy. It served as the cradle of lore in the days of yore and elicited numerous likeminded scholars from far and wide, who valued the work being done there. Ulugbek could enthuse a team of dedicated scholars, who devoted their time to study of stars.

Ulugbek believed: "the quest for knowledge is the duty of every Muslim man and woman". This particular sentence permeated across the Islamic world as a clarion call on the people to consider science as the only viable method to search for truth and solve the problems

facing the society. Scholars congregated in the Ulugbek Madrassa from various places because they believed that promotion of science was the only way to unravel the truth. He made Samarkand the centre of attraction for scholars and a fountainhead for dissemination of knowledge. As a result prominent scholars and mathematicians gathered around him. Since astronomy was closely a mathematical subject allied with astrophysics and astronomy, scholars interested in these disciplines searched for ways of cooperation in allied disciplines. Therefore, it would not be an exaggeration to say that an Uzbek was the founder of interdisciplinary science education in the Middle Ages. However, Ulugbek's main interest was in astronomy and in 1428, he set up the Ulugbek Observatory, which had no parallel in the world then.

Thus Samarkand as a city, as a centre of science learning and research on astronomy was catapulted to the world map – no mean achievement for a man who was supposed to be a king as descendant of Amir Timur. His contribution appalled the world, when the newly set up 15th century observatory not only deciphered the stars, but also exactly determined the length of the sidereal year: 365 days, 6 hours, 10 minutes and 8 seconds (with + 58 second tolerance). The observatory also accurately assessed tilt of the earth's axis at 23:52 degrees. These most accurate and precise measurement spurred the science world of Middle Ages, making Samarkand a science centre of the world. The sum total of Ulugbek's achievements could thus be said in a nutshell in three spheres: i. introduction of the new astronomical table, measuring the movements of 1018 stars, ii. fixing the exact length of the year; and iii. Introduction of interdisciplinary studies that encompassed astronomy, mathematics, astrophysics and astrology at a time when knowledge was scattered and studies were undertaken in an isolated manner. Finding interconnectedness of natural phenomena was not a mean achievement in the Middle Ages.

Although one could find more than a dozen institutions in Uzbekistan named after Mirzo Ulugbek, it is heartening to note that Ulugbek's contributions to astronomy is not limited to the observatory he set up in Samarkand but also to the domain of science knowledge in the world. The British and American scientists have recognized Ulugbek's contribution as much as the Russians, Indian and Latvians. In recognition of his contribution to providing new information about stars and planets, the Soviet government had released a postage

stamp of 5 Kopeek in 1987 with inscriptions "Uzbek Astronomer and Mathematician, Ulugbek (1394-1449). The Uzbek government has also immortalized his memory by adopting a similar measure and bringing out a postage stamp in 1994, while celebrating Mirzo Ulugbek's 600th birth anniversary.[5]

Conclusion

Both Central and South Asia are a continuum in time and space, a continuum in action and creativity. The India connect is ancient. Middle Ages came in due course to contribute to the epoch in this process of continuum. And the process continues. Past achievements are of heritage value today and the present will go down in history far too into the future, when historians and scientists will talk about the IT growth in India and its contribution to scientific development and economic growth in Central Asia. The posterity is beholden to these people for the body of knowledge they have created and left behind. Imagine the creation of zero in India, the theory of Algebra by al Khorezmi, the theory of building observatories by Mirzo Ulugbek and all these three contribution put together is being used as cornerstone in the world of modern Mathematics and astrophysics, which is the proud inheritor of all these scientific legacies and heritage of the past. The interconnectedness is not only limited to mathematical sciences and allied disciplines; it is spread over to medicine, religion and many other fields that continue to serve the society even today.

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IMPACT OF CLIMATE ON CEREAL CROP PRODUCTION IN TURKMENISTAN

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Abstract
Climate determines, to a larger extent, the growth, production and yield level of any crop. Turkmenistan which lies in warm-arid continental climatic zone, extends from north-west to south-east, having some distinguished climatic types. Being a downstream state dependent mainly upon Amu Darya for irrigation, the steps towards neutralizing the impact of climate, especially temperature and rainfall, did not yield too much, so for cereal crop production in the study region is concerned. In this paper an attempt has been made to see how and to what extent the weather variables, particularly, rainfall and temperature, have influenced the production and yield level of cereal crops in Turkmenistan.

Keywords
Climatic Zones, Production Levels, Downstream, Water Deficient, Continental, *Velayat,* Cereals, Yield, Turkmenistan, Climate, Rainfall, Temperature, Weather, Irrigation, Regional Variation.

Introduction

Being located in dry continental climatic zone, Turkmenistan can be divided into well demarcated four climatic sub-zones, i.e. a) Lower Amu Darya; b) Northern Karakum; c) Southern Karakum and d) South-east Karakum. The weather parameters of these climatic zones differ which effect the agricultural land use and production of crops. The Lower Amu Darya climatic zone is coldest plain part of Turkmenistan. The Northern Karakum covers the northern part of the Amu Darya valley – habitat of cold air masses. The Southern Karakum zone forms the warmest part of Amu Darya basin which is characterised by a high mean temperature and relatively warm winters. While the South-east Karakum encompasses both warm as well as cold seasons with strong winds (Table-I).

Table-I
Regional Climatic Parameters of Turkmenistan

Parameter	Lower Amu Darya	Northern Karakum	Southern Karakum	Southest Karakum
Mid annual air temperature (^{0}C)	12	12.3	15.8	16.8
Average temperature of the coldest month (^{0}C)	-6	-5.2	-0.2	+20
Average temperature of the warmest month (^{0}C)	+27	+28	+31	+31
Temperature fluctuations (^{0}C)	-	-	31	29
Frost free days	187-200	200	230	230
Days with temperature above 10^0 C	196	210	-	250
Annual precipitation (mm/ year)	76-90	100	134	204
Evaporation (mm)	-	1700	2248	2155
Maximum temperature (^{0}C)	-36	+32	-25	-31
Snow cover days / year	-	10-15	10-13	15

Source: Amangul Ovezberdyyeva, Sustainable Water Management in Turkmenistan: Challenges and Solutions, Arndi University, Greifswald, p. 17.

The northern region experiences severe winters, low temperatures with snow while in east and south-east, cyclones with precipitation peak (December to April) can be observed. The western region experiences maximum precipitation from October to May while in plain region of Turkmenistan summers are dry and the maximum precipitation falls in winter and spring.

Spatio-temporal Variation in Cereal Production and Yield

The analysed weather regime directly influences the production and productivity in Turkmenistan. Here, the impact of climate is observed more intense because of the higher continentality nature of the country combined with the lesser neutralizing forces like irrigation and its technology. The regional temperature and rainfall, ofcourse, in combination with the geo-economic determinants, has regulated the production pattern of cereal and their yield level (Table-II).

Table-II
Production and Yield of Cereal Crops in Turkmenistan (1990-2010)

Province	Year	Production of Cereal Crops (000 tons)	Yield of Cereal Crops (tons/ha)	Percentage Growth	
				Production	Yield
Ahal	1990	112	2.39	-	-
	1995	300	1.12	167.85	-113
	2000	355	1.62	18.33	44.64
	2005	560	2.03	57.76	25.30
	2010	410	1.57	-26.78	-44.61
Balkan	1990	20	2.04	-	-
	1995	28	1.71	40.0	-16.17
	2000	48	1.45	71.42	-15.20
	2005	70	1.87	45.83	28.97
	2010	80	1.33	14.28	-28.87
Dashoguz	1990	57	1.83	-	-
	1995	170	1.70	198.24	-7.10
	2000	182	1.29	7.05	-24.11
	2005	239	1.29	31.31	0.00
	2010	208	1.28	-7.94	-0.78
Lebap	1990	98	2.45	-	-
	1995	238	1.82	142.85	-25.71
	2000	245	1.36	2.94	-25.27
	2005	351	1.70	43.26	25.00
	2010	271	1.38	-22.79	-18.82
Mary	1990	121	2.49	-	-
	1995	312	1.90	157.85	-23.70
	2000	405	1.80	29.80	-5.26
	2005	583	2.11	43.95	17.22
	2010	439	1.65	-24.69	-21.80

Source: Compiled and computed on the basis of data from FAO, IMF, World Bank, Worldfact Book, and Statistical Yearbooks of Turkmenistan.

If we examine the percentage growth of area, production and yield of different Velayats of Turkmenistan from 1990 to 2010, the following picture of comparisons emerge, leading to various area-specific treatments for achieving the targets (Table-III).

Table-III
Cereals: Growth in Area, Production and Yield (1990-2010)

Velayat	% age Growth		
	Area	Production	Yield
Ahal	15.34	13.61	1.76
Balkan	23.64	27.99	2.91
Dashoguz	25.81	11.72	8.23
Lebap	22.70	30.04	6.17
Mary	12.59	10.03	2.18

Source: Complied and computed on the basis of data from FAO, IMF, World Bank and Statistical Yearbooks, Turkmenistan.

After superimposing the data of various relevant tables, the results of growth and yield level of cereal crops have been produced in Table-IV.

Table-IV
Categorization of Growth and Yield Levels of Cereals

Category	Growth Level		Yield Level	
	% Area	% Production	% Area	% Production
A	70.91	70.41	19.7	18.32
B	18.5	8.46	61.35	60.55
C	10.14	21.13	18.95	21.13

Source: Based upon the relevant tables.

The preceding analysis of facts and figures enables the author to regionalize the *Veyalats* of Turkmenistan into different developmental levels so far its productivity of cereal is concerned (Tavle-V).

Table-V
Cereal Crop Yield Indices in Provinces of Turkmenistan

2005			2010		
Index Range	Level	Name of Province	Index Range	Level	Name of Province
High	>127	Mary	High	>106	Mary
Medium	111-127	Ahal, Balkan, Lebap	Medium	85-106	Ahal, Lebap
Low	< 111	Dashoguz	Low	< 85	Balkan, Dashoguz

S*ource: Based upon tables II to IV.*

Conclusion

The aforementioned analysis leads to some of the inferences which follow. Firstly, Turkmenistan has a dry continental climate and, simultaneously, belongs to downstream sub-region and in both situations demand irrigation with improved technology just to neutralise its locational disadvantage, so far the production and productivity of cereals in relation to climate is concerned. Secondly, to its benefit, it is bordered by Amu Darya on its north-east and by Caspian, on its north-west. In former case, it utilizes and has the potential of diverting more water from Amu Darya for its irrigation purposes while in case of latter, being a coastal country of Caspian, it harnesses the resources of the water body and in future, its scope of utilizing Caspian resources seems bright. Thirdly, the recent investments on irrigation infrastructure by initiating mega-water projects and canals, has started yielding results whereby more irrigable acreage is being brought under cultivation and already irrigated land is being intensified with the required irrigation at required time. Fourthly, the production of cereal crops and their yield level has also responded positively with additional irrigation facilities which is evident from the rising figures prepared in different preceding tables. Fifthly, although climate, particularly, temperature and rainfall still controls the agricultural scenario of Turkmenistan but the improved irrigation and its technology as well as diversification-cum-rotation of crops with high-yielding, early-maturing and water-efficient varieties of cereals, has to some extent neutralized the influence of climate on food crops.

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GROWTH AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE IN KAZAKHSTAN ECONOMY

Imtiyaz Ahmad Shah
Imtiyaz-ul-Haq

Abstract
In this paper an attempt has been made to make use of a relevant methodology for growth accounting exercise in natural resource abundant economy, Kazakhstan, from 1991-2014. Growth accounting involves breaking down GDP growth into the contribution of labor inputs, capital inputs and multi-factor productivity (MFP) growth. This time period is divided into three phases 1991-1999, 2000-2007 and 2008-2014, in order to understand the progress of transition policies. Kazakhstan's economy has gone through stages of negative, high economic growth and declining growth after independence from the Soviet Union in 1990. The period from 1990 to 1997 was the period of negative economic growth. It was only from 2000 that Kazakhstan entered the phase of strong and sustained growth. During second phase 2000-2007, the Kazakhstan economy experienced an average growth rate of about 10 per cent. However, from 2008 the growth rate of Kazakhstan is showing declining trend. The paper highlights the fact that it is the technological progress (TFP) which has been the main source of economic growth in either dampening the severity of contraction during the 1990s or fueling the growth thereafter.

Keywords
Cobb-Douglas Production Function, Growth Accounting, Technology, Crisis, Recovery, Kazakhstan, Economic Growth, Annual Depreciation Rate, Policy Reforms.

Introduction

The technology and innovation is indispensable in the economic growth. According to Mokyr: "the difference between rich nations and poor nations is not that the rich have more money than the poor, but rich nations produce more goods and services. One reason they can do so is because their technology is better and have superior ability to control and manipulate nature and people for productive ends" (Mokyr, 1990). If Western Europe has been superior, in terms of economic growth, compared to most of the Central-Eastern and Former Soviet Union (F.S.U.) countries, this is undoubtedly, at least partly, due to technological superiority. However, although technology can be viewed from neo-classical, growth economists' point of view as

an (e.g. exogenous) independent variable determining the output, it is also country specific, that is it depends on the overall complex socio-economic framework of the historically specific social formation under investigation.

Kazakhstan Economy: An Overview

The breakdown of the Soviet empire initiated the largest transition from a socialist economy to a market economy. Kazakhstan is larger than Western Europe and has a low population density. The country has huge metallurgical reserves and one of the largest untapped oil fields found during the last 30 years. Since independence in 1991, Kazakhstan has been undertaking comprehensive reforms aimed at dismantling the command economy and creating a market economy (Johan Fredborn Larsson). The first few years of Kazakhstan's economy after the breakdown of Soviet Union were characterized by economic decline: by 1995 real GDP dropped to 61.4%of its 1990 level. The wide ranging inflation observed in the early 1990s peaked at annual rate of about 3000% at mid-nineties. Since 1992, Kazakhstan actively pursued a program of economic reform designed to establish a free market economy through privatization of state enterprises and deregulation . Kazakhstan remains today one of most successful reformers in the CIS, though its record is less than strong when compared with more advanced transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and it has strongest banking system in Central Asia and CIS. Some of the reforms taken by Kazakhstan are presented in Table-I.

Table-I

Summary of Kazakh Reform Programme

Policy Area	Introduction	Implementation
Systemic Reforms		
Liberalization of Internal Trade	1992	Internal trade restriction removed
Price liberalization	1992	Followed Russia's radical reforms, more than 80% of the prices were decontrolled.
Privatization of SOEs	1991	First Privatization Act passed in 1991, the privatization seriously started in 1992-1993, second wave in 1995-1996, slowed since 1997.

Foreign Investments	1991	"One-stop" State Investment Committee was Introduced in 1996.
Labor Market	1992	Introduction of wage flexibility and tax-based wage Policy.
Financial liberalization	1991	Restrictions on private and independent banking and financial institutions eliminated.
Legal Reforms	1991-1992	Property and commercial law.
Constitutional Reform	1991-1992	Independence and new constitution.
Stabilization Policy		
Fiscal Policy 1) Tax Reform	1992-1995	1992: Taxes for enterprises, personal income and VAT replaced old system. 1995: New tax code based on international standards enacted.
2) Public Expenditure Control	1992-1994	Fiscal deficit diminished significantly.
Monetary Policy Money Supply	1994	Control from 1995
1) Credit to the Public Sector	1993-1994	Control, hard budget constraints for SOEs
2) Central Bank Independence	1993-1995	Independence and increased autonomy
Trade and Exchange Rate Policy		
1) Liberalization of Foreign trade	1992-1996	State monopoly abolished, simplified regulation, Unified exchange rate
2) Import Tariff	1991-1992	Initially removed, later reintroduced at a low level
3) Export Taxes	1992	Reduced but later augmented
4) Currency	1993	National currency introduced

Source: Johan Fredborn Larsson (p.18).

Period of Negative GDP Growth (1991-1997)

Kazakhstan's transition from a planned to market economy was marked by difficulties. Like other post-Soviet countries, Kazakhstan's GDP

contracted dramatically during the first half of the 1990s. The economic downturn intensified during the early years of the transition, and was most serve in 1994. By 1995, Kazakhstan's economy had shrunk by a further 39%, and during the next four years growth remained flat. The rate of real GDP declines in the early 1990s were likely overstated in the official data, due to the emergence of the private sector, which in the early days of the transition was typically not fully included in the statistical base, and to the development of the underground economy.

Table-II
Main Economic Indicators of Kazakhstan (1991-1999)

Year	**1991**	**1992**	**1993**	**1994**	**1995**	**1996**	**1997**	**1998**	**1999**
Real GDP (% change)	-11	-5.3	-9.2	-12.6	-8.2	0.5	1.7	-1.9	2.7
Prices (% change)	96.3	1472.2	1243.4	1546.7	160.8	38.8	16.1	5.6	13.2
Gross capital formation (annual % growth)	-43.9	-2.6	-61.3	33.2	-42.4	-29.6	5.6	-11.9	12.6
Exports (bn$)	48.8	44.4	39.3	36.6	32.6	34.2	34.9	35.3	48.8
Imports (bn$)	88	68.4	51.1	48.3	38.7	32	34.4	32	26.1
Trade Balance (bn $)	-39.2	-24	-11.8	-11.7	-6.1	2.2	.5	3.3	22.7
Unemployment (%)	0.05	0.4	1.1	7.5	10.9	12.9	3.7	3.7	13.4

Source: World Bank Development Indicators.

It is evident from Table-II that during the initial years of independence, all indicators of development were showing negative and disturbing trend. There was negative growth rate but the inflation rate was very high. It was case of hyper inflation. Despite the dramatic contraction of GDP, the rate of the registered unemployment in Kazakhstan continued to remain low i.e. below 10 per cent until the mid 1990s. More specifically the rate of unemployment rose from 0.05 in 1991 to 3.7 in 1998. This is paradoxical[1]. The low unemployment rate did not avert the substantial decline of the living standards of the Kazakhstan population.

Increasing GDP Period (2000-2007)

After eight years of severe transitional crisis, Kazakhstan experienced an economic boom from 2000 to 2007. With average annual growth rates of 10 percent, the country became a success story not only in Central Asia but also in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Rising oil prices played a major role in this growth which can be seen by drastic increase in exports of country. As the price of oil climbed, the hydrocarbon sector's share in Kazakhstan's GDP also increased, from 11 percent in 1990 to almost 35 percent by 2007. In 2007, the hydrocarbon sector accounted for 57 percent of the country's total industrial output and 70 percent of export revenues; 27 percent of all foreign direct investments went into the extraction of crude oil and natural gas and 36 percent went into geological exploration and prospecting activities. But Kazakhstan's rapid growth in the last seven years did not exclusively depend on favorable world market conditions for these sectors. It is also the result of market-oriented economic reforms, especially rapid price and trade liberalization, privatization, sound macroeconomic policy, and the promotion of entrepreneurship. Moreover, the income and wealth effects resulting from expanded primary production stimulated other sectors, namely financial and general business services and construction/ real estate. The country's banking sector has been particularly praised by outside observers as Kazakhstan's major success and the most efficient one in the CIS.

Table-III
Main Economic Indicators of Kazakhstan (2000-20007)

Year	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Real GDP (%change)	9.8	13.5	9.8	9.3	9.6	9.6	10.7	8.9
Prices (%change)	17.4	10.1	5.8	11.7	16.1	17.8	21.5	15.5
Gross capital formation (annual % growth)	10.7	37.52	11	6.3	15	35	31.7	23.4
Exports (bn$)	31.1	35.1	44.3	43.5	50.7	54.5	60.6	31.1
Imports (bn$)	33.4	32.9	33.9	31.4	36	40.6	45.7	57.6
Trade Balance (bn $)	-2.3	2.2	10.4	11.1	14.7	13.9	14.9	-26.5
Unemployment (%)	3.7	10.4	9.3	8.7	8.3	8.1	7.7	7.2

Sources: World Bank Development Indicators.

Period of Declining GDP

The high growth rates achieved during 2000-2007 came down suddenly in the succeeding phase as is evident from Table-IV. The growth rate of 10.7 per cent during 2006 came down to 3.3 per cent during 2008 and was just 1.2 per cent during 2009. Due to its heavy dependence on oil and gas exports, Kazakhstan's economy was hit again with the onset of the global credit crunch and subsequent economic downturn worldwide. The GDP growth slowed down by 1.8 percentage points in 2007, followed by a sharp slowdown in 2008 as the worsening global economic conditions resulted in lower oil and commodity prices. In the same time, the bust of the real estate market together with the massive devaluation of the tinge weakened the bank balance sheets as it increased dramatically the banking sector's external debt burden in tinge terms. As a result, a large fiscal support (7.5 per cent of GDP) was taken to support the banking sector and other measures were taken to support economic activity. In 2010, Kazakhstan's economy recovered rapidly, buoyed by the rise in the commodity prices due to global economic recovery and ongoing government stimulus and investment.

The growth rate was 7.3 per cent and 7.5 per cent for 2010 and 2011 respectively. Kazakhstan's growth rate remained at a moderate level of 4.8 per cent in 2012 and 6 per cent in 2013, even though this was still lower than before the global crisis. Growth slipped to 4.3 per cent in 2014 due to worsening conditions with a sharp decline in oil prices and spillover from sanctions on the Russian Federation, a major trading partner, but the growth was still higher than the world average of 3.3 per cent in 2014. Given the heavy dependence on oil and gas, and with its major trading partners being Russia and China, the future prospects of Kazakhstan's economy very much depend on external conditions.

Table-IV

Main Economic Indicators of Kazakhstan (2008-20014)

Year	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**	**2013**	**2014**	**2015**
Real GDP (%change)	3.3	1.1	7.3	7.5	4.8	6	4.2	1.2
Prices (%change)	20.93	4.96	19.54	20.54	4.78	9.49	5.77	1.82
Gross capital formation (annual % growth)	-12.8	2.3	1.9	5.4	12.7	6.7	8.6	5.5
Exports (bn $)	72.11	63.53	65.5	65.76	68.92	70.78	69.01	66.18
Imports (bn $)	51.02	43.01	44.25	45.49	56.76	61.20	58.76	58.70
Trade .Balance (bn $)	2	2.2	10.4	11.1	14.7	13.9	14.9	-26.5
Unemployment (%)	6.63	6.55	5.76	5.38	5.28	5.19	5.05	4.97

Sources: World Bank Development Indicators.

Growth Accounting

Growth accounting was used by Abramovitz (1956) and Solow (1957) in explaining the determinants of growth worldwide, after World War II. In growth accounting, growth in a single country is decomposed over time, using a production function, into a part explained by growth in factor inputs and another part (i.e. the Solow residual), which is attributed to technological change, and is called Total Factor Productivity

(T.F.P.). The basic framework can be extended in other ways (Denison, 1967; Mankiw, Romer and Weil 1992), the most common of which is to consider different types of capital and labor (Romer, 1996). Growth accounting has been applied to numerous cases in the last two decades (Denison, 1985; Baily and Gordon, 1988; Griliches, 1988; Jorgenson, 1988; Young, 1994) with very satisfactory results. Cobb-Douglas production function, most commonly used production function in empirical investigations using aggregate data[2] (Thirlwall, 2001).

Following the methodology adopted by Michaelides, Economakis and Milios[3] in their study, we assume a Cobb-Douglas production function with two inputs, capital and labour and Hicks-neutral technological progress. So production at time t is given by:

$$Y(t) = A(t)\, L(t)^{\alpha} K(t)^{\beta} \qquad (1)$$

$$Y(t)>0,\ L(t)>0,\ K(t)>0,\ A(t)>0,\ \alpha>0,\ \beta>0$$

The notation is standard: Y is output, L labor, K capital, A the level of technology, while α and β are the elasticities of output with respect to labor and capital, respectively.

Technology constitutes a very crucial determinant of an economy's total productivity and competitiveness (O.E.C.D.,1996), however its direct quantification is difficult and it is often estimated indirectly using a production function.

From equation (1), using simple mathematics, we get that (see e.g. Thirlwall, 1999:181):

$$\frac{\vartheta y_t}{\delta t}\frac{1}{y_t} = \frac{\vartheta A_t}{\vartheta t}\frac{1}{A_{t+\sigma}}\frac{\vartheta L_t}{\vartheta t}\frac{1}{L_{t+\beta}}\frac{\vartheta K_t}{\vartheta t}\frac{1}{K_t}$$

$$\frac{\vartheta A_t}{\vartheta t}\frac{1}{A_t} = \frac{\vartheta y_t}{\delta t}\frac{1}{y_{t+\sigma}}\frac{\vartheta L_t}{\vartheta t}\frac{1}{L_{t+\beta}}\frac{\vartheta K_t}{\vartheta t}\frac{1}{K_t}$$

Equation (2) implies that the rate of change in output depends on growth in labour and capital, and on technological change, while equation (3) allows us to estimate technological change, indirectly.

Using simple mathematics, the rates of growth of labor productivity (Y/L) and capital productivity (Y/K) respectively, are given by:

$$1 = \frac{\vartheta y_t}{\delta t}\frac{1}{y_t} - \frac{\vartheta L_t}{\vartheta t}\frac{1}{Lt}$$

$$k = \frac{\vartheta y_t}{\delta t}\frac{1}{y_t} - \frac{\vartheta K_t}{\vartheta t}\frac{1}{K_t}$$

Thus, given that, typically, the sum of the values of α and β are set equal to unity (see e.g. Dornbusch and Fischer, 1993; Thirlwall, 2001; Stikuts, 2003; Billmeier, 2004), the Cobb-Douglas production function takes the form:

$$\frac{Y_t}{L_t} = \left(\frac{K_t}{L_t}\right)^{1-\sigma}$$

There are several approaches used by economists to estimating the shares of capital and labor in output. The first approach assumes that factor markets are perfectly competitive so that earnings of the factors (capital and labor) are proportional to their productivities. The second approach uses *a priori* measure of capital in the range of 0.3–0.4 (most commonly used in the growth literature). But many studies have found that the share of capital for developing countries is significantly larger than 0.4. The third approach would be to estimate the coefficients of the production function by regressing the growth rate of output on the growth rate of inputs and on the growth rates in capital and labor. The intercept (θ) then measures the growth in TFP, and the coefficients on the factor growth rates measure the shares of capital and labor, respectively.

As documented by Iradian, 2007,a fourth approach that does neither need perfectly market assumption nor the assumption of any particular functional form of the aggregate production function (Shigeru, Khan, and Murao, 2003). Their approach is based on nonparametric kernel derivative estimation techniques developed in the statistics and econometrics literature. This approach estimates much lower elasticity of output with respect to capital (around 0.20) for several East Asian countries, thus emphasizing even more the role of the residual (growth in TFP) in explaining growth.

Empirical Results

In this paper following the approach taken by De Broeck and Koen (2000)[3], the present accounting is done keeping the above Cobb Douglas

production function. It should be noted that this type of accounting relies on the assumption of the constant returns to scale production function. For simplicity the elasticities of output with respect to capital and labour are assumed to equal 0.3 and 0.7, respectively, and to be constant over time. Also the value of capital depreciation will be used in the calculation of the initial capital stock. In literature various values of the depreciation rate are used. Here we assume that rate of depreciation 0.05, which means that the full depreciation of a given capital unit takes place within 20 years. The choice of this value is based on estimates found in various pieces of research[4]. The computed changes in TFP should be interrupted as residuals that reflect a wide range of factors affecting the efficiency with which inputs are used.

The calculation results are summarized in Table-V, which reports average annual output, capital share, labour force share and residual total factor productivity of country Kazakhstan for the three phases: 1991-1999, 2000-2007and 2007-2014.

Table-V

Growth Accounting Results in Three Phases

Year	Output Growth	Capital Share*	Labor Share	TPF
1991 - 1999	-4.82	-5.87	-0.31	1.36
2000 - 2007	10.17	5.20	0.82	4.26
2008 - 2014	4.88	-0.13	1.19	3.84

Source: Results for different periods are obtained from own calculation using GDP, gross capital formation and total labor force data from the World Development Indicators.

**Annual depreciation rate is assumed to equal 0.5.*

During 1991-1999, the growth rate in production was negative, and declined by -4.82% per year. The major contributory factor in the collapse of output is attributed to drastic decline in rate of capital formation (-15.58%), by virtue of which capital stock share of output was recorded as -5.87 on an average. On the other hand, the labor force, another major factor of production, recorded almost a constant average growth rate (-0.005%) during this period and explains only a fall of -0.31 percent in its share of total collapse of output. Finally, the contribution of total factor productivity, on an average, in explaining the growth has remained positive and dominant with a share equal to 1.36 percent. We can see, therefore, that technology constituted the

"sheet-anchor" of the Kazakhstan economy during the period under investigation, since it kept the negative average annual rate of change in G.D.P. to only -4.82%, when a dramatic decline of the capital stock took place in the economy.

During second phase (2000-2008), the growth rate in production became positive but very high of the order 10.17 percent on an average. All the variables become positive. The capital stock contributed to this high GDP growth rate with a dominant share of 5.20 percent, while the share of labor made a contribution of only 0.82 percent. Finally, the annual average rate of change in T.F.P. during the period 2000-2007 was positive and equal to 4.26%. We can, therefore, conclude that capital and technology constituted the main driving force of the Kazakhstan economy during the second period. In third phase (2007-2014), growth rate once again declined and was 4.88 percent. The main reason of this decline was the negative contribution of capital stock. The capital stock contributed to this fall with a rate equal to -0.13 percent[5]. However, labor and technology contribution was positive and having values 1.19 percent and 3.84 percent respectively.

Conclusion

Soon after breakup from the erstwhile U.S.S.R. the Kazakhstan economy was shattered as reflected in the deterioration of its major macroeconomic indicators. Conditions were further aggravated due to embarking on the path of market economy from a system of central planning. The country found itself in a transformational recession that lasted for about more than seven years. However, it is evident from our analysis that the severity of the recession was somehow subdued by the role of total factor productivity (technology), under the conditions when there was serious collapse of investment. With the improvements in business climate due to progress made in establishing the foundations of free market economy by way of structural adjustments and stabilization policy, higher growth trajectories associated with sound macroeconomic indicators was experienced by the economy. As a result capital formation was on rise, which along with improvements in total factor productivity was responsible for sustained economic growth, especially during the second phase. However, this growth momentum seems to have slowed down in the recent past with the economy experiencing boom in the hydrocarbon sector. This has serious implications in the

sense that a lopsided growth may occur resulting into "dutch disease". For the balanced development of the economy it is, therefore, essential that measures are taken for improving productivity by diversification of the resources away from oil towards other sectors of the economy like agriculture, manufacturing and industry, enhancing the sector specific skills and education so that innovation, research and creativity can foster an environment of entrepreneurship leading to improvement in technological progress, finally leading to sustainable development.

References & Notes

1. *There could be various reasons assigned to existence of low unemployment rates alongside meltdown of production system like underestimation by official statistics, early retirement of the elderly as well as a decline in women's participation rates and above all privatization drive of SOEs was gradual and cautious retaining employment to ward off social crises. These reasons may be enough to explain why the collapse in production did not result in rapidly increasing unemployment.*
2. *There is certain limitation in using Cobb Douglas production as it is based on various assumptions. For a brief review of the model's theoretical limitations see Thirlwall (2001: 185-7.)*
3. *As for transition countries are concerned, De Broeck and Koen (2000) assumed shares of 0.3 for capital and 0.7 for labor. Loukoianova and Uigovskaya (2004) extended the period used by Broeck and Koen but using the same elasticities of output with respect to capital and labor for all transition countries.*
4. *Examples of such studies are Hern´andez and Maule´on (2003) for the economy of Spain, Cororaton (2002) for the Philippines, Felipe (1997) for a group of countries in East Asia, etc.*
5. *It is observed that during this period average growth rate of capital formation was 3.77 per cent compared to 10.17 per cent during the preceding period.*

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SIGNIFICANCE OF STONE BOWLS AND SADDLE QUERNS
A Case Study of Archaeological Sites in North-west Kashmir

Mumtaz A. Yatoo

Abstract

There is an intriguing material culture in stoneware i.e. stone bowls and saddle querns that were reported by the author from the early historic sites in a systematic transect survey of north-west Kashmir. This stoneware has previously been reported from only three places in Kashmir and roughly bracketed within a chronological date range of c. 1000 BCE to c. 3rd Century ACE. This stoneware was first reported from Megalithic phase at Gufkral. Till date there is very little work carried on this stoneware, however, similar material culture has been reported from few south Asian sites as well. In this paper an attempt has been made to analyse this intriguing material culture and put this in context with similar material from South Asia to understand its chronological significance.

Keywords

Material Culture, Chronological Order, Stoneware, Stone Bowls, Saddle Querns, North-west Kashmir, South Asia.

Description of Stoneware

Stone Bowls

The stone bowls were collected from nine sites (3.2, 4.5, 5.1, 6.5, 7.5, 8.4, 8.5, 9.4, and 15.1) in north-west Kashmir (Figs. 1&2). Two shades of Panjal trap (volcanic rock of which the Palaeolithic and the Neolithic stone tools were mostly made during the prehistoric period in Kashmir) were found in these stone bowls; one of purple and the other of green colour. These stone bowls are rimless, tapering towards the bottom (sometimes grooved at the bottom just above the base) with ring or disk bases. Such stone bowls have attracted very little attention of the archaeologists working in Kashmir. However, Shali considers them to be a prominent feature of the early historic period (Shali, 2001: 119). They were first reported from the Megalithic period (post Neolithic c. 1000 BCE to 1st century ACE) at Gufkral, and later these have been reported from Kushan period sites (1st to 5th century ACE) in south of Kashmir (Shali, 1993: 128). Similar stone bowls have also been

reported at earliest occupational layers at Martand (no date) (Lal, 1973: 13; Shali, 2001: 311) in Kashmir. Moreover, Converse (1978: 481), while exploring an early historic site on the outskirts of Srinagar in Kashmir, reported similar stone bowls. Alongside these stone bowls she found Kushan pottery and northern black polished ware (NBPW, c.500 BCE - 5th century ACE) associated with them. However, almost no analysis has been carried out on these stone bowls, and it is, therefore, very difficult to confidently suggest the purpose for which these stone bowls were made.

Fig. 1
Location of Study Sites



Fig. 2
Different Shades of Stone Bowls from New Sites in North-west Kashmir (Sites 5.1 and 8.5)

Photo: Mumtaz Yatoo 2017.

Like several pottery types, the shapes and designs of stone bowls continue from the early historic period onwards, as can be seen in the stone bowls found at two sites (7.4 and 9.5) in north-west Kashmir (Fig. 3). Typologically, these stone bowls look similar to those reported from the early historic period, but they were differentiated from the earlier ones on the basis of design, such as, etched impressions created by chiselling on their outer surface, with a smooth and fine textured interior. The design seems intended to give a pleasing look to the stone bowls and, therefore, may indicate an evolving appreciation of design. Although the origin of producing stone bowls dates to early historic period in Kashmir, their continued presence from two multi-period sites (early historic and later historic), indicates that the production of these stone vessels continued, albeit, with some modifications. However, their absence from key Kashmir sites or neighbouring regions obscures their precise archaeological context.

Fig. 3
Stones Bowls from New Sites in Kashmir (sites 7.4 and 9.5)

Photo: Mumtaz Yatoo 2017.

Saddle Querns

At four early historic sites, (1.1, 1.3, 4.3, and 9.2) saddle querns were collected (Fig. 3). These querns are made from basalt and sandstone rocks; basalt also known as trap rock or volcanic rock, while as sandstone is sedimentary rock. Similar types of querns have (earlier) been found from the Megalithic level at Burzahom and Gufkral, and the early historic site of Semthan. Sharma (1982; 2000) and Agrawal (1998) described these as tools used within a subsistence economy. Stacul reported querns or mullers for the first time at Kalako-deray from period IV in Swat c. 1700 – 1300 BCE. However, he says that true saddle querns occur at Aligrama in periods VI and VII (6th to 4th century BCE) (Stacul 1994b: 235). Typologically, the saddle querns collected in north west Kashmir look similar to those reported by Stacul and Tusa at Aligrama. Parallels of these tools can also be found at Chalcolithic cultures (1500 to 700 BCE) at Ahar at Rajasthan, and at Malwa and Kayatha in Madhya Pradesh, in India (Misra 2001: 513-516).

Fig. 4
Saddle Querns from New Sites in North-west Kashmir (1.1 and 9.2)

Photo: Mumtaz Yatoo 2017.

Analysis and Interpretation of Stoneware Material Culture: Kashmir and South Asia

Stoneware collected from the new sites in north-west Kashmir were first reported from the post-Neolithic phase (Megalithic period) c. 1000 to 3rd Century BCE at Gufkral, and later on reported at three other early historic sites. At Srinagar (one of the three early historic sites), it is associated with NBPW and Kushan period pottery (c. 7th century BCE to 1st century ACE) (Converse 1978); at Martand temple stone bowls have been found from its earliest habitational layer (no chronological date is given; however the temple itself is dated to c. 750 ACE, (Lal 1973; Shali 2001); and at the third site (somewhere in south Kashmir), these

are found with Kushan material culture (1st to 3rd century ACE) (Shali 1993). Except at Gufkral, there is no evidence yet that can suggest that this stoneware is associated with Megaliths or the Megalithic period. Similarly, except the Srinagar site (Converse, 1978), Martand temple (Lal, 1973; Shali 2001) and the south Kashmir site (Shali, 1993). There is also no evidence of this stoneware from key sites such as Harwan, Kanispora or Semthan, and very limited comparable types have been reported elsewhere in South Asia. Moreover, no NBPW pottery (which Converse (1978: 481) found along with stone bowls from a Srinagar site) was recovered during the present survey at any of the early historic sites where these bowls were found in north-west Kashmir.

The wide distribution of these stone implements during the early historic period in north-west Kashmir seems to indicate that this stoneware might have remained in production from c. 1000 BC to c. 3rd century ACE at the new sites in north-west Kashmir. The period between c. 1000 BC to 200 BC is the 'missing' chronological period in north-west Kashmir, which is the period corresponding to the Iron Age elsewhere in South Asia (Yatoo, 2012; 2015). The chronological dates assigned to this stone ware at sites such as Gufkral (c. 1000 BCE) or at Srinagar site (c. 7th century BCE to 1st century ACE) or at south Kashmir (1st to 3rd century ACE), indicate they probably belong to period between c. 1000 BCE to c. 3rd century ACE; hence roughly corresponding to the chronological period, thought to be missing in north-west Kashmir (Yatoo, 2015).

Discussion

The presence of two distinct types of material cultures: stone bowls and saddle querns reported at the early historic sites, suggest that they might be part of the Iron Age material culture in north west Kashmir. While Stacul (1979; 2001) unambiguously related saddle querns to iron metallurgy, there is no study on stone bowls yet. Stone bowls were found at nine new early historic sites, of which two also contain slag, and saddle querns were recorded at four new sites and interestingly one contained both a saddle quern and slag in north-west Kashmir. Stone bowls have been reported at Gufkral around c. 1000 BCE when the iron artefacts were reported there. The saddle querns are reported at Aligrama, Swat during periods VI and VII (6th to 4th century BCE). Stacul (1979: 341; 2001: 244) stated that period VII of Swat is represented by

iron metallurgy with the introduction of saddle querns and new pottery types. The absence of saddle querns from key early historic sites in Kashmir is perplexing though, and it is, therefore, not yet clear whether these saddle querns reported in north-west Kashmir have anything to do with Iron Age material culture or they might be material from two distinct cultures at north-west Kashmir.

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RESOURCE GEO-POLITICS IN CENTRAL ASIA
From Conflict to Cooperation

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Abstract
Within the frontiers of Political Geography, the Locational Benefit Concept (LBC) which is emerging as a cause of disputes, can be converted into a conflict resolution measure as well. Due to the growing awareness of this concept, particularly, after the disintegration of erstwhile Soviet Union, which changed the nature of regional problems from domestic to international issues within Central Asian Republics (C.A.R.s), the Mountainous and Non-mountainous sub-regions have repulsed some ugly developments over resource-sharing, especially, in case of hydrocarbon and water resources. The Mountainous sub-region comprising Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, are water-rich states accounting almost 80 percent of the regional water resources, originating from glaciers mostly located in Tienshan and Pamir mountains as compared to three lower riparian states including Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan which are water-deficit but energy-rich states abounding in Hydrocarbons i.e. oil and gas. Although the spatial variation in resources is a natural phenomena, but the nature of resource distribution in the study region is so unequal that the two sub-regions cannot sustain, not to talk of their balanced and sustainable development without regional cooperation for developing a proper resource-sharing mechanism. This strong argument has led to some arbitrations, agreements etc. whereby, the lower riparians receive required water flow at the required times from upper riparians in exchange of Hydrocarbon supply on subsidized rates. But some of the agreements have failed, some are in pipeline and there always remains a threat of such agreements failing any time. So there is an urgent need of developing a proper resource-sharing mechanism between the two sub-regions in order to avoid the potential conflicts on resource-sharing as well as, simultaneously, to have a sustained development for both the sub-regions. The main aim of this paper, therefore, is to analyse the regional resource inequalities leading to high order interdependence in the study region, particularly, between the two sub-physical regions, which has led to almost a water war in the region and to explore the possibilities for converting this potential conflict into regional cooperation by way of devising a viable resource-sharing mechanism.

Keywords
Resource Management, Conflict Resolution, Locational Benefit, Geo-Politics, Regional Cooperation, Regional Interdependence, Resource Imbalance, Water Deficit States, Energy Surplus Countries.

Introduction

Hydrocarbon and water resources are perhaps today the most dominating resources effecting both geo-economy and geo-polity of the world.[1] While civilizations bloomed around rivers, energy resources converted them into modern developed hi-tech societies. Water is the most essential and basic resource for the sustenance of life on earth, yet, more than half of humanity continues to live in water-stressed conditions. And now, with unprecedented economic and demographic expansion and soaring water consumption, our shrinking freshwater is getting increasingly laced with toxic substances discharged from industries and human habitations. Apart from our everyday needs, water supports biodiversity and ecosystems. But unfortunately, the 20th century turned out to be the most dangerous century as far as the management of resources, in general, and water, in particular, is concerned. Climate change is now accepted as a primary threat to the world's low-lying regions making them vulnerable to submerge, forcing people to migrate who will, in turn, bring their new habitats under further resource stress and exacerbate existing ethnic, sectarian or political tensions. Water insecurity not just triggers political instability but corrodes social fabric and peace forever.

Population growth has always been and will remain one of the key drivers of energy demand, alongwith economic and social development. While global population has increased by over 1.5 billion over the past two decades, the overall rate of population growth has been slowing down. The number of people without access to commercial energy has reduced slightly, and the latest estimate from the World Bank indicates that it is 1.2 billion people. Looking ahead, the global population growing from 7 billion to 9 billion over the next 25 years will make the challenge of meeting demands for both water and energy more acute. Currently, more than 650 million people lack access to clean water, and a billion do not have electricity. Distribution of resources over space, their sustainable utilization and proper sharing mechanism form one of the important components of Resource Geography. With growing population, climate change and intensive use of technology these resources are coming under unprecedental levels of stress, hence making collaborative management of these resources inevitable for us. Different states of the world have reacted to contain this problem within and across their borders, thereby, giving new dimensions to geopolitics of their respective regions. Although spatial variations in resource

distribution is a natural phenomenon, but the intensity of unequal resource distribution in Central Asian Republics (CARs) is highly uneven. The two major regional resources i.e. hydrocarbon and water are so unevenly distributed between two geo-physical regions that one region can't sustain without the other, thus intensifying the scenario of regional interdependence.

Background

Even though Central Asia is rich in water and hydrocarbon resources, the uneven spatial distribution and complex pattern of these resources with contrasting national needs have created an intricate resource dilemma in the region. Increasing national needs, claims by surrounding countries, uncertainties in renewable water volumes and energy development, and effects of climate change will put further strain on the future use of water and hydrocarbon resources in Central Asia. This situation is decisively influencing interregional relations, which are determined by the different capacities of each country to access these resources, and the varying degrees of priority they accord to resource uses. As a result of this situation, countries in the region may be classified into two broad sub-regions:

Fig. 1

Central Asia - Hydrocarbon and Water Resource



Source: Prepared by the author using Arc GIS 10.2.

Mountainous (Upper Riparian): Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, having major water surpluses, but almost devoid of hydrocarbon resources.

Non Mountainous (Lower Riparian): Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan which have sufficient hydrocarbon reserves but depend on Upper riparians for water supplies.

Spatial Distribution of Hydrocarbon Resources

Hydrocarbon resources are the most valuable as well as the most widely used source of energy in the world whose possession gives to its owner's greater economic returns than almost any other mineral. The largest of the world's traded oil comes from the Gulf countries[2] and for a brief period in the 1970s this group, consisting principally of the Arab oil states of the Middle East, came closer to bringing about a real change in international economic relations than has any other group or organisation before or since that time. Central Asia possesses a significant and diversified hydrocarbon resource base, although they are unevenly spread throughout the region. Apart from vast volumes of proven recoverable resources of hydrocarbon raw materials, the region has huge hydro-power capacity, large deposits of uranium, and favorable conditions for the development of non-conventional renewable energy. The share of Central Asia in the world energy markets is substantial.

Table-I

Total Proved Reserves of Oil and Gas in Lower Riparian Sub-region

Year	Kazakhstan		Uzbekistan		Turkmenistan	
	Oil (Thousand Million Barrels)	**Gas** (Trillion Cubic Meters)	**Oil** (Thousand Million Barrels)	**Gas** (Trillion Cubic Meters)	**Oil** (Thousand Million Barrels)	**Gas** (Trillion Cubic Meters)
1995	5.3	NA	0.3	NA	0.5	NA
2005	9.0	1.3	0.6	1.2	0.5	2.3
2015	30.0	0.9	0.6	1.1	0.6	17.5

Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy-2016.

Oil and Gas

Central Asia and the Caucasus are considered by many to be the next oil and gas frontier. A large part of proven recoverable coal and oil reserves are found in Kazakhstan, while Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are the best endowed in hydropower, with natural gas reserves more evenly divided between Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. In 1990s Central Asia came to forefront as an emerging destination for crude oil.

The estimates for reserves in the region varied widely, depending on the source publishing them. This range of different figures stemmed from fierce competition between the major oil companies which were probably increasing or diminishing the real amount of reserves depending on their own corporate interests. Some publications called the region a second Persian Gulf[3], although today the figures evidence a very different reality. Proved crude oil reserves total around 40 billion barrels, a very far cry from the reserves in other regions. Based on the regional classification of the *BP Statistical Review of World Energy* 2016, the region ranks sixth in the world, with figures comparable to those of Asia-Pacific and well below other regions. Based on the *BP Statistical Review*, Central Asian reserves currently account for 3.2 percent of total worldwide reserves and 1.2 percent of current global production. Overall, crude oil reserves and production in Central Asia are not very significant, and do not, therefore, play a pivotal role in international energy markets. However, crude oil reserves, because of their location close to large centers of consumption such as Europe, China and India, do have a significant geo-strategic value.

Coal

Coal is the most plentiful hydrocarbon on the planet. It is also the most widely distributed, and is likely to remain so for years to come. Coal powered the industrial revolution, and is helping power to the growth of many developing nations today. Found throughout Central Asia, it is used to supply electrical power and as local fuel for cooking and heating. It is exported in small quantities as well. Regional coal production declined significantly in the years following the Soviet break-up. Since Soviet times, coal in Central Asian republics has been used to fuel massive electrical production stations and given its relatively high volume and low cost, coal is unlikely to become an export source of revenue in the near future. In Central Asia, coal powers power stations, not only providing energy to local inhabitants but also frees up more valuable natural gas and oil assets to sell abroad in an era of record-high energy prices. Combined with the relatively low value and high volume of coal exports, geography and distance have largely locked Central Asia's coal assets into the regional market.

Of Central Asia's coal markets, Kazakhstan, as with oil exports, is the regional giant and the number nine producer in the world, it is also the 10th largest global exporter, leading the region with an estimated

34.5 billion short tons of recoverable coal reserves, located primarily in the major coal fields in Bogatyr and Severny, with exports primarily directed to the Russian Federation, followed by Ukraine. As with most gigantic projects dating from the Soviet period, Kazakhstan's Bogatyr Access Komir Co. produces approximately 35 percent of Kazakh coal output. Since independence, Turkmenistan has virtually ceased coal production, with its energy plants now being solely powered by thermal sources. Again, like Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan is seeking to export electrical energy surpluses to neighboring countries. Kyrgyzstan's coal-mining industry produces about 250,000 tons per year, but the nation remains primarily dependent on hydroelectric power. During the Soviet period, many Tajik enterprises were coal-fired. Coal in Tajikistan comes from the country's 18 mines, making it one of the country's cheapest energy resources. In 2015 estimated output was 100,000 tons, a dramatic decline from the Soviet period, when Tajikistan's Shurob facility alone produced 600,000 tons annually[4]. Many Tajik economists argue that reviving the use of coal for power generation would free up electrical assets for export, particularly, to energy-starved neighboring Afghanistan. Although coal's bulk and low value largely preclude exports, many foreign companies are seeking to invest in regional Central Asian supplies to proposed power projects. Central Asian coal provides domestic electrical production, while freeing up more valuable natural gas and oil production for export. In the meantime, coal provides Central Asians with the most important industrial energy source of the present century, i.e. electricity.

Table-II
Total Oil and Gas Proved Reserves and Production in Upper Riparian Sub-region (2015)

Country	Proved Reserves		Production	
	Oil (Million barrels)	**Gas** (Billion Cubic Meters)	**Oil** (Barrels per day)	**Gas** (Million Cubic Meters)
Kyrgyzstan	40	5.633	1000	12.5
Tajikistan	12	5.633	181.6	40

Source: C.I.A., World Fact Book-2016.

Spatial Distribution of Water Resources

Although Central Asia, in general, is water-rich, however, it is unevenly distributed. The major parts of Central Asia are strongly continental

semi-arid to arid with a general shortage of freshwater. Mean annual country wide precipitation is 273 mm – varying from 161 mm in Turkmenistan to 691 mm in Tajikistan. Kazakhstan, which is by far the largest country, receives an average annual precipitation of about 250 mm[5]. In general, the steppes and deserts receive less than 70 mm per year and the mountainous areas of Tajikistan can receive up to 2400 mm per year. Annual potential evaporation varies from above 2250 mm in the arid region to less than 500 mm in the mountainous areas[6]. Groundwater resources in Central Asia are generally stated to constitute about 10 to 15 percent of the surface water resources. However, there are great spatial variation throughout Central Asia as well as great needs to better quantify volumes and quality of sub-surface water.

Fig. 2



Source: Diagnostic Report on Water Resources in Central Asia, ICWC, 2000.

Water resources in Central Asia are predominantly transboundary in nature. Most of the region's surface water resources are generated in the mountains in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. These waters flow into the two main rivers to countries downstream – Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan – which are a part of the Aral Sea Basin. Water resources are critically important to the region's economy, its people, and the environment. Irrigation, for example, is vital for agricultural production and most of the population of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan depend directly or indirectly on irrigated agriculture. Water

is also important for energy production – hydropower energy satisfies more than 90 percent of the total electricity needs in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and is also an export commodity.[7] The competing demands of agriculture in downstream countries and hydropower generation in upstream countries fuel serious political disputes in the region, putting water as a strategic tool for regional security and stability.

Resource Management

Water is particularly important for Central Asia as it is heavily used in irrigation for farming and as a source of electricity production. Water is an essential resource for the economy and for social stability in Central Asia: with the fact that 60 percent of the population of the former Soviet republics in Central Asia live in rural areas and 45 percent of the workforce is employed in agriculture, its management becomes obvious and prioritized. The only country that appears to be less dependent upon this sector is Kazakhstan. Just 8 percent of its GDP comes from agriculture, although this 8 percent employs no less than 33 percent of the country's active population. More than 80 percent of the cultivated land in Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan is productive thanks to irrigation; the exception is Kazakhstan, where only 7 percent of cultivable land is irrigated. Energy security and food security are, therefore, tied up to water issues. While none of the five states is known for fish consumption, the ecological dimension of water management has gained an additional edge due to pollution and climate change, which threaten several water systems, including those that cross international boundaries. The Amu Darya River flows from the Afghan-Tajik border through Turkmenistan into Uzbekistan and the Syr Darya crosses Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Both rivers used to flow into the Aral Sea but their over-exploitation – for irrigation through the construction of canals in the Soviet period, as well as for hydroelectricity, has contributed to the depletion of most of the sea's water. Now neither river extends as far as the Aral Sea. While the steady evaporation of the Aral Sea has slowed down, in part as a result of policies implemented under the 1995 Nukus Declaration, the long-term environmental consequences of this catastrophe are still hard to comprehend.[8]

The international political dimension of water in Central Asia is further aggravated by the division of the region into upstream and

downstream countries. The upstream states – Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, possess most of the region's water resources, while the downstream states – Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, are largely dependent on the former's water provision. Divisions are further complicated by the fact that the two upstream states use water for hydroelectricity, while the downstream states that possess alternative energy resources need water predominantly for irrigation. Soviet-era policies had overcome these divisions by establishing a regional circuit for the distribution of water and other energy resources, such as, fossil-fuel based electricity. This was centrally administered from Moscow. In the post-Soviet context, however, the Central Asian states have decentralised the management of resources, in terms not only of the supply of water for agriculture and human consumption, but also regarding the crucial question of energy provision. Recent inter-state disagreements illustrate how difficult it is to coordinate the use of resources. Hydropower programmes in upstream countries affect water irrigation in downstream countries, giving rise to cross-border tensions. Uzbekistan has been strongly resisting the construction of the Rogun Dam in Tajikistan, which would give Tajikistan increased control over water flows to its northern neighbour and could potentially have negative effects on Uzbekistan's irrigation of cotton fields. Meanwhile, at the more local level, the pollution of rivers has caused tensions with users downstream. Kyrgyz and Kazakhstani cooperation on cross-border waters temporarily deteriorated after the Kyrgyz crisis in 2010, and in spite of subsequent agreements between the two governments, water disputes continue to flare up from time to time. In spite of their geographical proximity and common interests, the five Central Asian states have persistently failed to act as a region.

In addition to competing interests, such as in the energy sector, personal rivalries and dislikes among the presidents of the republics seem to underlie the lack of cooperation. Uzbekistan's current isolation, both internationally and regionally following border disputes with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, poses particular difficulties given its location at the centre of the region's water networks. Due to the Soviet legacy, the Central Asian water sector is inefficiently managed both ecologically and administratively. The so-called Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) aims to correct this. It is a holistic international approach to sustainable water management that attempts 'to balance the water accounts between man and the biosphere so that the human needs

are met with minimal harmful effects to the biosphere as well as to other human beings.'[9] Such a goal would be difficult to achieve in most contexts; in Central Asia there are several unique challenges that make implementation of the IWRM all the more difficult there. For example, one general challenge is that 'authorities for water management and environmental protection are separate'[10]**.** There is a need to reform water-related legislation. Many technical problems associated with an outdated Soviet infrastructure hamper water management – for instance, low irrigation efficiency or degradation of water supply systems and sewage treatment plants. Per capita water consumption in Central Asia is among the highest in the world.[11] In particular, irrigation-intensive agriculture and a growing urban population are using up significant amounts of Central Asian water resources.[12] The interdependence of water with other ecological challenges, such as the accumulation of salts and pesticides in Central Asian soils,[13] means that the broader environmental legacies are aggravating water management practices. Climate change may also reduce the region's available water resources, a scenario which the Kazakhstani authorities, in particular, have been examining lately.

Central Asian water and hydrocarbon resources and their management is a key policy area for the governments of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, as well as for international donors. However, a genuinely regional approach to resource management is still lacking. The range of issues and approaches involved, the multitude of donors, and the lack of cooperation among Central Asian governments and the other stakeholders make coordination in this area a complex challenge.

Regional Interdependence

Despite their geographical proximity and common interests, the five Central Asian Republics (CARs) have persistently failed to act as a region. The CARs inherited from the Soviet Union a fragmented network of resource production, transit routes and management mechanism. Upon independence, energy production and transit were controlled by some states while, water allocation by other states, resulting in disagreements over access to international markets, transit fees and allocation rights. Today, the independent Central Asian states still have divergent conflicting interests and priorities. However, despite of the

unquestionable tension that surrounds its delimitation, the Central Asian Region has not yet witnessed any large scale interstate conflict and there are no immediate expectations that this will change. As the landlocked Central Asian states are highly interdependent on each other they will remain so, owing their dependence on their neighbors' transportation channels to bring resources to the market, and owing to the trans-boundary waters flowing through different states. While the upper mountainous states of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are water rich but they lack hydrocarbon resources (Energy Resources) and the opposite situation is depicted by other geo-physical region comprising of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, which is somehow non-mountainous and is water- deficit but hydrocarbon resources are enormously found. This situation creates a scenario of inevitable regional interdependence in terms of resource sharing, management and utilization.

Both international and national actors involved in resource-related programmes in Central Asia agree that regional coordination efforts are needed, notably for managing cross-border rivers linking the Central Asian states. In 2004, experts from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan produced a regional water and energy strategy[14] within the framework of the United Nations Special Programme for the Economies of Central Asia (SPECA) working group on energy and water resources. The strategy was one of the first documents to clearly make links between water and energy issues and to make an attempt to balance upstream and downstream interests. Due to unresolved political issues and the lack of finances, only restricted components of this strategy are so far being implemented in the SPECA programme of work on water and energy. When it comes to the major problems on the Amu Darya and Syr Darya, the influence of international projects and organizations has been minimal. The international organizations have not been able to be very influential as brokers at the political level.

Resource Cooperation

At the disassembly of the USSR, the Central Asian states entered into a five-state compact to continue in force Soviet-era water policies and allocation practices for the time being, in order to avoid short-term dislocations. This initial decision to retain the Soviet status-quo was followed by a number of proclamations by the states about water

reform, including the 1993 Tashkent Heads of State Decision (creating the International Fund for the Aral Sea), the 1993 Kzyl-Orda Agreement (creating the Interstate Council for the Aral Sea), the 1995 Nukus Declaration (pledging the states to fulfill all water agreements existing between them), the 1997 Almaty Declaration (pledging the states to create an International Convention for the Sustainable Development of the Aral Sea Basin), and the 1999 Ashgabad Declaration (urging more international attention to the region). Beyond these vague regional agreements, 1995 and later river-specific agreements also exist, especially for the Syrdarya. These include roughly yearly agreements between the Syrdarya riparians on allocations of both water and energy, as well as the 1998-2003 Syrdarya Framework Agreement, which purports to be founded in the states' "common desire to find a fully complete and equitable resolution of the utilization of the water and energy resources of the Syrdarya Basin in accordance with the norms of international law." These agreements all involve efforts to balance upstream state needs for energy with downstream state needs for water. While these agreements have produced more open dialogue, they have not removed conflict. Public allegations of breached duties are now among the most common of disputes among the states. However, while these agreements have not been effective, they have not worsened the situation in the region. Rather, they have focused attention on the seriousness of the disagreements between the states and forced the states more fully to realize the complexity of their resource allocation problems. Thus, increased short-term tension may be the price of convincing the states to resolve issues that otherwise would explode into open and unmanageable conflict in the longer term. There are several organizations involved in the development of water cooperation in the region.

The International Fund for the Saving of the Aral Sea (IFAS) founded by the Central Asian Presidents, is the only cooperative structure that includes all five countries. It is a well-established structure with branches in each member country, and enjoys the political support at the highest level as the President of each member country serves in turn as Chairman of the body. IFAS provides all its officials with diplomatic privileges and its funding comes from the national budgets of the participating countries. The member countries have pledged to allocate a proportion of their respective GDP to IFAS. Although the Presidents

of Central Asia are representing their respective countries in IFAS, the organization has not been an efficient structure for cooperation. The International Commission for Water Coordination (ICWC), formally under IFAS, is an important structure for the resolution of operational water distribution issues on the Amu Darya and Syr Darya under the 1992 Agreement. Only water authorities are represented in ICWC, making it difficult to apply an intersectoral approach for cooperation involving, in addition to irrigation, energy and protection of ecosystems. This is also a hindrance to implementing its principal task – enforcing the implementation of water allocation in compliance with the 1992 Agreement and preparing new rules and procedures for sharing the waters of the transboundary rivers in Central Asia.

Gradually and steadily, the Central Asian states vocally repudiate harmful orientations of the USSR, embrace multilateral environmental conventions, and have taken some strong steps towards resolving some longstanding resource disputes. In early 2002, Kazakhstan's legislature ratified a treaty establishing a regime with Kyrgyzstan whereby Kazakhstan will pay several hundred thousand dollars per year to Kyrgyzstan in order to defray Kyrgyzstan's costs in maintaining water control installations on the economically important Chu and Talas rivers[15], both of which flow from Kyrgyzstan into Kazakhstan and are outside the Aral Sea basin. Almost at the same time, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan signed an Agreement for Cooperation in the Rational Use of Water and Energy Resources in 2002[16]. These achievements lend credence to the promise of the Central Asian states to the international community that they will pioneer binding resource management agreements to foster regional cooperation for sustainable development.

Conclusion

The water and energy ties that evolved between Central Asian Republics over last quarter century, the comparable basic levels of their economic development, their mutual interest in achieving optimum water use, and the interdependence between this problem and that of energy supply – all call for a sound and effective approach to the use of hydrocarbon and water resources based on reinforced regional integration. The varying degree of availability of hydrocarbon and water resources and their uneven distribution across Central Asia make it imperative that the countries of the region cooperate in improving their trade in, and

exchange of, such resources within the region. Most of the regional trade in water resources and energy is in the form of exchange where water resources for irrigation and hydropower from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are bartered for fuel and power from other republics. Integration of Central Asian Republics in the sphere of resources and regionalization of their resource markets will enhance intra-regional resource security and efficiency of the sustainable management of hydrocarbon and water resources. Moreover, the intensity of Locational Benefit Concept (LBC) if not reduced, needs to be rationalized by way of taking into cognizance the stakes of both the sub-regions.

References & Notes

1 Hydrocarbon resources are resources that contain hydrocarbon molecules – molecules consisting of both hydrogen and carbon. Such resources are often known as fossil fuel resources as hydrocarbons are the primary constituents of natural gas, oil, and coal. Hydrocarbon resources are the largest source of primary energy, contributing to over 85 percent of the world's energy.

2 Eight nations namely Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates having coasts along the Persian Gulf are termed as Gulf Countries.

3 The Persian Gulf is a Mediterranean sea in Western Asia. The body of water is an extension of the Indian Ocean through the Strait of Hormuz and lies between Iran to the northeast and the Arabian Peninsula to the southwest.

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